Provided by: libssl-doc_1.1.0g-2ubuntu4_all bug


       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
       SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, SSL_verify_cb - set peer certificate
       verification parameters


        #include <openssl/ssl.h>

        void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
        void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);

        void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
        void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);

        typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);


       SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ctx to be mode and specifies the
       verify_callback function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL
       pointer can be used for verify_callback.

       SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ssl to be mode and specifies the
       verify_callback function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL
       pointer can be used for verify_callback. In this case last verify_callback set
       specifically for this ssl remains. If no special callback was set before, the default
       callback for the underlying ctx is used, that was valid at the time ssl was created with
       SSL_new(3). Within the callback function, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx can be called
       to get the data index of the current SSL object that is doing the verification.

       SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the certificate chain verification
       that shall be allowed for ctx.

       SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the certificate chain verification that
       shall be allowed for ssl.


       The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically or'ed mode flags:

           Server mode: the server will not send a client certificate request to the client, so
           the client will not send a certificate.

           Client mode: if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the server will
           send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the certificate verification
           process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake using the SSL_get_verify_result(3)
           function.  The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.

           Server mode: the server sends a client certificate request to the client.  The
           certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process fails, the
           TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the
           reason for the verification failure.  The behaviour can be controlled by the

           Client mode: the server certificate is verified. If the verification process fails,
           the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the
           reason for the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an
           anonymous cipher is used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored.

           Server mode: if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL handshake is
           immediately terminated with a "handshake failure" alert.  This flag must be used
           together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.

           Client mode: ignored

           Server mode: only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do
           not ask for a client certificate again in case of a renegotiation. This flag must be
           used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.

           Client mode: ignored

       If the mode is SSL_VERIFY_NONE none of the other flags may be set.

       The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in verification
       procedure or using another application provided verification function set with
       SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3).  The following descriptions apply in the case of the
       built-in procedure. An application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth
       information and the verify_callback() function, but the way this information is used may
       be different.

       SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set a limit on the number of
       certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates.  Neither the end-entity
       nor the trust-anchor certificates count against depth. If the certificate chain needed to
       reach a trusted issuer is longer than depth+2, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be
       issued.  The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA certificate", "level
       2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum depth to 2 allows the
       levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the trust-anchor).  The default depth
       limit is 100, allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate CA certificates
       and a final trust anchor certificate.

       The verify_callback function is used to control the behaviour when the SSL_VERIFY_PEER
       flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and receives two arguments:
       preverify_ok indicates, whether the verification of the certificate in question was passed
       (preverify_ok=1) or not (preverify_ok=0). x509_ctx is a pointer to the complete context
       used for the certificate chain verification.

       The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level (the root CA
       certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate.  At each level signatures and
       issuer attributes are checked. Whenever a verification error is found, the error number is
       stored in x509_ctx and verify_callback is called with preverify_ok=0. By applying
       X509_CTX_store_* functions verify_callback can locate the certificate in question and
       perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES). If no error is found for a certificate,
       verify_callback is called with preverify_ok=1 before advancing to the next level.

       The return value of verify_callback controls the strategy of the further verification
       process. If verify_callback returns 0, the verification process is immediately stopped
       with "verification failed" state. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert
       is sent to the peer and the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If verify_callback returns 1,
       the verification process is continued. If verify_callback always returns 1, the TLS/SSL
       handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification failures and the connection
       will be established. The calling process can however retrieve the error code of the last
       verification error using SSL_get_verify_result(3) or by maintaining its own error storage
       managed by verify_callback.

       If no verify_callback is specified, the default callback will be used.  Its return value
       is identical to preverify_ok, so that any verification failure will lead to a termination
       of the TLS/SSL handshake with an alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.


       In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set, but whether any
       flags are set. This can lead to unexpected behaviour if SSL_VERIFY_PEER and other flags
       are not used as required.


       The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information.


       The following code sequence realizes an example verify_callback function that will always
       continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification failure, if wished. The callback
       realizes a verification depth limit with more informational output.

       All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain is printed on
       request.  The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client

       The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data into/retrieve
       application data from the SSL structure (see CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3),

        typedef struct {
          int verbose_mode;
          int verify_depth;
          int always_continue;
        } mydata_t;
        int mydata_index;
        static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
           char    buf[256];
           X509   *err_cert;
           int     err, depth;
           SSL    *ssl;
           mydata_t *mydata;

           err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
           err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
           depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);

            * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
            * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
           ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
           mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);

           X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);

            * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
            * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
            * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
            * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
            * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
            * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
            * additional certificates would be logged.
           if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
               preverify_ok = 0;
               err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
               X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
           if (!preverify_ok) {
               printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err,
                        X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
           else if (mydata->verbose_mode)
               printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf);

            * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
            * it for something special
           if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT))
             X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
             printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);

           if (mydata->always_continue)
             return 1;
             return preverify_ok;

        mydata_t mydata;

        mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);


         * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
         * an appropriate error in the logfile.
        SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);

         * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
         * structure.
        mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
        SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);

        SSL_accept(ssl);       /* check of success left out for clarity */
        if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))
          if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK)
            /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */


       ssl(7), SSL_new(3), SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3), SSL_get_verify_result(3),
       SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3), SSL_get_peer_certificate(3),
       SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3), SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3),


       Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use this file except in
       compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source
       distribution or at <>.