Provided by: systemd_248.3-1ubuntu8_amd64 bug

NAME

       systemd-cryptenroll - Enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2, TPM2 token/devices to LUKS2 encrypted volumes

SYNOPSIS

       systemd-cryptenroll [OPTIONS...] [DEVICE]

DESCRIPTION

       systemd-cryptenroll is a tool for enrolling hardware security tokens and devices into a
       LUKS2 encrypted volume, which may then be used to unlock the volume during boot.
       Specifically, it supports tokens and credentials of the following kind to be enrolled:

        1. PKCS#11 security tokens and smartcards that may carry an RSA key pair (e.g. various
           YubiKeys)

        2. FIDO2 security tokens that implement the "hmac-secret" extension (most FIDO2 keys,
           including YubiKeys)

        3. TPM2 security devices

        4. Recovery keys. These are similar to regular passphrases, however are randomly
           generated on the computer and thus generally have higher entropy than user chosen
           passphrases. Their character set has been designed to ensure they are easy to type in,
           while having high entropy. They may also be scanned off screen using QR codes.
           Recovery keys may be used for unlocking LUKS2 volumes wherever passphrases are
           accepted. They are intended to be used in combination with an enrolled hardware
           security token, as a recovery option when the token is lost.

        5. Regular passphrases

       In addition, the tool may be used to enumerate currently enrolled security tokens and wipe
       a subset of them. The latter may be combined with the enrollment operation of a new
       security token, in order to update or replace enrollments.

       The tool supports only LUKS2 volumes, as it stores token meta-information in the LUKS2
       JSON token area, which is not available in other encryption formats.

OPTIONS

       The following options are understood:

       --password
           Enroll a regular password/passphrase. This command is mostly equivalent to cryptsetup
           luksAddKey, however may be combined with --wipe-slot= in one call, see below.

       --recovery-key
           Enroll a recovery key. Recovery keys are most identical to passphrases, but are
           computer generated instead of human chosen, and thus have a guaranteed high entropy.
           The key uses a character set that is easy to type in, and may be scanned off screen
           via a QR code.

       --pkcs11-token-uri=URI
           Enroll a PKCS#11 security token or smartcard (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a PKCS#11 smart
           card URI referring to the token. Alternatively the special value "auto" may be
           specified, in order to automatically determine the URI of a currently plugged in
           security token (of which there must be exactly one). The special value "list" may be
           used to enumerate all suitable PKCS#11 tokens currently plugged in. The security token
           must contain an RSA key pair which is used to encrypt the randomly generated key that
           is used to unlock the LUKS2 volume. The encrypted key is then stored in the LUKS2 JSON
           token header area.

           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled PKCS#11 security token, specify the
           pkcs11-uri= option in the respective /etc/crypttab line:

               myvolume /dev/sda1 - pkcs11-uri=auto

           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation
           and its matching /etc/crypttab line.

       --fido2-device=PATH
           Enroll a FIDO2 security token that implements the "hmac-secret" extension (e.g. a
           YubiKey). Expects a hidraw device referring to the FIDO2 device (e.g.  /dev/hidraw1).
           Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in order to automatically
           determine the device node of a currently plugged in security token (of which there
           must be exactly one). The special value "list" may be used to enumerate all suitable
           FIDO2 tokens currently plugged in. Note that many hardware security tokens that
           implement FIDO2 also implement the older PKCS#11 standard. Typically FIDO2 is
           preferable, given it's simpler to use and more modern.

           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled FIDO2 security token, specify the
           fido2-device= option in the respective /etc/crypttab line:

               myvolume /dev/sda1 - fido2-device=auto

           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation
           and its matching /etc/crypttab line.

       --tpm2-device=PATH
           Enroll a TPM2 security chip. Expects a device node path referring to the TPM2 chip
           (e.g.  /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively the special value "auto" may be specified, in order
           to automatically determine the device node of a currently discovered TPM2 device (of
           which there must be exactly one). The special value "list" may be used to enumerate
           all suitable TPM2 devices currently discovered.

           In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled TPM2 security chip, specify the
           tpm2-device= option in the respective /etc/crypttab line:

               myvolume /dev/sda1 - tpm2-device=auto

           See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation
           and its matching /etc/crypttab line.

           Use --tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure which TPM2 PCR indexes to bind the
           enrollment to.

       --tpm2-pcrs= [PCR...]
           Configures the TPM2 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) to bind the enrollment
           requested via --tpm2-device= to. Takes a comma separated list of numeric PCR indexes
           in the range 0...23. If not used, defaults to PCR 7 only. If an empty string is
           specified, binds the enrollment to no PCRs at all. PCRs allow binding the enrollment
           to specific software versions and system state, so that the enrolled unlocking key is
           only accessible (may be "unsealed") if specific trusted software and/or configuration
           is used.

           Table 1. Well-known PCR Definitions
           ┌────┬──────────────────────────────────┐
           │PCRExplanation                      │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │0   │ Core system firmware executable  │
           │    │ code; changes on firmware        │
           │    │ updates                          │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │1   │ Core system firmware data/host   │
           │    │ platform configuration;          │
           │    │ typically contains serial and    │
           │    │ model numbers, changes on basic  │
           │    │ hardware/CPU/RAM replacements    │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │2   │ Extended or pluggable executable │
           │    │ code; includes option ROMs on    │
           │    │ pluggable hardware               │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │3   │ Extended or pluggable firmware   │
           │    │ data; includes information about │
           │    │ pluggable hardware               │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │4   │ Boot loader; changes on boot     │
           │    │ loader updates                   │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │5   │ GPT/Partition table; changes     │
           │    │ when the partitions are added,   │
           │    │ modified or removed              │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │6   │ Power state events; changes on   │
           │    │ system suspend/sleep             │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │7   │ Secure boot state; changes when  │
           │    │ UEFI SecureBoot mode is          │
           │    │ enabled/disabled                 │
           ├────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
           │8   │ sd-boot(7) measures the kernel   │
           │    │ command line in this PCR.        │
           └────┴──────────────────────────────────┘

       --wipe-slot= [SLOT...]
           Wipes one or more LUKS2 key slots. Takes a comma separated list of numeric slot
           indexes, or the special strings "all" (for wiping all key slots), "empty" (for wiping
           all key slots that are unlocked by an empty passphrase), "password" (for wiping all
           key slots that are unlocked by a traditional passphrase), "recovery" (for wiping all
           key slots that are unlocked by a recovery key), "pkcs11" (for wiping all key slots
           that are unlocked by a PKCS#11 token), "fido2" (for wiping all key slots that are
           unlocked by a FIDO2 token), "tpm2" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a
           TPM2 chip), or any combination of these strings or numeric indexes, in which case all
           slots matching either are wiped. As safety precaution an operation that wipes all
           slots without exception (so that the volume cannot be unlocked at all anymore, unless
           the volume key is known) is refused.

           This switch may be used alone, in which case only the requested wipe operation is
           executed. It may also be used in combination with any of the enrollment options listed
           above, in which case the enrollment is completed first, and only when successful the
           wipe operation executed — and the newly added slot is always excluded from the wiping.
           Combining enrollment and slot wiping may thus be used to update existing enrollments:

               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto

           The above command will enroll the TPM2 chip, and then wipe all previously created TPM2
           enrollments on the LUKS2 volume, leaving only the newly created one. Combining wiping
           and enrollment may also be used to replace enrollments of different types, for example
           for changing from a PKCS#11 enrollment to a FIDO2 one:

               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=pkcs11 --fido2-device=auto

           Or for replacing an enrolled empty password by TPM2:

               systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto

       -h, --help
           Print a short help text and exit.

       --version
           Print a short version string and exit.

EXIT STATUS

       On success, 0 is returned, a non-zero failure code otherwise.

SEE ALSO

       systemd(1), systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8), crypttab(5), cryptsetup(8)