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NAME

     jail, jail_attach - imprison current process and future descendants

LIBRARY

     Standard C Library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS

     #include <sys/param.h>
     #include <sys/jail.h>

     int
     jail(struct jail *jail);

     int
     jail_attach(int jid);

DESCRIPTION

     The jail() system call sets up a jail and locks the current process in
     it.

     The argument is a pointer to a structure describing the prison:

           struct jail {
                   u_int32_t       version;
                   char            *path;
                   char            *hostname;
                   u_int32_t       ip_number;
           };

     “version” defines the version of the API in use.  It should be set to
     zero at this time.

     The “path” pointer should be set to the directory which is to be the root
     of the prison.

     The “hostname” pointer can be set to the hostname of the prison.  This
     can be changed from the inside of the prison.

     The “ip_number” can be set to the IP number assigned to the prison.

     The jail_attach() system call attaches the current process to an existing
     jail, identified by jid.

RETURN VALUES

     If successful, jail() returns a non-negative integer, termed the jail
     identifier (JID).  It returns -1 on failure, and sets errno to indicate
     the error.

     The jail_attach() function returns the value 0 if successful; otherwise
     the value -1 is returned and the global variable errno is set to indicate
     the error.

PRISON?

     Once a process has been put in a prison, it and its descendants cannot
     escape the prison.

     Inside the prison, the concept of “superuser” is very diluted.  In
     general, it can be assumed that nothing can be mangled from inside a
     prison which does not exist entirely inside that prison.  For instance
     the directory tree below “path” can be manipulated all the ways a root
     can normally do it, including “rm -rf /*” but new device special nodes
     cannot be created because they reference shared resources (the device
     drivers in the kernel).  The effective “securelevel” for a process is the
     greater of the global “securelevel” or, if present, the per-jail
     “securelevel”.

     All IP activity will be forced to happen to/from the IP number specified,
     which should be an alias on one of the network interfaces.

     It is possible to identify a process as jailed by examining
     “/proc/<pid>/status”: it will show a field near the end of the line,
     either as a single hyphen for a process at large, or the hostname
     currently set for the prison for jailed processes.

ERRORS

     The jail() system call will fail if:

     [EINVAL]           The version number of the argument is not correct.

     Further jail() calls chroot(2) internally, so it can fail for all the
     same reasons.  Please consult the chroot(2) manual page for details.

SEE ALSO

     chdir(2), chroot(2)

HISTORY

     The jail() system call appeared in FreeBSD 4.0.  The jail_attach() system
     call appeared in FreeBSD 5.1.

AUTHORS

     The jail feature was written by Poul-Henning Kamp for R&D Associates
     “http://www.rndassociates.com/” who contributed it to FreeBSD.