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NAME

     mac_none - null MAC policy module

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the null policy into your kernel, place the following lines in
     your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_NONE

     Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following
     line in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_none_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_none policy module implements a sample MAC policy that has no
     effect on access control in the system.  Unlike mac_stub(4), none of the
     MAC entry points are defined.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_none.

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4),
     mac_stub(4), mac_test(4), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_none policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network
     Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates
     Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of
     the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.  The TrustedBSD
     MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.