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NAME

     mac_none — null MAC policy module

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the null policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
     configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_NONE

     Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel
     configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_none_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_none policy module implements a sample MAC policy that has no effect on access
     control in the system.  Unlike mac_stub(4), none of the MAC entry points are defined.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_none.

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4),
     mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_stub(4), mac_test(4), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_none policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD
     Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the
     Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract
     N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.  The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is
     considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not
     all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework
     policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged
     user.