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     mac_partition -- process partition policy


     To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the
     following lines in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the
     following line in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):



     The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy,
     which allows administrators to place running processes into
     ``partitions'', based on their numeric process partition (specified in
     the process's MAC label).  Processes with a specified partition can only
     see processes that are in the same partition.  If no partition is
     specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the system
     (subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).
     No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are

   Label Format
     Partition labels take on the following format:


     Where value can be any integer value or ``none''.  For example:



     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4),
     mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)


     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.


     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network
     Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates
     Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part
     of the DARPA CHATS research program.


     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.  The TrustedBSD
     MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.