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NAME

     mac_seeotheruids — simple policy controlling whether users see other users

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
     configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS

     Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel
     configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_seeotheruids policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets
     owned by other users.

     To enable mac_seeotheruids, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled to 1.  To
     permit superuser awareness of other credentials by virtue of privilege, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged to 1.

     To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group, set the sysctl
     OID security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled to 1.

     To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled to 1, and
     security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid to the group ID to be exempted.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_seeotheruids.

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4),
     mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_test(4), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_seeotheruids policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the
     TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the
     Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract
     N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.  The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is
     considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not
     all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework
     policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged
     user.