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NAME

       random, urandom - kernel random number source devices

SYNOPSIS

       #include <linux/random.h>

       int ioctl(fd, RNDrequest, param);

DESCRIPTION

       The  character  special  files  /dev/random  and  /dev/urandom  (present  since  Linux 1.3.30) provide an
       interface to the kernel's random number generator.  File /dev/random has major device number 1 and  minor
       device number 8.  File /dev/urandom has major device number 1 and minor device number 9.

       The  random  number  generator  gathers environmental noise from device drivers and other sources into an
       entropy pool.  The generator also keeps an estimate of the number of bits of noise in the  entropy  pool.
       From this entropy pool random numbers are created.

       When  read,  the  /dev/random device will only return random bytes within the estimated number of bits of
       noise in the entropy pool.  /dev/random  should  be  suitable  for  uses  that  need  very  high  quality
       randomness  such  as  one-time  pad  or  key  generation.   When  the  entropy  pool is empty, reads from
       /dev/random will block until additional environmental noise is gathered.

       A read from the /dev/urandom device will not block waiting for more entropy.  As a result,  if  there  is
       not  sufficient  entropy  in  the  entropy  pool,  the  returned values are theoretically vulnerable to a
       cryptographic attack on the algorithms used by the driver.  Knowledge of how to do this is not  available
       in  the  current unclassified literature, but it is theoretically possible that such an attack may exist.
       If this is a concern in your application, use /dev/random instead.

       Writing to /dev/random or /dev/urandom will update the entropy pool with the data written, but this  will
       not  result in a higher entropy count.  This means that it will impact the contents read from both files,
       but it will not make reads from /dev/random faster.

   Usage
       If you are unsure about whether you should use /dev/random or /dev/urandom, then probably you want to use
       the  latter.  As a general rule, /dev/urandom should be used for everything except long-lived GPG/SSL/SSH
       keys.

       If a seed file is saved across reboots as recommended below (all major Linux distributions have done this
       since  2000 at least), the output is cryptographically secure against attackers without local root access
       as soon as it is reloaded in the boot sequence, and perfectly adequate  for  network  encryption  session
       keys.  Since reads from /dev/random may block, users will usually want to open it in nonblocking mode (or
       perform a read with timeout), and provide some sort of user notification if the desired  entropy  is  not
       immediately available.

       The kernel random-number generator is designed to produce a small amount of high-quality seed material to
       seed a cryptographic pseudo-random number generator (CPRNG).  It is designed for security, not speed, and
       is  poorly  suited  to  generating  large amounts of random data.  Users should be very economical in the
       amount of seed material that they read from /dev/urandom (and /dev/random); unnecessarily  reading  large
       quantities of data from this device will have a negative impact on other users of the device.

       The amount of seed material required to generate a cryptographic key equals the effective key size of the
       key.  For example, a 3072-bit RSA or Diffie-Hellman private key has an effective key size of 128 bits (it
       requires  about  2^128  operations  to  break)  so a key generator only needs 128 bits (16 bytes) of seed
       material from /dev/random.

       While some safety margin above that minimum is  reasonable,  as  a  guard  against  flaws  in  the  CPRNG
       algorithm, no cryptographic primitive available today can hope to promise more than 256 bits of security,
       so if any program reads more than 256 bits (32 bytes) from the kernel random pool per invocation, or  per
       reasonable  reseed  interval  (not  less  than  one  minute),  that  should  be  taken as a sign that its
       cryptography is not skillfully implemented.

   Configuration
       If your system does not have /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created  with  the
       following commands:

           mknod -m 644 /dev/random c 1 8
           mknod -m 644 /dev/urandom c 1 9
           chown root:root /dev/random /dev/urandom

       When  a  Linux  system  starts  up without much operator interaction, the entropy pool may be in a fairly
       predictable state.  This reduces the actual amount of noise in the entropy pool below the  estimate.   In
       order  to counteract this effect, it helps to carry entropy pool information across shut-downs and start-
       ups.  To do this, add the following lines to an appropriate script which is run during the  Linux  system
       start-up sequence:

           echo "Initializing random number generator..."
           random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
           # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
           # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
           if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
               cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
           else
               touch $random_seed
           fi
           chmod 600 $random_seed
           poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
           [ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
           dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes

       Also, add the following lines in an appropriate script which is run during the Linux system shutdown:

           # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
           # Save the whole entropy pool
           echo "Saving random seed..."
           random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
           touch $random_seed
           chmod 600 $random_seed
           poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
           [ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
           dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes

   /proc Interface
       The files in the directory /proc/sys/kernel/random (present since 2.3.16) provide an additional interface
       to the /dev/random device.

       The read-only file entropy_avail gives the available entropy.  Normally, this will be 4096 (bits), a full
       entropy pool.

       The  file  poolsize  gives  the  size of the entropy pool.  The semantics of this file vary across kernel
       versions:

              Linux 2.4:  This file gives the size of the entropy pool in bytes.  Normally, this file will  have
                          the  value  512,  but  it  is  writable,  and can be changed to any value for which an
                          algorithm is available.  The choices are 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, or 2048.

              Linux 2.6:  This file is read-only, and gives the size of the entropy pool in bits.   It  contains
                          the value 4096.

       The  file  read_wakeup_threshold  contains the number of bits of entropy required for waking up processes
       that sleep waiting for entropy from /dev/random.  The default is  64.   The  file  write_wakeup_threshold
       contains  the  number  of bits of entropy below which we wake up processes that do a select(2) or poll(2)
       for write access to /dev/random.  These values can be changed by writing to the files.

       The read-only files uuid and boot_id contain random  strings  like  6fd5a44b-35f4-4ad4-a9b9-6b9be13e1fe9.
       The former is generated afresh for each read, the latter was generated once.

   ioctl(2) interface
       The  following  ioctl(2)  requests  are  defined  on  file descriptors connected to either /dev/random or
       /dev/urandom.  All  requests  performed  will  interact  with  the  input  entropy  pool  impacting  both
       /dev/random  and  /dev/urandom.   The  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  capability  is  required  for  all  requests except
       RNDGETENTCNT.

       RNDGETENTCNT
              Retrieve the entropy count of the input pool, the contents will be the same as  the  entropy_avail
              file under proc.  The result will be stored in the int pointed to by the argument.

       RNDADDTOENTCNT
              Increment  or  decrement  the  entropy  count  of  the  input  pool by the value pointed to by the
              argument.

       RNDGETPOOL
              Removed in Linux 2.6.9.

       RNDADDENTROPY
              Add some additional entropy to the input pool, incrementing the entropy count.  This differs  from
              writing  to  /dev/random  or  /dev/urandom,  which  only adds some data but does not increment the
              entropy count.  The following structure is used:

                  struct rand_pool_info {
                      int    entropy_count;
                      int    buf_size;
                      __u32  buf[0];
                  };

              Here entropy_count is the value added to (or subtracted from) the entropy count, and  buf  is  the
              buffer of size buf_size which gets added to the entropy pool.

       RNDZAPENTCNT, RNDCLEARPOOL
              Zero the entropy count of all pools and add some system data (such as wall clock) to the pools.

FILES

       /dev/random
       /dev/urandom

SEE ALSO

       mknod(1)
       RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security"

COLOPHON

       This  page  is  part  of  release 3.54 of the Linux man-pages project.  A description of the project, and
       information about reporting bugs, can be found at http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.