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       fexecve - execute program specified via file descriptor


       #include <unistd.h>

       int fexecve(int fd, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);

   Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see feature_test_macros(7)):

           Since glibc 2.10:
               _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 700 || _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L
           Before glibc 2.10:


       fexecve() performs the same task as execve(2), with the difference that
       the file to be executed is specified via a file descriptor, fd,  rather
       than  via a pathname.  The file descriptor fd must be opened read-only,
       and the caller must have permission to execute the file that it  refers


       A  successful  call to fexecve() never returns.  On error, the function
       does return, with a result value of -1, and errno is set appropriately.


       Errors are as for execve(2), with the following additions:

       EINVAL fd is not a valid file descriptor, or argv is NULL, or  envp  is

       ENOSYS The /proc filesystem could not be accessed.


       fexecve() is implemented since glibc 2.3.2.


       For   an   explanation   of   the  terms  used  in  this  section,  see

       │InterfaceAttributeValue   │
       │fexecve() │ Thread safety │ MT-Safe │


       POSIX.1-2008.  This function is not specified in POSIX.1-2001,  and  is
       not   widely   available   on   other  systems.   It  is  specified  in


       On Linux, fexecve() is implemented using  the  proc(5)  filesystem,  so
       /proc needs to be mounted and available at the time of the call.

       The  idea  behind fexecve() is to allow the caller to verify (checksum)
       the contents of an executable before executing it.  Simply opening  the
       file,  checksumming the contents, and then doing an execve(2) would not
       suffice, since, between the two steps, the  filename,  or  a  directory
       prefix  of  the  pathname,  could have been exchanged (by, for example,
       modifying the target of a symbolic link).  fexecve() does not  mitigate
       the  problem  that  the contents of a file could be changed between the
       checksumming and the call to fexecve(); for that, the  solution  is  to
       ensure  that the permissions on the file prevent it from being modified
       by malicious users.

       The natural idiom when using fexecve() is to set the close-on-exec flag
       on fd, so that the file descriptor does not leak through to the program
       that is executed.  This approach is natural for two reasons.  First, it
       prevents  file descriptors being consumed unnecessarily.  (The executed
       program normally has no need of a file descriptor that  refers  to  the
       program  itself.)   Second, if fexecve() is used recursively, employing
       the close-on-exec flag prevents the  file  descriptor  exhaustion  that
       would  result from the fact that each step in the recursion would cause
       one more file descriptor to be passed to the  new  program.   (But  see


       If  fd  refers  to  a  script (i.e., it is an executable text file that
       names a script interpreter with a  first  line  that  begins  with  the
       characters  #!)   and  the close-on-exec flag has been set for fd, then
       fexecve() fails with the error ENOENT.  This error occurs  because,  by
       the time the script interpreter is executed, fd has already been closed
       because of the close-on-exec flag.  Thus, the close-on-exec flag  can't
       be  set  on  fd  if  it  refers  to  a  script, leading to the problems
       described in NOTES.


       execve(2), execveat(2)


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