Provided by: manpages-dev_4.15-1_all bug


       memfd_create - create an anonymous file


       #include <sys/memfd.h>

       int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags);


       memfd_create()  creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to it.
       The file behaves like a regular file, and so can be  modified,  truncated,  memory-mapped,
       and  so  on.   However,  unlike a regular file, it lives in RAM and has a volatile backing
       storage.  Once all references to the file  are  dropped,  it  is  automatically  released.
       Anonymous  memory  is used for all backing pages of the file.  Therefore, files created by
       memfd_create() have the same semantics as other anonymous memory allocations such as those
       allocated using mmap(2) with the MAP_ANONYMOUS flag.

       The initial size of the file is set to 0.  Following the call, the file size should be set
       using ftruncate(2).  (Alternatively, the file may be populated by  calls  to  write(2)  or

       The name supplied in name is used as a filename and will be displayed as the target of the
       corresponding symbolic link in the directory /proc/self/fd/.  The displayed name is always
       prefixed  with  memfd:  and  serves  only for debugging purposes.  Names do not affect the
       behavior of the file descriptor, and as such multiple files can have the same name without
       any side effects.

       The   following   values  may  be  bitwise  ORed  in  flags  to  change  the  behavior  of

              Set the close-on-exec (FD_CLOEXEC) flag  on  the  new  file  descriptor.   See  the
              description of the O_CLOEXEC flag in open(2) for reasons why this may be useful.

              Allow  sealing  operations on this file.  See the discussion of the F_ADD_SEALS and
              F_GET_SEALS operations in fcntl(2), and also NOTES,  below.   The  initial  set  of
              seals  is  empty.   If  this  flag  is  not  set,  the initial set of seals will be
              F_SEAL_SEAL, meaning that no other seals can be set on the file.

       MFD_HUGETLB (since Linux 4.14)
              The anonymous file will be created in the hugetlbfs filesystem  using  huge  pages.
              See   the  Linux  kernel  source  file  Documentation/vm/hugetlbpage.txt  for  more
              information about hugetlbfs.  The  hugetlbfs  filesystem  does  not  support  file-
              sealing  operations.   Therefore, specifying both MFD_HUGETLB and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
              in flags is disallowed.

       MFD_HUGE_2MB, MFD_HUGE_1GB, ...
              Used in conjunction with MFD_HUGETLB  to  select  alternative  hugetlb  page  sizes
              (respectively,  2 MB,  1 GB,  ...)   on  systems that support multiple hugetlb page
              sizes.  Definitions for known huge page sizes  are  included  in  the  header  file

              For  details  on  encoding huge page sizes not included in the header file, see the
              discussion of the similarly named constants in mmap(2).

       Unused bits in flags must be 0.

       As its return value, memfd_create() returns a new file descriptor  that  can  be  used  to
       refer  to  the file.  This file descriptor is opened for both reading and writing (O_RDWR)
       and O_LARGEFILE is set for the file descriptor.

       With respect to fork(2) and execve(2), the usual semantics apply for the  file  descriptor
       created  by  memfd_create().   A  copy  of  the  file descriptor is inherited by the child
       produced by fork(2) and refers to the same file.  The file descriptor is preserved  across
       execve(2), unless the close-on-exec flag has been set.


       On  success,  memfd_create()  returns a new file descriptor.  On error, -1 is returned and
       errno is set to indicate the error.


       EFAULT The address in name points to invalid memory.

       EINVAL flags included unknown bits.

       EINVAL name was too long.  (The limit is 249 bytes, excluding the terminating null byte.)

       EINVAL Both MFD_HUGETLB and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING were specified in flags.

       EMFILE The per-process limit on the number of open file descriptors has been reached.

       ENFILE The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been reached.

       ENOMEM There was insufficient memory to create a new anonymous file.


       The memfd_create() system call first appeared in Linux 3.17; glibc support  was  added  in
       version 2.27.


       The memfd_create() system call is Linux-specific.


       The  memfd_create()  system  call  provides  a  simple  alternative to manually mounting a
       tmpfs(5) filesystem and creating and opening a  file  in  that  filesystem.   The  primary
       purpose of memfd_create() is to create files and associated file descriptors that are used
       with the file-sealing APIs provided by fcntl(2).

       The memfd_create() system call also has uses without file  sealing  (which  is  why  file-
       sealing  is  disabled,  unless  explicitly requested with the MFD_ALLOW_SEALING flag).  In
       particular, it can be used as an alternative to creating files in tmp or as an alternative
       to  using  the open(2) O_TMPFILE in cases where there is no intention to actually link the
       resulting file into the filesystem.

   File sealing
       In the absence of file sealing, processes that communicate via shared memory  must  either
       trust each other, or take measures to deal with the possibility that an untrusted peer may
       manipulate the shared memory region in problematic ways.  For example, an  untrusted  peer
       might  modify  the  contents of the shared memory at any time, or shrink the shared memory
       region.  The former possibility leaves the local process vulnerable  to  time-of-check-to-
       time-of-use  race  conditions (typically dealt with by copying data from the shared memory
       region before checking and using it).  The latter possibility  leaves  the  local  process
       vulnerable  to SIGBUS signals when an attempt is made to access a now-nonexistent location
       in the shared memory region.  (Dealing with this possibility necessitates  the  use  of  a
       handler for the SIGBUS signal.)

       Dealing  with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on code that employs shared memory.
       Memory sealing enables that extra complexity to be eliminated, by allowing  a  process  to
       operate  secure  in  the  knowledge  that  its  peer  can't modify the shared memory in an
       undesired fashion.

       An example of the usage of the sealing mechanism is as follows:

       1. The first process creates a tmpfs(5) file using memfd_create().  The call yields a file
          descriptor used in subsequent steps.

       2. The  first process sizes the file created in the previous step using ftruncate(2), maps
          it using mmap(2), and populates the shared memory with the desired data.

       3. The first process uses the fcntl(2) F_ADD_SEALS operation to place one or more seals on
          the file, in order to restrict further modifications on the file.  (If placing the seal
          F_SEAL_WRITE, then it will be necessary to first  unmap  the  shared  writable  mapping
          created in the previous step.)

       4. A  second  process  obtains a file descriptor for the tmpfs(5) file and maps it.  Among
          the possible ways in which this could happen are the following:

          *  The process that called memfd_create() could transfer the resulting file  descriptor
             to  the  second  process  via  a  UNIX domain socket (see unix(7) and cmsg(3)).  The
             second process then maps the file using mmap(2).

          *  The second process is created via fork(2) and thus automatically inherits  the  file
             descriptor  and  mapping.   (Note that in this case and the next, there is a natural
             trust relationship between the two processes, since they are running under the  same
             user ID.  Therefore, file sealing would not normally be necessary.)

          *  The second process opens the file /proc/<pid>/fd/<fd>, where <pid> is the PID of the
             first process (the one that called memfd_create()), and <fd> is the  number  of  the
             file  descriptor returned by the call to memfd_create() in that process.  The second
             process then maps the file using mmap(2).

       5. The second process uses the fcntl(2) F_GET_SEALS operation to retrieve the bit mask  of
          seals  that  has  been applied to the file.  This bit mask can be inspected in order to
          determine what kinds of restrictions  have  been  placed  on  file  modifications.   If
          desired,  the  second process can apply further seals to impose additional restrictions
          (so long as the F_SEAL_SEAL seal has not yet been applied).


       Below are shown two example programs that demonstrate the use of  memfd_create()  and  the
       file sealing API.

       The  first program, t_memfd_create.c, creates a tmpfs(5) file using memfd_create(), sets a
       size for the file, maps it into memory, and optionally places some seals on the file.  The
       program  accepts  up to three command-line arguments, of which the first two are required.
       The first argument is the name to associate with the file, the second argument is the size
       to  be  set  for  the file, and the optional third argument is a string of characters that
       specify seals to be set on file.

       The second program, t_get_seals.c, can be used to open an existing file that  was  created
       via memfd_create() and inspect the set of seals that have been applied to that file.

       The  following  shell  session  demonstrates the use of these programs.  First we create a
       tmpfs(5) file and set some seals on it:

           $ ./t_memfd_create my_memfd_file 4096 sw &
           [1] 11775
           PID: 11775; fd: 3; /proc/11775/fd/3

       At this point, the t_memfd_create program  continues  to  run  in  the  background.   From
       another program, we can obtain a file descriptor for the file created by memfd_create() by
       opening the /proc/[pid]/fd  file  that  corresponds  to  the  file  descriptor  opened  by
       memfd_create().   Using  that  pathname,  we  inspect  the  content  of the /proc/[pid]/fd
       symbolic link, and use our t_get_seals program to view the seals that have been placed  on
       the file:

           $ readlink /proc/11775/fd/3
           /memfd:my_memfd_file (deleted)
           $ ./t_get_seals /proc/11775/fd/3
           Existing seals: WRITE SHRINK

   Program source: t_memfd_create.c

       #include <sys/memfd.h>
       #include <fcntl.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>
       #include <unistd.h>
       #include <string.h>
       #include <stdio.h>

       #define errExit(msg)    do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
                               } while (0)

       main(int argc, char *argv[])
           int fd;
           unsigned int seals;
           char *addr;
           char *name, *seals_arg;
           ssize_t len;

           if (argc < 3) {
               fprintf(stderr, "%s name size [seals]\n", argv[0]);
               fprintf(stderr, "\t'seals' can contain any of the "
                       "following characters:\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\tg - F_SEAL_GROW\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\ts - F_SEAL_SHRINK\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\tw - F_SEAL_WRITE\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\tS - F_SEAL_SEAL\n");

           name = argv[1];
           len = atoi(argv[2]);
           seals_arg = argv[3];

           /* Create an anonymous file in tmpfs; allow seals to be
              placed on the file */

           fd = memfd_create(name, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
           if (fd == -1)

           /* Size the file as specified on the command line */

           if (ftruncate(fd, len) == -1)

           printf("PID: %ld; fd: %d; /proc/%ld/fd/%d\n",
                   (long) getpid(), fd, (long) getpid(), fd);

           /* Code to map the file and populate the mapping with data
              omitted */

           /* If a 'seals' command-line argument was supplied, set some
              seals on the file */

           if (seals_arg != NULL) {
               seals = 0;

               if (strchr(seals_arg, 'g') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_GROW;
               if (strchr(seals_arg, 's') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK;
               if (strchr(seals_arg, 'w') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_WRITE;
               if (strchr(seals_arg, 'S') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_SEAL;

               if (fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals) == -1)

           /* Keep running, so that the file created by memfd_create()
              continues to exist */



   Program source: t_get_seals.c

       #include <sys/memfd.h>
       #include <fcntl.h>
       #include <unistd.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>
       #include <string.h>
       #include <stdio.h>

       #define errExit(msg)    do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
                               } while (0)

       main(int argc, char *argv[])
           int fd;
           unsigned int seals;

           if (argc != 2) {
               fprintf(stderr, "%s /proc/PID/fd/FD\n", argv[0]);

           fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
           if (fd == -1)

           seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
           if (seals == -1)

           printf("Existing seals:");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_SEAL)
               printf(" SEAL");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_GROW)
               printf(" GROW");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
               printf(" WRITE");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)
               printf(" SHRINK");

           /* Code to map the file and access the contents of the
              resulting mapping omitted */



       fcntl(2), ftruncate(2), mmap(2), shmget(2), shm_open(3)


       This  page  is  part of release 4.15 of the Linux man-pages project.  A description of the
       project, information about reporting bugs, and the latest version of  this  page,  can  be
       found at