NAME

     mac_partition — process partition policy

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your
     kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the following line in
     your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy, which allows
     administrators to place running processes into “partitions”, based on their numeric process
     partition (specified in the process's MAC label).  Processes with a specified partition can
     only see processes that are in the same partition.  If no partition is specified for a
     process, it can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy
     restrictions not defined in this man page).  No provisions for placing processes into
     multiple partitions are available.

   Label Format
     Partition labels take on the following format:

           partition/value

     Where value can be any integer value or “none”.  For example:

           partition/1
           partition/20
           partition/none

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4),
     mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the
     TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the
     Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract
     N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not
     all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework
     policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged
     user.