Provided by: cryptsetup-bin_2.0.2-1ubuntu1.2_amd64 
NAME
cryptsetup - manage plain dm-crypt and LUKS encrypted volumes
SYNOPSIS
cryptsetup <options> <action> <action args>
DESCRIPTION
cryptsetup is used to conveniently setup dm-crypt managed device-mapper mappings. These include plain dm-
crypt volumes and LUKS volumes. The difference is that LUKS uses a metadata header and can hence offer
more features than plain dm-crypt. On the other hand, the header is visible and vulnerable to damage.
In addition, cryptsetup provides limited support for the use of loop-AES volumes and for TrueCrypt
compatible volumes.
PLAIN DM-CRYPT OR LUKS?
Unless you understand the cryptographic background well, use LUKS. With plain dm-crypt there are a
number of possible user errors that massively decrease security. While LUKS cannot fix them all, it can
lessen the impact for many of them.
WARNINGS
A lot of good information on the risks of using encrypted storage, on handling problems and on security
aspects can be found in the Cryptsetup FAQ. Read it. Nonetheless, some risks deserve to be mentioned
here.
Backup: Storage media die. Encryption has no influence on that. Backup is mandatory for encrypted data
as well, if the data has any worth. See the Cryptsetup FAQ for advice on how to do a backup of an
encrypted volume.
Character encoding: If you enter a passphrase with special symbols, the passphrase can change depending
on character encoding. Keyboard settings can also change, which can make blind input hard or impossible.
For example, switching from some ASCII 8-bit variant to UTF-8 can lead to a different binary encoding and
hence different passphrase seen by cryptsetup, even if what you see on the terminal is exactly the same.
It is therefore highly recommended to select passphrase characters only from 7-bit ASCII, as the encoding
for 7-bit ASCII stays the same for all ASCII variants and UTF-8.
LUKS header: If the header of a LUKS volume gets damaged, all data is permanently lost unless you have a
header-backup. If a key-slot is damaged, it can only be restored from a header-backup or if another
active key-slot with known passphrase is undamaged. Damaging the LUKS header is something people manage
to do with surprising frequency. This risk is the result of a trade-off between security and safety, as
LUKS is designed for fast and secure wiping by just overwriting header and key-slot area.
Previously used partitions: If a partition was previously used, it is a very good idea to wipe filesystem
signatures, data, etc. before creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container on it. For a quick removal of
filesystem signatures, use "wipefs". Take care though that this may not remove everything. In particular,
MD RAID signatures at the end of a device may survive. It also does not remove data. For a full wipe,
overwrite the whole partition before container creation. If you do not know how to do that, the
cryptsetup FAQ describes several options.
BASIC COMMANDS
The following are valid actions for all supported device types.
open <device> <name> --type <device_type>
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
Device type can be plain, luks (default), loopaes or tcrypt.
For backward compatibility there are open command aliases:
create (argument-order <name> <device>): open --type plain
plainOpen: open --type plain
luksOpen: open --type luks
loopaesOpen: open --type loopaes
tcryptOpen: open --type tcrypt
<options> are type specific and are described below for individual device types. For create, the
order of the <name> and <device> options is inverted for historical reasons, all other aliases use
the standard <device> <name> order.
close <name>
Removes the existing mapping <name> and wipes the key from kernel memory.
For backward compatibility there are close command aliases: remove, plainClose, luksClose,
loopaesClose, tcryptClose (all behaves exactly the same, device type is determined automatically
from active device).
<options> can be [--deferred]
status <name>
Reports the status for the mapping <name>.
resize <name>
Resizes an active mapping <name>.
If --size (in 512-bytes sectors) is not specified, the size is computed from the underlying
device. For LUKS it is the size of the underlying device without the area reserved for LUKS header
(see data payload offset in luksDump command). For plain crypt device, the whole device size is
used.
Note that this does not change the raw device geometry, it just changes how many sectors of the
raw device are represented in the mapped device.
If cryptsetup detected volume key for active device loaded in kernel keyring service, resize
action would first try to retrieve the key using a token and only if it failed it'd ask for a
passphrase to unlock a keyslot (LUKS) or to derive a volume key again (plain mode). The kernel
keyring is used by default for LUKS2 devices.
With LUKS2 device additional <options> can be [--token-id, --token-only, --key-slot, --key-file,
--keyfile-size, --keyfile-offset, --timeout, --disable-locks, --disable-keyring].
PLAIN MODE
Plain dm-crypt encrypts the device sector-by-sector with a single, non-salted hash of the passphrase. No
checks are performed, no metadata is used. There is no formatting operation. When the raw device is
mapped (opened), the usual device operations can be used on the mapped device, including filesystem
creation. Mapped devices usually reside in /dev/mapper/<name>.
The following are valid plain device type actions:
open --type plain <device> <name>
create <name> <device> (OBSOLETE syntax)
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
<options> can be [--hash, --cipher, --verify-passphrase, --sector-size, --key-file, --keyfile-
offset, --key-size, --offset, --skip, --size, --readonly, --shared, --allow-discards]
Example: 'cryptsetup open --type plain /dev/sda10 e1' maps the raw encrypted device /dev/sda10 to
the mapped (decrypted) device /dev/mapper/e1, which can then be mounted, fsck-ed or have a
filesystem created on it.
LUKS EXTENSION
LUKS, the Linux Unified Key Setup, is a standard for disk encryption. It adds a standardized header at
the start of the device, a key-slot area directly behind the header and the bulk data area behind that.
The whole set is called a 'LUKS container'. The device that a LUKS container resides on is called a
'LUKS device'. For most purposes, both terms can be used interchangeably. But note that when the LUKS
header is at a nonzero offset in a device, then the device is not a LUKS device anymore, but has a LUKS
container stored in it at an offset.
LUKS can manage multiple passphrases that can be individually revoked or changed and that can be securely
scrubbed from persistent media due to the use of anti-forensic stripes. Passphrases are protected against
brute-force and dictionary attacks by PBKDF2, which implements hash iteration and salting in one
function.
LUKS2 is a new version of header format that allows additional extensions like different PBKDF algorithm
or authenticated encryption. You can format device with LUKS2 header if you specify --type luks2 in
luksFormat command. For activation, the format is already recognized automatically.
Each passphrase, also called a key in this document, is associated with one of 8 key-slots. Key
operations that do not specify a slot affect the first slot that matches the supplied passphrase or the
first empty slot if a new passphrase is added.
The <device> parameter can also be specified by a LUKS UUID in the format UUID=<uuid>. Translation to
real device name uses symlinks in /dev/disk/by-uuid directory.
To specify a detached header, the --header parameter can be used in all LUKS commands and always takes
precedence over the positional <device> parameter.
The following are valid LUKS actions:
luksFormat <device> [<key file>]
Initializes a LUKS partition and sets the initial passphrase (for key-slot 0), either via
prompting or via <key file>. Note that if the second argument is present, then the passphrase is
taken from the file given there, without the need to use the --key-file option. Also note that for
both forms of reading the passphrase from a file you can give '-' as file name, which results in
the passphrase being read from stdin and the safety-question being skipped.
You can only call luksFormat on a LUKS device that is not mapped.
To use LUKS2, specify --type luks2.
<options> can be [--hash, --cipher, --verify-passphrase, --key-size, --key-slot, --key-file (takes
precedence over optional second argument), --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --use-random |
--use-urandom, --uuid, --master-key-file, --iter-time, --header, --pbkdf-force-iterations,
--force-password, --disable-locks].
For LUKS2, additional <options> can be [--integrity, --integrity-no-wipe, --sector-size, --label,
--subsystem, --pbkdf, --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel, --disable-locks, --disable-keyring].
WARNING: Doing a luksFormat on an existing LUKS container will make all data the old container
permanently irretrievable unless you have a header backup.
open --type luks <device> <name>
luksOpen <device> <name> (old syntax)
Opens the LUKS device <device> and sets up a mapping <name> after successful verification of the
supplied passphrase.
First, the passphrase is searched in LUKS tokens. If it's not found in any token and also the
passphrase is not supplied via --key-file, the command prompts for it interactively.
<options> can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --readonly, --test-passphrase,
--allow-discards, --header, --key-slot, --master-key-file, --token-id, --token-only,
--disable-keyring, --disable-locks].
luksSuspend <name>
Suspends an active device (all IO operations will block and accesses to the device will wait
indefinitely) and wipes the encryption key from kernel memory. Needs kernel 2.6.19 or later.
After this operation you have to use luksResume to reinstate the encryption key and unblock the
device or close to remove the mapped device.
WARNING: never suspend the device on which the cryptsetup binary resides.
<options> can be [--header, --disable-locks].
luksResume <name>
Resumes a suspended device and reinstates the encryption key. Prompts interactively for a
passphrase if --key-file is not given.
<options> can be [--key-file, --keyfile-size, --header, --disable-keyring,--disable-locks]
luksAddKey <device> [<key file with new key>]
adds a new passphrase. An existing passphrase must be supplied interactively or via --key-file.
The new passphrase to be added can be specified interactively or read from the file given as
positional argument.
<options> can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --new-keyfile-offset,
--new-keyfile-size, --key-slot, --master-key-file, --iter-time, --force-password, --header,
--disable-locks].
luksRemoveKey <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]
Removes the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device. The passphrase to be removed can be
specified interactively, as the positional argument or via --key-file.
<options> can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --header, --disable-locks]
WARNING: If you read the passphrase from stdin (without further argument or with '-' as an
argument to --key-file), batch-mode (-q) will be implicitly switched on and no warning will be
given when you remove the last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing the last
passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
luksChangeKey <device> [<new key file>]
Changes an existing passphrase. The passphrase to be changed must be supplied interactively or via
--key-file. The new passphrase can be supplied interactively or in a file given as positional
argument.
If a key-slot is specified (via --key-slot), the passphrase for that key-slot must be given and
the new passphrase will overwrite the specified key-slot. If no key-slot is specified and there is
still a free key-slot, then the new passphrase will be put into a free key-slot before the key-
slot containing the old passphrase is purged. If there is no free key-slot, then the key-slot with
the old passphrase is overwritten directly.
WARNING: If a key-slot is overwritten, a media failure during this operation can cause the
overwrite to fail after the old passphrase has been wiped and make the LUKS container
inaccessible.
<options> can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --new-keyfile-offset,
--new-keyfile-size, --key-slot, --force-password, --header, --disable-locks].
luksKillSlot <device> <key slot number>
Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device. Except running in batch-mode (-q) a
remaining passphrase must be supplied, either interactively or via --key-file. This command can
remove the last remaining key-slot, but requires an interactive confirmation when doing so.
Removing the last passphrase makes a LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
<options> can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --header, --disable-locks].
WARNING: If you read the passphrase from stdin (without further argument or with '-' as an
argument to --key-file), batch-mode (-q) will be implicitly switched on and no warning will be
given when you remove the last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing the last
passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
NOTE: If there is no passphrase provided (on stdin or through --key-file argument) and batch-mode
(-q) is active, the key-slot is removed without any other warning.
erase <device>
luksErase <device>
Erase all keyslots and make the LUKS container permanently inaccessible. You do not need to
provide any password for this operation.
WARNING: This operation is irreversible.
luksUUID <device>
Print the UUID of a LUKS device.
Set new UUID if --uuid option is specified.
isLuks <device>
Returns true, if <device> is a LUKS device, false otherwise. Use option -v to get human-readable
feedback. 'Command successful.' means the device is a LUKS device.
luksDump <device>
Dump the header information of a LUKS device.
If the --dump-master-key option is used, the LUKS device master key is dumped instead of the
keyslot info. Beware that the master key cannot be changed and can be used to decrypt the data
stored in the LUKS container without a passphrase and even without the LUKS header. This means
that if the master key is compromised, the whole device has to be erased to prevent further
access. Use this option carefully.
To dump the master key, a passphrase has to be supplied, either interactively or via --key-file.
<options> can be [--dump-master-key, --key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --header,
--disable-locks].
WARNING: If --dump-master-key is used with --key-file and the argument to --key-file is '-', no
validation question will be asked and no warning given.
luksHeaderBackup <device> --header-backup-file <file>
Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area.
Note: Using '-' as filename writes the header backup to a file named '-'.
WARNING: This backup file and a passphrase valid at the time of backup allows decryption of the
LUKS data area, even if the passphrase was later changed or removed from the LUKS device. Also
note that with a header backup you lose the ability to securely wipe the LUKS device by just
overwriting the header and key-slots. You either need to securely erase all header backups in
addition or overwrite the encrypted data area as well. The second option is less secure, as some
sectors can survive, e.g. due to defect management.
luksHeaderRestore <device> --header-backup-file <file>
Restores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area from the specified file.
Note: Using '-' as filename reads the header backup from a file named '-'.
WARNING: Header and keyslots will be replaced, only the passphrases from the backup will work
afterward.
This command requires that the master key size and data offset of the LUKS header already on the
device and of the header backup match. Alternatively, if there is no LUKS header on the device,
the backup will also be written to it.
token <add|remove> <device>
Adds a new keyring token to enable auto-activation of the device. For the auto-activation, the
passphrase must be stored in keyring with the specified description. Usually, the passphrase
should be stored in user or user-session keyring. The token command is supported only for LUKS2.
For adding new keyring token, option --key-description is mandatory. Also, new token is assigned
to key slot specified with --key-slot option or to all active key slots in the case --key-slot
option is omitted.
To remove existing token, specify the token ID which should be removed with --token-id option.
WARNING: The action token remove removes any token type, not just keyring type from token slot
specified by --token-id option.
<options> can be [--header, --token-id, --key-slot, --key-description, --disable-locks,
--disable-keyring].
convert <device> --type <format>
Converts the device between LUKS and LUKS2 format (if possible). The conversion will not be
performed if there is an additional LUKS2 feature or LUKS has unsupported header size.
WARNING: The convert action can destroy the LUKS header in the case of a crash during conversion
or if a media error occurs. Always create a header backup before performing this operation!
<options> can be [--header, --type].
config <device>
Set permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header). The config command is supported only
for LUKS2.
The permanent options can be --priority to set priority (normal, prefer, ignore) for keyslot
(specified by --key-slot) or --label and --subsystem.
<options> can be [--priority, --label, --subsystem, --key-slot, --header].
loop-AES EXTENSION
cryptsetup supports mapping loop-AES encrypted partition using a compatibility mode.
open --type loopaes <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile>
loopaesOpen <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile> (old syntax)
Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
If the key file is encrypted with GnuPG, then you have to use --key-file=- and decrypt it before
use, e.g. like this:
gpg --decrypt <keyfile> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device> <name>
WARNING: The loop-AES extension cannot use the direct input of key file on real terminal because
the keys are separated by end-of-line and only part of the multi-key file would be read.
If you need it in script, just use the pipe redirection:
echo $keyfile | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device> <name>
Use --keyfile-size to specify the proper key length if needed.
Use --offset to specify device offset. Note that the units need to be specified in number of 512
byte sectors.
Use --skip to specify the IV offset. If the original device used an offset and but did not use it
in IV sector calculations, you have to explicitly use --skip 0 in addition to the offset
parameter.
Use --hash to override the default hash function for passphrase hashing (otherwise it is detected
according to key size).
<options> can be [--key-file, --key-size, --offset, --skip, --hash, --readonly, --allow-discards].
See also section 7 of the FAQ and http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net for more information regarding loop-
AES.
TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible and VeraCrypt) EXTENSION
cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt, tcplay or VeraCrypt (with --veracrypt option) encrypted
partition using a native Linux kernel API. Header formatting and TCRYPT header change is not supported,
cryptsetup never changes TCRYPT header on-device.
TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available (introduced in Linux kernel
2.6.38). If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface for symmetric key cipher
algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
Because TCRYPT header is encrypted, you have to always provide valid passphrase and keyfiles.
Cryptsetup should recognize all header variants, except legacy cipher chains using LRW encryption mode
with 64 bits encryption block (namely Blowfish in LRW mode is not recognized, this is limitation of
kernel crypto API).
To recognize a VeraCrypt device use the --veracrypt option. VeraCrypt is just extension of TrueCrypt
header with increased iteration count so unlocking can take quite a lot of time (in comparison with
TCRYPT device).
To open a VeraCrypt device with a custom Personal Iteration Multiplier (PIM) value, additionally to
--veracrypt use either the --veracrypt-pim=<PIM> option to directly specify the PIM on the command- line
or use --veracrypt-query-pim to be prompted for the PIM.
The PIM value affects the number of iterations applied during key derivation. Please refer to
https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Personal%20Iterations%20Multiplier%20(PIM).html for more detailed
information.
NOTE: Activation with tcryptOpen is supported only for cipher chains using LRW or XTS encryption modes.
The tcryptDump command should work for all recognized TCRYPT devices and doesn't require superuser
privilege.
To map system device (device with boot loader where the whole encrypted system resides) use
--tcrypt-system option. You can use partition device as the parameter (parameter must be real partition
device, not an image in a file), then only this partition is mapped.
If you have the whole TCRYPT device as a file image and you want to map multiple partition encrypted with
system encryption, please create loopback mapping with partitions first (losetup -P, see losetup(8) man
page for more info), and use loop partition as the device parameter.
If you use the whole base device as a parameter, one device for the whole system encryption is mapped.
This mode is available only for backward compatibility with older cryptsetup versions which mapped TCRYPT
system encryption using the whole device.
To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available), use --tcrypt-hidden option.
To explicitly use backup (secondary) header, use --tcrypt-backup option.
NOTE: There is no protection for a hidden volume if the outer volume is mounted. The reason is that if
there were any protection, it would require some metadata describing what to protect in the outer volume
and the hidden volume would become detectable.
open --type tcrypt <device> <name>
tcryptOpen <device> <name> (old syntax)
Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
<options> can be [--key-file, --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system, --tcrypt-backup, --readonly,
--test-passphrase, --allow-discards, --veracrypt, --veracrypt-pim, --veracrypt-query-pim].
The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the passphrase and can be
repeated. Note that using keyfiles is compatible with TCRYPT and is different from LUKS keyfile
logic.
WARNING: Option --allow-discards cannot be combined with option --tcrypt-hidden. For normal
mapping, it can cause the destruction of hidden volume (hidden volume appears as unused space for
outer volume so this space can be discarded).
tcryptDump <device>
Dump the header information of a TCRYPT device.
If the --dump-master-key option is used, the TCRYPT device master key is dumped instead of TCRYPT
header info. Beware that the master key (or concatenated master keys if cipher chain is used) can
be used to decrypt the data stored in the TCRYPT container without a passphrase. This means that
if the master key is compromised, the whole device has to be erased to prevent further access. Use
this option carefully.
<options> can be [--dump-master-key, --key-file, --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system,
--tcrypt-backup].
The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the passphrase and can be
repeated.
See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt for more information regarding TrueCrypt.
Please note that cryptsetup does not use TrueCrypt code, please report all problems related to this
compatibility extension to the cryptsetup project.
MISCELLANEOUS
repair <device>
Tries to repair the device metadata if possible. Currently supported only for LUKS device type.
This command is useful to fix some known benign LUKS metadata header corruptions. Only basic
corruptions of unused keyslot are fixable. This command will only change the LUKS header, not any
key-slot data.
WARNING: Always create a binary backup of the original header before calling this command.
benchmark <options>
Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function). Without parameters, it tries to measure few
common configurations.
To benchmark other ciphers or modes, you need to specify --cipher and --key-size options or --hash
for KDF test.
NOTE: This benchmark is using memory only and is only informative. You cannot directly predict
real storage encryption speed from it.
For testing block ciphers, this benchmark requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available
(introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38). If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space
interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
(CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
<options> can be [--cipher, --key-size, --hash].
OPTIONS
--verbose, -v
Print more information on command execution.
--debug
Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output lines are always prefixed by '#'.
--type <device-type>
Specifies required device type, for more info read BASIC COMMANDS section.
--hash, -h <hash-spec>
Specifies the passphrase hash for open (for plain and loopaes device types).
Specifies the hash used in the LUKS key setup scheme and volume key digest for luksFormat. The
specified hash is used as hash-parameter for PBKDF2 and for the AF splitter.
The specified hash name is passed to the compiled-in crypto backend. Different backends may
support different hashes. For luksFormat, the hash algorithm must provide at least 160 bits of
output, which excludes, e.g., MD5. Do not use a non-crypto hash like "crc32" as this breaks
security.
Values compatible with old version of cryptsetup are "ripemd160" for open --type plain and "sha1"
for luksFormat.
Use cryptsetup --help to show the defaults.
--cipher, -c <cipher-spec>
Set the cipher specification string.
cryptsetup --help shows the compiled-in defaults. The current default in the distributed sources
is "aes-cbc-essiv:sha256" for plain dm-crypt and "aes-xts-plain64" for LUKS.
If a hash is part of the cipher specification, then it is used as part of the IV generation. For
example, ESSIV needs a hash function, while "plain64" does not and hence none is specified.
For XTS mode you can optionally set a key size of 512 bits with the -s option. Key size for XTS
mode is twice that for other modes for the same security level.
XTS mode requires kernel 2.6.24 or later and plain64 requires kernel 2.6.33 or later. More
information can be found in the FAQ.
--verify-passphrase, -y
When interactively asking for a passphrase, ask for it twice and complain if both inputs do not
match. Advised when creating a regular mapping for the first time, or when running luksFormat.
Ignored on input from file or stdin.
--key-file, -d name
Read the passphrase from file.
If the name given is "-", then the passphrase will be read from stdin. In this case, reading will
not stop at newline characters.
With LUKS, passphrases supplied via --key-file are always the existing passphrases requested by a
command, except in the case of luksFormat where --key-file is equivalent to the positional key
file argument.
If you want to set a new passphrase via key file, you have to use a positional argument to
luksAddKey.
See section NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING for more information.
--keyfile-offset value
Skip value bytes at the beginning of the key file. Works with all commands that accept key files.
--keyfile-size, -l value
Read a maximum of value bytes from the key file. The default is to read the whole file up to the
compiled-in maximum that can be queried with --help. Supplying more data than the compiled-in
maximum aborts the operation.
This option is useful to cut trailing newlines, for example. If --keyfile-offset is also given,
the size count starts after the offset. Works with all commands that accept key files.
--new-keyfile-offset value
Skip value bytes at the start when adding a new passphrase from key file with luksAddKey.
--new-keyfile-size value
Read a maximum of value bytes when adding a new passphrase from key file with luksAddKey. The
default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in maximum length that can be queried with
--help. Supplying more than the compiled in maximum aborts the operation. When
--new-keyfile-offset is also given, reading starts after the offset.
--master-key-file
Use a master key stored in a file.
For luksFormat this allows creating a LUKS header with this specific master key. If the master key
was taken from an existing LUKS header and all other parameters are the same, then the new header
decrypts the data encrypted with the header the master key was taken from.
WARNING: If you create your own master key, you need to make sure to do it right. Otherwise, you
can end up with a low-entropy or otherwise partially predictable master key which will compromise
security.
For luksAddKey this allows adding a new passphrase without having to know an existing one.
For open this allows one to open the LUKS device without giving a passphrase.
--dump-master-key
For luksDump this option includes the master key in the displayed information. Use with care, as
the master key can be used to bypass the passphrases, see also option --master-key-file.
--use-random
--use-urandom
For luksFormat these options define which kernel random number generator will be used to create
the master key (which is a long-term key).
See NOTES ON RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS for more information. Use cryptsetup --help to show the
compiled-in default random number generator.
WARNING: In a low-entropy situation (e.g. in an embedded system), both selections are problematic.
Using /dev/urandom can lead to weak keys. Using /dev/random can block a long time, potentially
forever, if not enough entropy can be harvested by the kernel.
--key-slot, -S <0-7>
For LUKS operations that add key material, this options allows you to specify which key slot is
selected for the new key. This option can be used for luksFormat, and luksAddKey.
In addition, for open, this option selects a specific key-slot to compare the passphrase against.
If the given passphrase would only match a different key-slot, the operation fails.
--key-size, -s <bits>
Sets key size in bits. The argument has to be a multiple of 8. The possible key-sizes are limited
by the cipher and mode used.
See /proc/crypto for more information. Note that key-size in /proc/crypto is stated in bytes.
This option can be used for open --type plain or luksFormat. All other LUKS actions will use the
key-size specified in the LUKS header. Use cryptsetup --help to show the compiled-in defaults.
--size, -b <number of 512 byte sectors>
Set the size of the device in sectors of 512 bytes. This option is only relevant for the open and
resize actions.
--offset, -o <number of 512 byte sectors>
Start offset in the backend device in 512-byte sectors. This option is only relevant for the open
action with plain or loopaes device types.
--skip, -p <number of 512 byte sectors>
Start offset used in IV calculation in 512-byte sectors (how many sectors of the encrypted data to
skip at the beginning). This option is only relevant for the open action with plain or loopaes
device types.
Hence, if --offset n, and --skip s, sector n (the first sector of the encrypted device) will get a
sector number of s for the IV calculation.
--readonly, -r
set up a read-only mapping.
--shared
Creates an additional mapping for one common ciphertext device. Arbitrary mappings are supported.
This option is only relevant for the open --type plain action. Use --offset, --size and --skip to
specify the mapped area.
--pbkdf <PBKDF spec>
Set Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) algorithm for LUKS keyslot. The PBKDF can be:
pbkdf2 (for PBKDF2 according to RFC2898), argon2i for Argon2i or argon2id for Argon2id (see
https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Argon2 for more info).
For LUKS1, only PBKDF2 is accepted (no need to use this option). The default PBKDF2 for LUKS2 is
set during compilation time and is available in cryptsetup --help output.
A PBKDF is used for increasing dictionary and brute-force attack cost for keyslot passwords. The
parameters can be time, memory and parallel cost.
For PBKDF2, only time cost (number of iterations) applies. For Argon2i/id, there is also memory
cost (memory required during the process of key derivation) and parallel cost (number of threads
that run in parallel during the key derivation.
Note that increasing memory cost also increases time, so the final parameter values are measured
by a benchmark. The benchmark tries to find iteration time (--iter-time) with required memory cost
--pbkdf-memory. If it is not possible, the memory cost is decreased as well. The parallel cost
--pbkdf-parallel is constant, is is checked against available CPU cores (if not available, it is
decreased) and the maximum parallel cost is 4.
You can see all PBKDF parameters for particular LUKS2 keyslot with luksDump command.
NOTE: If you do not want to use benchmark and want to specify all parameters directly, use
--pbkdf-force-iterations with --pbkdf-memory and --pbkdf-parallel. This will override the values
without benchmarking. Note it can cause extremely long unlocking time. Use only is specified
cases, for example, if you know that the formatted device will be used on some small embedded
system. In this case, the LUKS PBKDF2 digest will be set to the minimum iteration count.
--iter-time, -i <number of milliseconds>
The number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF passphrase processing. This option is only
relevant for LUKS operations that set or change passphrases, such as luksFormat or luksAddKey.
Specifying 0 as parameter selects the compiled-in default.
--pbkdf-memory <number>
Set the memory cost for PBKDF (for Argon2i/id the number represents kilobytes). Note that it is
maximal value, PBKDF benchmark or available physical memory can decrease it. This option is not
available for PBKDF2.
--pbkdf-parallel <number>
Set the parallel cost for PBKDF (number of threads, up to 4). Note that it is maximal value, it
is decreased automatically if CPU online count is lower. This option is not available for PBKDF2.
--pbkdf-force-iterations <num>
Avoid PBKDF benchmark and set time cost (iterations) directly. It can be used for LUKS/LUKS2
device only. See --pbkdf option for more info.
--batch-mode, -q
Suppresses all confirmation questions. Use with care!
If the -y option is not specified, this option also switches off the passphrase verification for
luksFormat.
--progress-frequency <seconds>
Print separate line every <seconds> with wipe progress.
--timeout, -t <number of seconds>
The number of seconds to wait before timeout on passphrase input via terminal. It is relevant
every time a passphrase is asked, for example for open, luksFormat or luksAddKey. It has no
effect if used in conjunction with --key-file.
This option is useful when the system should not stall if the user does not input a passphrase,
e.g. during boot. The default is a value of 0 seconds, which means to wait forever.
--tries, -T
How often the input of the passphrase shall be retried. This option is relevant every time a
passphrase is asked, for example for open, luksFormat or luksAddKey. The default is 3 tries.
--align-payload <number of 512 byte sectors>
Align payload at a boundary of value 512-byte sectors. This option is relevant for luksFormat.
If not specified, cryptsetup tries to use the topology info provided by the kernel for the
underlying device to get the optimal alignment. If not available (or the calculated value is a
multiple of the default) data is by default aligned to a 1MiB boundary (i.e. 2048 512-byte
sectors).
For a detached LUKS header, this option specifies the offset on the data device. See also the
--header option.
--uuid=UUID
Use the provided UUID for the luksFormat command instead of generating a new one. Changes the
existing UUID when used with the luksUUID command.
The UUID must be provided in the standard UUID format, e.g. 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc.
--allow-discards
Allow the use of discard (TRIM) requests for the device. This option is only relevant for open
action.
WARNING: This command can have a negative security impact because it can make filesystem-level
operations visible on the physical device. For example, information leaking filesystem type, used
space, etc. may be extractable from the physical device if the discarded blocks can be located
later. If in doubt, do not use it.
A kernel version of 3.1 or later is needed. For earlier kernels, this option is ignored.
--perf-same_cpu_crypt
Perform encryption using the same cpu that IO was submitted on. The default is to use an unbound
workqueue so that encryption work is automatically balanced between available CPUs. This option
is only relevant for open action.
NOTE: This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning, use only if you
need a change to default dm-crypt behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.
--perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus
Disable offloading writes to a separate thread after encryption. There are some situations where
offloading write bios from the encryption threads to a single thread degrades performance
significantly. The default is to offload write bios to the same thread. This option is only
relevant for open action.
NOTE: This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning, use only if you
need a change to default dm-crypt behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.
--test-passphrase
Do not activate the device, just verify passphrase. This option is only relevant for open action
(the device mapping name is not mandatory if this option is used).
--header <device or file storing the LUKS header>
Use a detached (separated) metadata device or file where the LUKS header is stored. This option
allows one to store ciphertext and LUKS header on different devices.
This option is only relevant for LUKS devices and can be used with the luksFormat, open,
luksSuspend, luksResume, status and resize commands.
For luksFormat with a file name as the argument to --header, the file will be automatically
created if it does not exist. See the cryptsetup FAQ for header size calculation.
For other commands that change the LUKS header (e.g. luksAddKey), specify the device or file with
the LUKS header directly as the LUKS device.
If used with luksFormat, the --align-payload option is taken as absolute sector alignment on
ciphertext device and can be zero.
WARNING: There is no check whether the ciphertext device specified actually belongs to the header
given. In fact, you can specify an arbitrary device as the ciphertext device for open with the
--header option. Use with care.
--header-backup-file <file>
Specify file with header backup for luksHeaderBackup or luksHeaderBackup actions.
--force-password
Do not use password quality checking for new LUKS passwords.
This option applies only to luksFormat, luksAddKey and luksChangeKey and is ignored if cryptsetup
is built without password quality checking support.
For more info about password quality check, see the manual page for pwquality.conf(5) and
passwdqc.conf(5).
--deferred
Defers device removal in close command until the last user closes it.
--disable-locks
Disable lock protection for metadata on disk. This option is valid only for LUKS2 and ignored for
other formats.
WARNING: Do not use this option unless you run cryptsetup in a restricted environment where
locking is impossible to perform (where /run directory cannot be used).
--disable-keyring
Do not load volume key in kernel keyring but use store key directly in the dm-crypt target. This
option is supported only for the LUKS2 format.
--key-description <text>
Set key description in keyring for use with token command.
--priority <normal|prefer|ignore>
Set a priority for LUKS2 keyslot. The prefer priority marked slots are tried before normal
priority. The ignored priority means, that slot is never used, if not explicitly requested by
--key-slot option.
--token-id
Specify what token to use in actions token, open or resize. If omitted, all available tokens will
be checked before proceeding further with passphrase prompt.
--token-only
Do not proceed further with action (any of token, open or resize) if token activation failed.
Without the option, action asks for passphrase to proceed further.
--sector-size <bytes>
Set sector size for use with disk encryption. It must be power of two and in range 512 - 4096
bytes. The default is 512 bytes sectors. This option is available only in the LUKS2 mode.
Note that if sector size is higher than underlying device hardware sector and there is not
integrity protection that uses data journal, using this option can increase risk on incomplete
sector writes during a power fail.
If used together with --integrity option and dm-integrity journal, the atomicity of writes is
guaranteed in all cases (but it cost write performance - data has to be written twice).
Increasing sector size from 512 bytes to 4096 bytes can provide better performance on most of the
modern storage devices and also with some hw encryption accelerators.
--persistent
If used with LUKS2 devices and activation commands like open, the specified activation flags are
persistently written into metadata and used next time automatically even for normal activation.
(No need to use cryptab or other system configuration files.) Only --allow-discards,
--perf-same_cpu_crypt, --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus and --integrity-no-journal can be stored
persistently.
--label <LABEL>
--subsystem <SUBSYSTEM> Set label and subsystem description for LUKS2 device, can be used in
config and format actions. The label and subsystem are optional fields and can be later used in
udev scripts for triggering user actions once device marked by these labels is detected.
--integrity <integrity algorithm>
Specify integrity algorithm to be used for authenticated disk encryption in LUKS2.
WARNING: This extension is EXPERIMENTAL and requires dm-integrity kernel target (available since
kernel version 4.12). For more info, see AUTHENTICATED DISK ENCRYPTION section.
--integrity-no-journal
Activate device with integrity protection without using data journal (direct write of data and
integrity tags). Note that without journal power fail can cause non-atomic write and data
corruption. Use only if journalling is performed on a different storage layer.
--integrity-no-wipe
Skip wiping of device authentication (integrity) tags. If you skip this step, sectors will report
invalid integrity tag until an application write to the sector.
NOTE: Even some writes to the device can fail if the write is not aligned to page size and page-
cache initiates read of a sector with invalid integrity tag.
--tcrypt-hidden
--tcrypt-system --tcrypt-backup Specify which TrueCrypt on-disk header will be used to open the
device. See TCRYPT section for more info.
--veracrypt
Allow VeraCrypt compatible mode. Only for TCRYPT extension. See TCRYPT section for more info.
--veracrypt-pim
--veracrypt-query-pim Use a custom Personal Iteration Multiplier (PIM) for VeraCrypt device. See
TCRYPT section for more info.
--version
Show the program version.
--usage
Show short option help.
--help, -?
Show help text and default parameters.
RETURN CODES
Cryptsetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission (bad passphrase), 3 out of memory, 4 wrong device
specified, 5 device already exists or device is busy.
NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING FOR PLAIN MODE
Note that no iterated hashing or salting is done in plain mode. If hashing is done, it is a single
direct hash. This means that low-entropy passphrases are easy to attack in plain mode.
From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first newline, i.e. '\n'. The input without the
newline character is processed with the default hash or the hash specified with --hash. The hash result
will be truncated to the key size of the used cipher, or the size specified with -s.
From stdin: Reading will continue until a newline (or until the maximum input size is reached), with the
trailing newline stripped. The maximum input size is defined by the same compiled-in default as for the
maximum key file size and can be overwritten using --keyfile-size option.
The data read will be hashed with the default hash or the hash specified with --hash. The hash result
will be truncated to the key size of the used cipher, or the size specified with -s.
Note that if --key-file=- is used for reading the key from stdin, trailing newlines are not stripped from
the input.
If "plain" is used as argument to --hash, the input data will not be hashed. Instead, it will be zero
padded (if shorter than the key size) or truncated (if longer than the key size) and used directly as the
binary key. This is useful for directly specifying a binary key. No warning will be given if the amount
of data read from stdin is less than the key size.
From a key file: It will be truncated to the key size of the used cipher or the size given by -s and
directly used as a binary key.
WARNING: The --hash argument is being ignored. The --hash option is usable only for stdin input in plain
mode.
If the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup will quit with an error. The maximum input size is
defined by the same compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and can be overwritten using
--keyfile-size option.
NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING FOR LUKS
LUKS uses PBKDF2 to protect against dictionary attacks and to give some protection to low-entropy
passphrases (see RFC 2898 and the cryptsetup FAQ).
From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first newline and then processed by PBKDF2 without the
newline character.
From stdin: LUKS will read passphrases from stdin up to the first newline character or the compiled-in
maximum key file length. If --keyfile-size is given, it is ignored.
From key file: The complete keyfile is read up to the compiled-in maximum size. Newline characters do not
terminate the input. The --keyfile-size option can be used to limit what is read.
Passphrase processing: Whenever a passphrase is added to a LUKS header (luksAddKey, luksFormat), the user
may specify how much the time the passphrase processing should consume. The time is used to determine the
iteration count for PBKDF2 and higher times will offer better protection for low-entropy passphrases, but
open will take longer to complete. For passphrases that have entropy higher than the used key length,
higher iteration times will not increase security.
The default setting of one or two seconds is sufficient for most practical cases. The only exception is a
low-entropy passphrase used on a device with a slow CPU, as this will result in a low iteration count. On
a slow device, it may be advisable to increase the iteration time using the --iter-time option in order
to obtain a higher iteration count. This does slow down all later luksOpen operations accordingly.
INCOHERENT BEHAVIOR FOR INVALID PASSPHRASES/KEYS
LUKS checks for a valid passphrase when an encrypted partition is unlocked. The behavior of plain dm-
crypt is different. It will always decrypt with the passphrase given. If the given passphrase is wrong,
the device mapped by plain dm-crypt will essentially still contain encrypted data and will be unreadable.
NOTES ON SUPPORTED CIPHERS, MODES, HASHES AND KEY SIZES
The available combinations of ciphers, modes, hashes and key sizes depend on kernel support. See
/proc/crypto for a list of available options. You might need to load additional kernel crypto modules in
order to get more options.
For the --hash option, if the crypto backend is libgcrypt, then all algorithms supported by the gcrypt
library are available. For other crypto backends, some algorithms may be missing.
NOTES ON PASSPHRASES
Mathematics can't be bribed. Make sure you keep your passphrases safe. There are a few nice tricks for
constructing a fallback, when suddenly out of the blue, your brain refuses to cooperate. These fallbacks
need LUKS, as it's only possible with LUKS to have multiple passphrases. Still, if your attacker model
does not prevent it, storing your passphrase in a sealed envelope somewhere may be a good idea as well.
NOTES ON RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS
Random Number Generators (RNG) used in cryptsetup are always the kernel RNGs without any modifications or
additions to data stream produced.
There are two types of randomness cryptsetup/LUKS needs. One type (which always uses /dev/urandom) is
used for salts, the AF splitter and for wiping deleted keyslots.
The second type is used for the volume (master) key. You can switch between using /dev/random and
/dev/urandom here, see --use-random and --use-urandom options. Using /dev/random on a system without
enough entropy sources can cause luksFormat to block until the requested amount of random data is
gathered. In a low-entropy situation (embedded system), this can take a very long time and potentially
forever. At the same time, using /dev/urandom in a low-entropy situation will produce low-quality keys.
This is a serious problem, but solving it is out of scope for a mere man-page. See urandom(4) for more
information.
AUTHENTICATED DISK ENCRYPTION (EXPERIMENTAL)
Since Linux kernel version 4.12 dm-crypt supports authenticated disk encryption.
Normal disk encryption modes are length-preserving (plaintext sector is of the same size as a ciphertext
sector) and can provide only confidentiality protection, but not cryptographically sound data integrity
protection.
Authenticated modes require additional space per-sector for authentication tag and use Authenticated
Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithms.
If you configure LUKS2 device with data integrity protection, there will be an underlying dm-integrity
device, which provides additional per-sector metadata space and also provide data journal protection to
ensure atomicity of data and metadata update. Because there must be additional space for metadata and
journal, the available space for the device will be smaller than for length-preserving modes.
The dm-crypt device then resides on top of such a dm-integrity device. All activation and deactivation
of this device stack is performed by cryptsetup, there is no difference in using luksOpen for integrity
protected devices. If you want to format LUKS2 device with data integrity protection, use --integrity
option.
Some integrity modes requires two independent keys (key for encryption and for authentication). Both
these keys are stored in one LUKS keyslot.
WARNING: All support for authenticated modes is experimental and there are only some modes available for
now. Note that there are a very few authenticated encryption algorithms that are suitable for disk
encryption.
NOTES ON LOOPBACK DEVICE USE
Cryptsetup is usually used directly on a block device (disk partition or LVM volume). However, if the
device argument is a file, cryptsetup tries to allocate a loopback device and map it into this file. This
mode requires Linux kernel 2.6.25 or more recent which supports the loop autoclear flag (loop device is
cleared on the last close automatically). Of course, you can always map a file to a loop-device manually.
See the cryptsetup FAQ for an example.
When device mapping is active, you can see the loop backing file in the status command output. Also see
losetup(8).
LUKS2 header locking
The LUKS2 on-disk metadata is updated in several steps and to achieve proper atomic update, there is a
locking mechanism. For an image in file, code uses flock(2) system call. For a block device, lock is
performed over a special file stored in a locking directory (by default /run/lock/cryptsetup). The
locking directory should be created with the proper security context by the distribution during the boot-
up phase. Only LUKS2 uses locks, other formats do not use this mechanism.
DEPRECATED ACTIONS
The reload action is no longer supported. Please use dmsetup(8) if you need to directly manipulate with
the device mapping table.
The luksDelKey was replaced with luksKillSlot.
REPORTING BUGS
Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on the cryptsetup mailing list at <dm-crypt@saout.de>
or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website. Please attach the output of the failed command with the
--debug option added.
AUTHORS
cryptsetup originally written by Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
The LUKS extensions and original man page were written by Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>.
Man page extensions by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
Man page rewrite and extension by Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2004 Jana Saout
Copyright © 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth
Copyright © 2009-2018 Red Hat, Inc.
Copyright © 2009-2018 Milan Broz
Copyright © 2012-2014 Arno Wagner
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO warranty; not even for
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
SEE ALSO
The LUKS website at https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/
The cryptsetup FAQ, contained in the distribution package and online at
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
The cryptsetup mailing list and list archive, see FAQ entry 1.6.
The LUKS on-disk format specification available at
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification
cryptsetup January 2018 CRYPTSETUP(8)