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NAME
public_key - API module for public-key infrastructure.
DESCRIPTION
Provides functions to handle public-key infrastructure, for details see public_key(7).
DATA TYPES
Note:
All records used in this Reference Manual are generated from ASN.1 specifications and are
documented in the User's Guide. See Public-key Records.
Use the following include directive to get access to the records and constant macros
described here and in the User's Guide:
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
The following data types are used in the functions for public_key:
oid():
Object identifier, a tuple of integers as generated by the ASN.1 compiler.
boolean() =:
true | false
string() =:
[bytes()]
der_encoded() =:
binary()
pki_asn1_type() =:
'Certificate'
| 'RSAPrivateKey'
| 'RSAPublicKey'
| 'DSAPrivateKey'
| 'DSAPublicKey'
| 'DHParameter'
| 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo'
| 'PrivateKeyInfo'
| 'CertificationRequest'
| 'CertificateList'
| 'ECPrivateKey'
| 'EcpkParameters'
pem_entry () =:
{pki_asn1_type(), binary(), %% DER or encrypted DER
not_encrypted | cipher_info()}
cipher_info() = :
{"RC2-CBC" | "DES-CBC" | "DES-EDE3-CBC", crypto:strong_rand_bytes(8)
| {#'PBEParameter{}, digest_type()} | #'PBES2-params'{}}
public_key() =:
rsa_public_key() | dsa_public_key() | ec_public_key()
private_key() =:
rsa_private_key() | dsa_private_key() | ec_private_key()
rsa_public_key() =:
#'RSAPublicKey'{}
rsa_private_key() =:
#'RSAPrivateKey'{}
dsa_public_key() =:
{integer(), #'Dss-Parms'{}}
dsa_private_key() =:
#'DSAPrivateKey'{}
ec_public_key():
= {#'ECPoint'{}, #'ECParameters'{} | {namedCurve, oid()}}
ec_private_key() =:
#'ECPrivateKey'{}
key_params() =:
#'DHParameter'{} | {namedCurve, oid()} | #'ECParameters'{} | {rsa, Size::integer(),
PubExp::integer()}
public_crypt_options() =:
[{rsa_pad, rsa_padding()}]
rsa_padding() =:
'rsa_pkcs1_padding'
| 'rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding'
| 'rsa_no_padding'
public_sign_options() =:
[{rsa_pad, rsa_sign_padding()} | {rsa_pss_saltlen, integer()}]
rsa_sign_padding() =:
'rsa_pkcs1_padding'
| 'rsa_pkcs1_pss_padding'
digest_type() = :
Union of rsa_digest_type(), dss_digest_type(), and ecdsa_digest_type().
rsa_digest_type() = :
'md5' | 'ripemd160' | 'sha' | 'sha224' | 'sha256' | 'sha384' | 'sha512'
dss_digest_type() = :
'sha' | 'sha224' | 'sha256' | 'sha384' | 'sha512'
Note that the actual supported dss_digest_type depends on the underlying crypto
library. In OpenSSL version >= 1.0.1 the listed digest are supported, while in 1.0.0
only sha, sha224 and sha256 are supported. In version 0.9.8 only sha is supported.
ecdsa_digest_type() = :
'sha' | 'sha224' | 'sha256' | 'sha384' | 'sha512'
crl_reason() = :
unspecified
| keyCompromise
| cACompromise
| affiliationChanged
| superseded
| cessationOfOperation
| certificateHold
| privilegeWithdrawn
| aACompromise
issuer_name() =:
{rdnSequence,[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}
ssh_file() =:
openssh_public_key
| rfc4716_public_key
| known_hosts
| auth_keys
EXPORTS
compute_key(OthersKey, MyKey)->
compute_key(OthersKey, MyKey, Params)->
Types:
OthersKey = #'ECPoint'{} | binary(), MyKey = #'ECPrivateKey'{} | binary()
Params = #'DHParameter'{}
Computes shared secret.
decrypt_private(CipherText, Key) -> binary()
decrypt_private(CipherText, Key, Options) -> binary()
Types:
CipherText = binary()
Key = rsa_private_key()
Options = public_crypt_options()
Public-key decryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_decrypt/4
decrypt_public(CipherText, Key) - > binary()
decrypt_public(CipherText, Key, Options) - > binary()
Types:
CipherText = binary()
Key = rsa_public_key()
Options = public_crypt_options()
Public-key decryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_decrypt/4
der_decode(Asn1type, Der) -> term()
Types:
Asn1Type = atom()
ASN.1 type present in the Public Key applications ASN.1 specifications.
Der = der_encoded()
Decodes a public-key ASN.1 DER encoded entity.
der_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> der_encoded()
Types:
Asn1Type = atom()
ASN.1 type present in the Public Key applications ASN.1 specifications.
Entity = term()
Erlang representation of Asn1Type
Encodes a public-key entity with ASN.1 DER encoding.
dh_gex_group(MinSize, SuggestedSize, MaxSize, Groups) -> {ok, {Size,Group}} |
{error,Error}
Types:
MinSize = positive_integer()
SuggestedSize = positive_integer()
MaxSize = positive_integer()
Groups = undefined | [{Size,[{G,P}]}]
Size = positive_integer()
Group = {G,P}
G = positive_integer()
P = positive_integer()
Selects a group for Diffie-Hellman key exchange with the key size in the range
MinSize...MaxSize and as close to SuggestedSize as possible. If Groups == undefined
a default set will be used, otherwise the group is selected from Groups.
First a size, as close as possible to SuggestedSize, is selected. Then one group
with that key size is randomly selected from the specified set of groups. If no
size within the limits of MinSize and MaxSize is available, {error,no_group_found}
is returned.
The default set of groups is listed in lib/public_key/priv/moduli. This file may be
regenerated like this:
$> cd $ERL_TOP/lib/public_key/priv/
$> generate
---- wait until all background jobs has finished. It may take several days !
$> cat moduli-* > moduli
$> cd ..; make
encrypt_private(PlainText, Key) -> binary()
Types:
PlainText = binary()
Key = rsa_private_key()
Public-key encryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_encrypt/4.
encrypt_public(PlainText, Key) -> binary()
Types:
PlainText = binary()
Key = rsa_public_key()
Public-key encryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_encrypt/4.
generate_key(Params) -> {Public::binary(), Private::binary()} | #'ECPrivateKey'{} |
#'RSAPrivateKey'{}
Types:
Params = key_params()
Generates a new keypair. Note that except for Diffie-Hellman the public key is
included in the private key structure. See also crypto:generate_key/2
pem_decode(PemBin) -> [pem_entry()]
Types:
PemBin = binary()
Example {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("cert.pem").
Decodes PEM binary data and returns entries as ASN.1 DER encoded entities.
pem_encode(PemEntries) -> binary()
Types:
PemEntries = [pem_entry()]
Creates a PEM binary.
pem_entry_decode(PemEntry) -> term()
pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password) -> term()
Types:
PemEntry = pem_entry()
Password = string()
Decodes a PEM entry. pem_decode/1 returns a list of PEM entries. Notice that if the
PEM entry is of type 'SubjectPublickeyInfo', it is further decoded to an
rsa_public_key() or dsa_public_key().
pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> pem_entry()
pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, {CipherInfo, Password}) -> pem_entry()
Types:
Asn1Type = pki_asn1_type()
Entity = term()
Erlang representation of Asn1Type. If Asn1Type is 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo',
Entity must be either an rsa_public_key(), dsa_public_key() or an
ec_public_key() and this function creates the appropriate
'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' entry.
CipherInfo = cipher_info()
Password = string()
Creates a PEM entry that can be feed to pem_encode/1.
pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp|plain) -> #'Certificate'{} | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Types:
Cert = der_encoded()
Decodes an ASN.1 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Option otp uses the customized ASN.1
specification OTP-PKIX.asn1 for decoding and also recursively decode most of the
standard parts.
pkix_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, otp | plain) -> der_encoded()
Types:
Asn1Type = atom()
The ASN.1 type can be 'Certificate', 'OTPCertificate' or a subtype of either.
Entity = #'Certificate'{} | #'OTPCertificate'{} | a valid subtype
DER encodes a PKIX x509 certificate or part of such a certificate. This function
must be used for encoding certificates or parts of certificates that are
decoded/created in the otp format, whereas for the plain format this function
directly calls der_encode/2.
pkix_is_issuer(Cert, IssuerCert) -> boolean()
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{} | #'CertificateList'{}
IssuerCert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Checks if IssuerCert issued Cert.
pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(Cert) -> boolean()
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Checks if a certificate is a fixed Diffie-Hellman certificate.
pkix_is_self_signed(Cert) -> boolean()
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Checks if a certificate is self-signed.
pkix_issuer_id(Cert, IssuedBy) -> {ok, IssuerID} | {error, Reason}
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
IssuedBy = self | other
IssuerID = {integer(), issuer_name()}
The issuer id consists of the serial number and the issuers name.
Reason = term()
Returns the issuer id.
pkix_normalize_name(Issuer) -> Normalized
Types:
Issuer = issuer_name()
Normalized = issuer_name()
Normalizes an issuer name so that it can be easily compared to another issuer name.
pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, CertChain, Options) -> {ok, {PublicKeyInfo, PolicyTree}}
| {error, {bad_cert, Reason}}
Types:
TrustedCert = #'OTPCertificate'{} | der_encoded() | atom()
Normally a trusted certificate, but it can also be a path-validation error
that can be discovered while constructing the input to this function and that
is to be run through the verify_fun. Examples are unknown_ca and
selfsigned_peer.
CertChain = [der_encoded()]
A list of DER-encoded certificates in trust order ending with the peer
certificate.
Options = proplists:proplist()
PublicKeyInfo = {?'rsaEncryption' | ?'id-dsa', rsa_public_key() | integer(),
'NULL' | 'Dss-Parms'{}}
PolicyTree = term()
At the moment this is always an empty list as policies are not currently
supported.
Reason = cert_expired | invalid_issuer | invalid_signature | name_not_permitted
| missing_basic_constraint | invalid_key_usage | {revoked, crl_reason()} |
atom()
Performs a basic path validation according to RFC 5280. However, CRL validation is
done separately by pkix_crls_validate/3 and is to be called from the supplied
verify_fun.
Available options:
{verify_fun, fun()}:
The fun must be defined as:
fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{},
Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() | {revoked, atom()}} |
{extension, #'Extension'{}},
InitialUserState :: term()) ->
{valid, UserState :: term()} |
{valid_peer, UserState :: term()} |
{fail, Reason :: term()} |
{unknown, UserState :: term()}.
If the verify callback fun returns {fail, Reason}, the verification process is
immediately stopped. If the verify callback fun returns {valid, UserState}, the
verification process is continued. This can be used to accept specific path
validation errors, such as selfsigned_peer, as well as verifying application-
specific extensions. If called with an extension unknown to the user
application, the return value {unknown, UserState} is to be used.
{max_path_length, integer()}:
The max_path_length is the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate
certificates that can follow the peer certificate in a valid certification
path. So, if max_path_length is 0, the PEER must be signed by the trusted ROOT-
CA directly, if it is 1, the path can be PEER, CA, ROOT-CA, if it is 2, the
path can be PEER, CA, CA, ROOT-CA, and so on.
Possible reasons for a bad certificate:
cert_expired:
Certificate is no longer valid as its expiration date has passed.
invalid_issuer:
Certificate issuer name does not match the name of the issuer certificate in
the chain.
invalid_signature:
Certificate was not signed by its issuer certificate in the chain.
name_not_permitted:
Invalid Subject Alternative Name extension.
missing_basic_constraint:
Certificate, required to have the basic constraints extension, does not have a
basic constraints extension.
invalid_key_usage:
Certificate key is used in an invalid way according to the key-usage extension.
{revoked, crl_reason()}:
Certificate has been revoked.
atom():
Application-specific error reason that is to be checked by the verify_fun.
pkix_crl_issuer(CRL) -> issuer_name()
Types:
CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
Returns the issuer of the CRL.
pkix_crls_validate(OTPCertificate, DPAndCRLs, Options) -> CRLStatus()
Types:
OTPCertificate = #'OTPCertificate'{}
DPAndCRLs = [{DP::#'DistributionPoint'{}, {DerCRL::der_encoded(),
CRL::#'CertificateList'{}}}]
Options = proplists:proplist()
CRLStatus() = valid | {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} | {bad_cert,
{revocation_status_undetermined, {bad_crls, Details::term()}}} | {bad_cert,
{revoked, crl_reason()}}
Performs CRL validation. It is intended to be called from the verify fun of
pkix_path_validation/3 .
Available options:
{update_crl, fun()}:
The fun has the following type specification:
fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{}) ->
#'CertificateList'{}
The fun uses the information in the distribution point to access the latest
possible version of the CRL. If this fun is not specified, Public Key uses the
default implementation:
fun(_DP, CRL) -> CRL end
{issuer_fun, fun()}:
The fun has the following type specification:
fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{},
{rdnSequence,[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}, term()) ->
{ok, #'OTPCertificate'{}, [der_encoded]}
The fun returns the root certificate and certificate chain that has signed the
CRL.
fun(DP, CRL, Issuer, UserState) -> {ok, RootCert, CertChain}
{undetermined_details, boolean()}:
Defaults to false. When revocation status can not be determined, and this
option is set to true, details of why no CRLs where accepted are included in
the return value.
pkix_crl_verify(CRL, Cert) -> boolean()
Types:
CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Verify that Cert is the CRL signer.
pkix_dist_point(Cert) -> DistPoint
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
DistPoint = #'DistributionPoint'{}
Creates a distribution point for CRLs issued by the same issuer as Cert. Can be
used as input to pkix_crls_validate/3
pkix_dist_points(Cert) -> DistPoints
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
DistPoints = [#'DistributionPoint'{}]
Extracts distribution points from the certificates extensions.
pkix_match_dist_point(CRL, DistPoint) -> boolean()
Types:
CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
DistPoint = #'DistributionPoint'{}
Checks whether the given distribution point matches the Issuing Distribution Point
of the CRL, as described in RFC 5280. If the CRL doesn't have an Issuing
Distribution Point extension, the distribution point always matches.
pkix_sign(#'OTPTBSCertificate'{}, Key) -> der_encoded()
Types:
Key = rsa_private_key() | dsa_private_key()
Signs an 'OTPTBSCertificate'. Returns the corresponding DER-encoded certificate.
pkix_sign_types(AlgorithmId) -> {DigestType, SignatureType}
Types:
AlgorithmId = oid()
Signature OID from a certificate or a certificate revocation list.
DigestType = rsa_digest_type() | dss_digest_type()
SignatureType = rsa | dsa | ecdsa
Translates signature algorithm OID to Erlang digest and signature types.
pkix_test_data(Options) -> Config
pkix_test_data([chain_opts()]) -> [conf_opt()]
Types:
Options = #{chain_type() := chain_opts()}
Options for ROOT, Intermediate and Peer certs
chain_type() = server_chain | client_chain
chain_opts() = #{root := [cert_opt()] | root_cert(), peer := [cert_opt()],
intermediates => [[cert_opt()]]}
A valid chain must have at least a ROOT and a peer cert. The root cert can be
given either as a cert pre-generated by pkix_test_root_cert/2 , or as root
cert generation options.
root_cert() = #{cert := der_encoded(), key := Key}
A root certificate generated by pkix_test_root_cert/2 .
cert_opt() = {Key, Value}
For available options see cert_opt() below.
Config = #{server_config := [conf_opt()], client_config := [conf_opt()]}
conf_opt() = {cert, der_encoded()} | {key, PrivateKey} |{cacerts,
[der_encoded()]}
This is a subset of the type ssl:ssl_option(). PrivateKey is what
generate_key/1 returns.
Creates certificate configuration(s) consisting of certificate and its private key
plus CA certificate bundle, for a client and a server, intended to facilitate
automated testing of applications using X509-certificates, often through SSL/TLS.
The test data can be used when you have control over both the client and the server
in a test scenario.
When this function is called with a map containing client and server chain
specifications; it generates both a client and a server certificate chain where the
cacerts returned for the server contains the root cert the server should trust and
the intermediate certificates the server should present to connecting clients. The
root cert the server should trust is the one used as root of the client certificate
chain. Vice versa applies to the cacerts returned for the client. The root cert(s)
can either be pre-generated with pkix_test_root_cert/2 , or if options are
specified; it is (they are) generated.
When this function is called with a list of certificate options; it generates a
configuration with just one node certificate where cacerts contains the root cert
and the intermediate certs that should be presented to a peer. In this case the
same root cert must be used for all peers. This is useful in for example an Erlang
distributed cluster where any node, towards another node, acts either as a server
or as a client depending on who connects to whom. The generated certificate
contains a subject altname, which is not needed in a client certificate, but makes
the certificate useful for both roles.
The cert_opt() type consists of the following options:
{digest, digest_type()}:
Hash algorithm to be used for signing the certificate together with the key
option. Defaults to sha that is sha1.
{key, key_params() | private_key()}:
Parameters to be used to call public_key:generate_key/1, to generate a key, or
an existing key. Defaults to generating an ECDSA key. Note this could fail if
Erlang/OTP is compiled with a very old cryptolib.
{validity, {From::erlang:timestamp(), To::erlang:timestamp()}} :
The validity period of the certificate.
{extensions, [#'Extension'{}]}:
Extensions to include in the certificate.
Default extensions included in CA certificates if not otherwise specified are:
[#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
extnValue = [keyCertSign, cRLSign],
critical = false},
#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-basicConstraints',
extnValue = #'BasicConstraints'{cA = true},
critical = true}]
Default extensions included in the server peer cert if not otherwise specified
are:
[#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
extnValue = [digitalSignature, keyAgreement],
critical = false},
#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName',
extnValue = [{dNSName, Hostname}],
critical = false}]
Hostname is the result of calling net_adm:localhost() in the Erlang node where
this funcion is called.
Note:
Note that the generated certificates and keys does not provide a formally correct
PKIX-trust-chain and they can not be used to achieve real security. This function
is provided for testing purposes only.
pkix_test_root_cert(Name, Options) -> RootCert
Types:
Name = string()
The root certificate name.
Options = [cert_opt()]
For available options see cert_opt() under pkix_test_data/1.
RootCert = #{cert := der_encoded(), key := Key}
A root certificate and key. The Key is generated by generate_key/1.
Generates a root certificate that can be used in multiple calls to pkix_test_data/1
when you want the same root certificate for several generated certificates.
pkix_verify(Cert, Key) -> boolean()
Types:
Cert = der_encoded()
Key = rsa_public_key() | dsa_public_key() | ec_public_key()
Verifies PKIX x.509 certificate signature.
pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs) -> boolean()
pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs, Opts) -> boolean()
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
ReferenceIDs = [ RefID ]
RefID = {dns_id,string()} | {srv_id,string()} | {uri_id,string()} |
{ip,inet:ip_address()|string()} | {OtherRefID,term()}}
OtherRefID = atom()
Opts = [ PvhOpt() ]
PvhOpt = [MatchOpt | FailCallBackOpt | FqdnExtractOpt]
MatchOpt = {match_fun, fun(RefId | FQDN::string(), PresentedID) -> boolean() |
default}
PresentedID = {dNSName,string()} | {uniformResourceIdentifier,string() |
{iPAddress,list(byte())} | {OtherPresId,term()}}
OtherPresID = atom()
FailCallBackOpt = {fail_callback, fun(#'OTPCertificate'{}) -> boolean()}
FqdnExtractOpt = {fqdn_fun, fun(RefID) -> FQDN::string() | default | undefined}
This function checks that the Presented Identifier (e.g hostname) in a peer
certificate is in agreement with the Reference Identifier that the client expects
to be connected to. The function is intended to be added as an extra client check
of the peer certificate when performing public_key:pkix_path_validation/3
See RFC 6125 for detailed information about hostname verification. The User's
Manual and code examples describes this function more detailed.
The {OtherRefId,term()} is defined by the user and is passed to the match_fun, if
defined. If that term is a binary, it will be converted to a string.
The ip Reference ID takes an inet:ip_address() or an ip address in string format
(E.g "10.0.1.1" or "1234::5678:9012") as second element.
sign(Msg, DigestType, Key) -> binary()
sign(Msg, DigestType, Key, Options) -> binary()
Types:
Msg = binary() | {digest,binary()}
The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data to be signed or it is the
hashed value of "plain text", that is, the digest.
DigestType = rsa_digest_type() | dss_digest_type() | ecdsa_digest_type()
Key = rsa_private_key() | dsa_private_key() | ec_private_key()
Options = public_sign_options()
Creates a digital signature.
ssh_decode(SshBin, Type) -> [{public_key(), Attributes::list()}]
Types:
SshBin = binary()
Example {ok, SshBin} = file:read_file("known_hosts").
Type = public_key | ssh_file()
If Type is public_key the binary can be either an RFC4716 public key or an
OpenSSH public key.
Decodes an SSH file-binary. In the case of known_hosts or auth_keys, the binary can
include one or more lines of the file. Returns a list of public keys and their
attributes, possible attribute values depends on the file type represented by the
binary.
RFC4716 attributes - see RFC 4716.:
{headers, [{string(), utf8_string()}]}
auth_key attributes - see manual page for sshd.:
{comment, string()}{options, [string()]}{bits, integer()} - In SSH version 1
files.
known_host attributes - see manual page for sshd.:
{hostnames, [string()]}{comment, string()}{bits, integer()} - In SSH version 1
files.
ssh_encode([{Key, Attributes}], Type) -> binary()
Types:
Key = public_key()
Attributes = list()
Type = ssh_file()
Encodes a list of SSH file entries (public keys and attributes) to a binary.
Possible attributes depend on the file type, see ssh_decode/2 .
ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(HostKey) -> string()
ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(DigestType, HostKey) -> string()
ssh_hostkey_fingerprint([DigestType], HostKey) -> [string()]
Types:
Key = public_key()
DigestType = digest_type()
Calculates a ssh fingerprint from a public host key as openssh does.
The algorithm in ssh_hostkey_fingerprint/1 is md5 to be compatible with older ssh-
keygen commands. The string from the second variant is prepended by the algorithm
name in uppercase as in newer ssh-keygen commands.
Examples:
2> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(Key).
"f5:64:a6:c1:5a:cb:9f:0a:10:46:a2:5c:3e:2f:57:84"
3> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(md5,Key).
"MD5:f5:64:a6:c1:5a:cb:9f:0a:10:46:a2:5c:3e:2f:57:84"
4> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(sha,Key).
"SHA1:bSLY/C4QXLDL/Iwmhyg0PGW9UbY"
5> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(sha256,Key).
"SHA256:aZGXhabfbf4oxglxltItWeHU7ub3Dc31NcNw2cMJePQ"
6> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint([sha,sha256],Key).
["SHA1:bSLY/C4QXLDL/Iwmhyg0PGW9UbY",
"SHA256:aZGXhabfbf4oxglxltItWeHU7ub3Dc31NcNw2cMJePQ"]
verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key) -> boolean()
verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key, Options) -> boolean()
Types:
Msg = binary() | {digest,binary()}
The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data or it is the hashed value of
"plain text", that is, the digest.
DigestType = rsa_digest_type() | dss_digest_type() | ecdsa_digest_type()
Signature = binary()
Key = rsa_public_key() | dsa_public_key() | ec_public_key()
Options = public_sign_options()
Verifies a digital signature.
short_name_hash(Name) -> string()
Types:
Name = issuer_name()
Generates a short hash of an issuer name. The hash is returned as a string
containing eight hexadecimal digits.
The return value of this function is the same as the result of the commands openssl
crl -hash and openssl x509 -issuer_hash, when passed the issuer name of a CRL or a
certificate, respectively. This hash is used by the c_rehash tool to maintain a
directory of symlinks to CRL files, in order to facilitate looking up a CRL by its
issuer name.