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NAME

       access, faccessat, faccessat2 - check user's permissions for a file

SYNOPSIS

       #include <unistd.h>

       int access(const char *pathname, int mode);

       #include <fcntl.h>           /* Definition of AT_* constants */
       #include <unistd.h>

       int faccessat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int mode, int flags);
                       /* But see C library/kernel differences, below */

       int faccessat2(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int mode, int flags);

   Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see feature_test_macros(7)):

       faccessat():
           Since glibc 2.10:
               _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L
           Before glibc 2.10:
               _ATFILE_SOURCE

DESCRIPTION

       access()  checks whether the calling process can access the file pathname.  If pathname is
       a symbolic link, it is dereferenced.

       The mode specifies the accessibility check(s) to be performed, and  is  either  the  value
       F_OK, or a mask consisting of the bitwise OR of one or more of R_OK, W_OK, and X_OK.  F_OK
       tests for the existence of the file.  R_OK, W_OK, and X_OK test whether  the  file  exists
       and grants read, write, and execute permissions, respectively.

       The  check is done using the calling process's real UID and GID, rather than the effective
       IDs as is done when  actually  attempting  an  operation  (e.g.,  open(2))  on  the  file.
       Similarly, for the root user, the check uses the set of permitted capabilities rather than
       the set of effective capabilities; and for non-root users, the check uses an empty set  of
       capabilities.

       This  allows  set-user-ID programs and capability-endowed programs to easily determine the
       invoking user's  authority.   In  other  words,  access()  does  not  answer  the  "can  I
       read/write/execute  this  file?"  question.   It  answers  a  slightly different question:
       "(assuming I'm a setuid binary) can  the  user  who  invoked  me  read/write/execute  this
       file?",  which  gives set-user-ID programs the possibility to prevent malicious users from
       causing them to read files which users shouldn't be able to read.

       If the calling process is privileged (i.e., its real UID is zero), then an X_OK  check  is
       successful  for a regular file if execute permission is enabled for any of the file owner,
       group, or other.

   faccessat()
       faccessat() operates in exactly the same way  as  access(),  except  for  the  differences
       described here.

       If  the  pathname  given  in  pathname is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the
       directory referred to by the file descriptor dirfd (rather than relative  to  the  current
       working directory of the calling process, as is done by access() for a relative pathname).

       If  pathname  is  relative  and  dirfd  is  the  special  value AT_FDCWD, then pathname is
       interpreted relative to the  current  working  directory  of  the  calling  process  (like
       access()).

       If pathname is absolute, then dirfd is ignored.

       flags is constructed by ORing together zero or more of the following values:

       AT_EACCESS
              Perform  access  checks  using  the  effective  user  and  group  IDs.  By default,
              faccessat() uses the real IDs (like access()).

       AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
              If pathname is a symbolic link, do not dereference it: instead  return  information
              about the link itself.

       See openat(2) for an explanation of the need for faccessat().

   faccessat2()
       The   description   of   faccessat()  given  above  corresponds  to  POSIX.1  and  to  the
       implementation provided by glibc.  However, the  glibc  implementation  was  an  imperfect
       emulation (see BUGS) that papered over the fact that the raw Linux faccessat() system call
       does not have a flags argument.  To allow for a proper implementation, Linux 5.8 added the
       faccessat2()  system  call,  which  supports  the  flags  argument  and  allows  a correct
       implementation of the faccessat() wrapper function.

RETURN VALUE

       On success (all requested permissions granted, or mode is F_OK and the file exists),  zero
       is returned.  On error (at least one bit in mode asked for a permission that is denied, or
       mode is F_OK and the file does not exist, or some other error occurred), -1  is  returned,
       and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS

       access() and faccessat() shall fail if:

       EACCES The  requested  access  would be denied to the file, or search permission is denied
              for  one  of  the  directories  in  the  path  prefix  of  pathname.    (See   also
              path_resolution(7).)

       ELOOP  Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving pathname.

       ENAMETOOLONG
              pathname is too long.

       ENOENT A component of pathname does not exist or is a dangling symbolic link.

       ENOTDIR
              A component used as a directory in pathname is not, in fact, a directory.

       EROFS  Write permission was requested for a file on a read-only filesystem.

       access() and faccessat() may fail if:

       EFAULT pathname points outside your accessible address space.

       EINVAL mode was incorrectly specified.

       EIO    An I/O error occurred.

       ENOMEM Insufficient kernel memory was available.

       ETXTBSY
              Write access was requested to an executable which is being executed.

       The following additional errors can occur for faccessat():

       EBADF  dirfd is not a valid file descriptor.

       EINVAL Invalid flag specified in flags.

       ENOTDIR
              pathname  is relative and dirfd is a file descriptor referring to a file other than
              a directory.

VERSIONS

       faccessat() was added to Linux in kernel 2.6.16; library support was  added  to  glibc  in
       version 2.4.

       faccessat2() was added to Linux in version 5.8.

CONFORMING TO

       access(): SVr4, 4.3BSD, POSIX.1-2001, POSIX.1-2008.

       faccessat(): POSIX.1-2008.

       faccessat2(): Linux-specific.

NOTES

       Warning:  Using  these calls to check if a user is authorized to, for example, open a file
       before actually doing so using open(2) creates a security hole,  because  the  user  might
       exploit  the  short  time interval between checking and opening the file to manipulate it.
       For this reason, the use of this system call should be  avoided.   (In  the  example  just
       described, a safer alternative would be to temporarily switch the process's effective user
       ID to the real ID and then call open(2).)

       access() always dereferences symbolic links.  If you need to check the  permissions  on  a
       symbolic link, use faccessat() with the flag AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.

       These  calls return an error if any of the access types in mode is denied, even if some of
       the other access types in mode are permitted.

       If the calling process has  appropriate  privileges  (i.e.,  is  superuser),  POSIX.1-2001
       permits  an  implementation  to  indicate  success  for  an X_OK check even if none of the
       execute file permission bits are set.  Linux does not do this.

       A file is accessible only if the permissions on each of the directories in the path prefix
       of  pathname  grant search (i.e., execute) access.  If any directory is inaccessible, then
       the access() call fails, regardless of the permissions on the file itself.

       Only access bits are checked, not the file type or contents.  Therefore, if a directory is
       found  to  be  writable, it probably means that files can be created in the directory, and
       not that the directory can be written as a file.  Similarly, a DOS file may be found to be
       "executable," but the execve(2) call will still fail.

       These  calls may not work correctly on NFSv2 filesystems with UID mapping enabled, because
       UID mapping is done on the server and hidden from the client,  which  checks  permissions.
       (NFS  versions  3 and higher perform the check on the server.)  Similar problems can occur
       to FUSE mounts.

   C library/kernel differences
       The raw faccessat() system call takes only the first three arguments.  The AT_EACCESS  and
       AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW  flags  are actually implemented within the glibc wrapper function for
       faccessat().  If either of these flags is specified, then  the  wrapper  function  employs
       fstatat(2) to determine access permissions, but see BUGS.

   Glibc notes
       On   older  kernels  where  faccessat()  is  unavailable  (and  when  the  AT_EACCESS  and
       AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags are not specified), the glibc wrapper function falls back to the
       use  of access().  When pathname is a relative pathname, glibc constructs a pathname based
       on the symbolic link in /proc/self/fd that corresponds to the dirfd argument.

BUGS

       Because the Linux kernel's faccessat() system call does not support a flags argument,  the
       glibc  faccessat()  wrapper  function  provided  in  glibc  2.32  and earlier emulates the
       required functionality using a combination of the faccessat() system call and  fstatat(2).
       However,  this  emulation  does not take ACLs into account.  Starting with glibc 2.33, the
       wrapper function avoids this bug by making use of the faccessat2() system call where it is
       provided by the underlying kernel.

       In  kernel  2.4  (and earlier) there is some strangeness in the handling of X_OK tests for
       superuser.  If all categories of execute permission are disabled for a nondirectory  file,
       then  the  only  access()  test that returns -1 is when mode is specified as just X_OK; if
       R_OK or W_OK is also specified in mode, then access() returns 0 for such files.  Early 2.6
       kernels (up to and including 2.6.3) also behaved in the same way as kernel 2.4.

       In  kernels  before 2.6.20, these calls ignored the effect of the MS_NOEXEC flag if it was
       used to mount(2) the underlying filesystem.  Since kernel 2.6.20, the  MS_NOEXEC  flag  is
       honored.

SEE ALSO

       chmod(2), chown(2), open(2), setgid(2), setuid(2), stat(2), euidaccess(3), credentials(7),
       path_resolution(7), symlink(7)

COLOPHON

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       found at https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.