Provided by: cryptsetup-bin_2.3.6-0ubuntu1_amd64 bug


       cryptsetup - manage plain dm-crypt and LUKS encrypted volumes


       cryptsetup <options> <action> <action args>


       cryptsetup  is  used  to conveniently setup dm-crypt managed device-mapper mappings. These
       include plain dm-crypt volumes and LUKS volumes.  The  difference  is  that  LUKS  uses  a
       metadata  header and can hence offer more features than plain dm-crypt. On the other hand,
       the header is visible and vulnerable to damage.

       In addition, cryptsetup  provides  limited  support  for  the  use  of  loop-AES  volumes,
       TrueCrypt, VeraCrypt and BitLocker compatible volumes.


       Unless  you  understand  the cryptographic background well, use LUKS.  With plain dm-crypt
       there are a number of possible user errors that massively decrease  security.  While  LUKS
       cannot fix them all, it can lessen the impact for many of them.


       A  lot  of  good information on the risks of using encrypted storage, on handling problems
       and on security aspects can be found in the Cryptsetup FAQ.  Read  it.  Nonetheless,  some
       risks deserve to be mentioned here.

       Backup:  Storage  media die. Encryption has no influence on that.  Backup is mandatory for
       encrypted data as well, if the data has any worth. See the Cryptsetup FAQ  for  advice  on
       how to do a backup of an encrypted volume.

       Character  encoding:  If  you  enter a passphrase with special symbols, the passphrase can
       change depending on character encoding. Keyboard settings can also change, which can  make
       blind  input  hard  or impossible. For example, switching from some ASCII 8-bit variant to
       UTF-8 can lead to a different binary encoding  and  hence  different  passphrase  seen  by
       cryptsetup,  even  if  what  you  see on the terminal is exactly the same. It is therefore
       highly recommended to select passphrase characters only from 7-bit ASCII, as the  encoding
       for 7-bit ASCII stays the same for all ASCII variants and UTF-8.

       LUKS  header:  If  the  header of a LUKS volume gets damaged, all data is permanently lost
       unless you have a header-backup.  If a key-slot is damaged, it can only be restored from a
       header-backup  or if another active key-slot with known passphrase is undamaged.  Damaging
       the LUKS header is something people manage to do with surprising frequency. This  risk  is
       the  result  of  a trade-off between security and safety, as LUKS is designed for fast and
       secure wiping by just overwriting header and key-slot area.

       Previously used partitions: If a partition was previously used, it is a very good idea  to
       wipe  filesystem signatures, data, etc. before creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container
       on it.  For a quick removal of filesystem signatures, use "wipefs". Take care though  that
       this  may  not remove everything. In particular, MD RAID signatures at the end of a device
       may survive. It also does not remove data. For a full wipe, overwrite the whole  partition
       before container creation. If you do not know how to do that, the cryptsetup FAQ describes
       several options.


       The following are valid actions for all supported device types.

       open <device> <name> --type <device_type>

              Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.

              Device type can be plain, luks (default), luks1, luks2, loopaes or tcrypt.

              For backward compatibility there are open command aliases:

              create (argument-order <name> <device>): open --type plain
              plainOpen: open --type plain
              luksOpen: open --type luks
              loopaesOpen: open --type loopaes
              tcryptOpen: open --type tcrypt
              bitlkOpen: open --type bitlk

              <options> are type specific and are described below for  individual  device  types.
              For create, the order of the <name> and <device> options is inverted for historical
              reasons, all other aliases use the standard <device> <name> order.

       close <name>

              Removes the existing mapping <name> and wipes the key from kernel memory.

              For backward compatibility there are close  command  aliases:  remove,  plainClose,
              luksClose,  loopaesClose, tcryptClose (all behaves exactly the same, device type is
              determined automatically from active device).

              <options> can be [--deferred]

       status <name>

              Reports the status for the mapping <name>.

       resize <name>

              Resizes an active mapping <name>.

              If --size (in 512-bytes sectors) or --device-size are not specified,  the  size  is
              computed  from  the  underlying  device.  For LUKS it is the size of the underlying
              device without the area reserved for  LUKS  header  (see  data  payload  offset  in
              luksDump command).  For plain crypt device, the whole device size is used.

              Note  that  this  does not change the raw device geometry, it just changes how many
              sectors of the raw device are represented in the mapped device.

              If cryptsetup detected volume key  for  active  device  loaded  in  kernel  keyring
              service,  resize  action would first try to retrieve the key using a token and only
              if it failed it'd ask for a passphrase to unlock a keyslot (LUKS) or  to  derive  a
              volume  key  again  (plain  mode).  The kernel keyring is used by default for LUKS2

              With  LUKS2  device  additional  <options>  can   be   [--token-id,   --token-only,
              --key-slot,     --key-file,     --keyfile-size,     --keyfile-offset,    --timeout,
              --disable-locks, --disable-keyring].

       refresh <name>

              Refreshes parameters of active mapping <name>.

              Updates parameters of active device <name> without need to  deactivate  the  device
              (and  umount  filesystem).  Currently  it  supports parameters refresh on following
              devices:  LUKS1,  LUKS2  (including  authenticated  encryption),  plain  crypt  and

              Mandatory parameters are identical to those of an open action for respective device

              You  may  change  following  parameters  on  all   devices   --perf-same_cpu_crypt,
              --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus,  --perf-no_read_workqueue, --perf-no_write_workqueue
              and --allow-discards.

              Refreshing device without any optional  parameter  will  refresh  the  device  with
              default setting (respective to device type).

              LUKS2 only:

              --integrity-no-journal  parameter  affects  only  LUKS2 devices with underlying dm-
              integrity device.

              Adding option --persistent stores any combination of  device  parameters  above  in
              LUKS2 metadata (only after successful refresh operation).

              --disable-keyring  parameter  refreshes a device with volume key passed in dm-crypt

       reencrypt <device> or --active-name <name> [<new_name>]

              Run resilient reencryption (LUKS2 device only).

              There are 3 basic modes of operation:

              • device reencryption (reencrypt)

              • device encryption (reencrypt --encrypt)

              • device decryption (reencrypt --decrypt)

              <device> or --active-name <name> is mandatory parameter.

              With <device> parameter cryptsetup looks up active  <device>  dm  mapping.   If  no
              active  mapping  is  detected,  it  starts  offline  reencryption  otherwise online
              reencryption takes place.

              Reencryption process may be  safely  interrupted  by  a  user  via  SIGTERM  signal

              To  resume already initialized or interrupted reencryption, just run the cryptsetup
              reencrypt command again to continue the reencryption operation.   Reencryption  may
              be  resumed with different --resilience or --hotzone-size unless implicit datashift
              resilience mode is used (reencrypt --encrypt with --reduce-device-size option).

              If the reencryption process was interrupted abruptly (reencryption  process  crash,
              system  crash,  poweroff)  it  may  require recovery. The recovery is currently run
              automatically on next activation (action open) when needed.

              Optional parameter <new_name> takes  effect  only  with  --encrypt  option  and  it
              activates  device  <new_name>  immediately  after  encryption  initialization  gets
              finished. That's useful when device needs to be  ready  as  soon  as  possible  and
              mounted (used) before full data area encryption is completed.

              Action    supports    following   additional   <options>   [--encrypt,   --decrypt,
              --device-size,  --resilience,   --resilience-hash,   --hotzone-size,   --init-only,
              --resume-only, --reduce-device-size, --master-key-file, --key-size].


       Plain  dm-crypt encrypts the device sector-by-sector with a single, non-salted hash of the
       passphrase. No checks  are  performed,  no  metadata  is  used.  There  is  no  formatting
       operation.   When  the  raw  device is mapped (opened), the usual device operations can be
       used on the mapped device, including filesystem creation.  Mapped devices  usually  reside
       in /dev/mapper/<name>.

       The following are valid plain device type actions:

       open --type plain <device> <name>
       create <name> <device> (OBSOLETE syntax)

              Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.

              <options> can be [--hash, --cipher, --verify-passphrase, --sector-size, --key-file,
              --keyfile-offset,  --key-size,  --offset,  --skip,  --size,  --readonly,  --shared,
              --allow-discards, --refresh]

              Example: 'cryptsetup open --type plain /dev/sda10 e1' maps the raw encrypted device
              /dev/sda10 to the mapped (decrypted)  device  /dev/mapper/e1,  which  can  then  be
              mounted, fsck-ed or have a filesystem created on it.


       LUKS,  the  Linux  Unified  Key  Setup,  is  a  standard  for  disk encryption.  It adds a
       standardized header at the start of the device, a key-slot area directly behind the header
       and  the  bulk  data  area  behind  that. The whole set is called a 'LUKS container'.  The
       device that a LUKS container resides on is called a 'LUKS  device'.   For  most  purposes,
       both terms can be used interchangeably. But note that when the LUKS header is at a nonzero
       offset in a device, then the device is not a LUKS device anymore, but has a LUKS container
       stored in it at an offset.

       LUKS  can manage multiple passphrases that can be individually revoked or changed and that
       can be securely scrubbed from persistent media due to the use  of  anti-forensic  stripes.
       Passphrases  are  protected  against  brute-force  and dictionary attacks by PBKDF2, which
       implements hash iteration and salting in one function.

       LUKS2 is a new version of header format that allows additional extensions  like  different
       PBKDF  algorithm  or authenticated encryption.  You can format device with LUKS2 header if
       you specify --type luks2 in luksFormat command.  For activation,  the  format  is  already
       recognized automatically.

       Each  passphrase,  also  called  a  key in this document, is associated with one of 8 key-
       slots.  Key operations that do not specify a slot affect the first slot that  matches  the
       supplied passphrase or the first empty slot if a new passphrase is added.

       The  <device>  parameter  can  also be specified by a LUKS UUID in the format UUID=<uuid>.
       Translation to real device name uses symlinks in /dev/disk/by-uuid directory.

       To specify a detached header, the --header parameter can be used in all LUKS commands  and
       always takes precedence over the positional <device> parameter.

       The following are valid LUKS actions:

       luksFormat <device> [<key file>]

              Initializes  a  LUKS  partition  and  sets the initial passphrase (for key-slot 0),
              either via prompting or via <key  file>.  Note  that  if  the  second  argument  is
              present,  then  the passphrase is taken from the file given there, without the need
              to use the --key-file option.  Also  note  that  for  both  forms  of  reading  the
              passphrase  from  a  file  you  can  give  '-'  as  file name, which results in the
              passphrase being read from stdin and the safety-question being skipped.

              You cannot call luksFormat on a device or filesystem that is mapped or in use, e.g.
              mounted  filesysem,  used in LVM, active RAID member etc.  The device or filesystem
              has to be un-mounted in order to call luksFormat.

              To use LUKS2, specify --type luks2.

              <options> can be [--hash, --cipher,  --verify-passphrase,  --key-size,  --key-slot,
              --key-file  (takes  precedence  over  optional  second argument), --keyfile-offset,
              --keyfile-size,   --use-random   |   --use-urandom,   --uuid,    --master-key-file,
              --iter-time,   --header,   --pbkdf-force-iterations,  --force-password,  --disable-

              For  LUKS2,  additional  <options>  can   be   [--integrity,   --integrity-no-wipe,
              --sector-size,  --label,  --subsystem,  --pbkdf,  --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel,
              --disable-locks, --disable-keyring,  --luks2-metadata-size,  --luks2-keyslots-size,
              --keyslot-cipher, --keyslot-key-size].

              WARNING:  Doing  a  luksFormat on an existing LUKS container will make all data the
              old container permanently irretrievable unless you have a header backup.

       open --type luks <device> <name>
       luksOpen <device> <name> (old syntax)

              Opens the LUKS device <device> and  sets  up  a  mapping  <name>  after  successful
              verification of the supplied passphrase.

              First,  the  passphrase  is searched in LUKS tokens. If it's not found in any token
              and also the passphrase is not supplied via --key-file, the command prompts for  it

              <options>   can   be  [--key-file,  --keyfile-offset,  --keyfile-size,  --readonly,
              --test-passphrase,  --allow-discards,  --header,   --key-slot,   --master-key-file,
              --token-id,  --token-only,  --disable-keyring,  --disable-locks, --type, --refresh,

       luksSuspend <name>

              Suspends an active device (all IO operations will block and accesses to the  device
              will  wait  indefinitely)  and  wipes  the encryption key from kernel memory. Needs
              kernel 2.6.19 or later.

              After this operation you have to use luksResume to reinstate the encryption key and
              unblock the device or close to remove the mapped device.

              WARNING: never suspend the device on which the cryptsetup binary resides.

              <options> can be [--header, --disable-locks].

       luksResume <name>

              Resumes   a   suspended   device   and  reinstates  the  encryption  key.   Prompts
              interactively for a passphrase if --key-file is not given.

              <options>  can  be  [--key-file,   --keyfile-size,   --header,   --disable-keyring,
              --disable-locks, --type]

       luksAddKey <device> [<key file with new key>]

              Adds a new passphrase. An existing passphrase must be supplied interactively or via
              --key-file.  The new passphrase to be added can be specified interactively or  read
              from the file given as positional argument.

              NOTE:  with  --unbound  option  the  action  creates new unbound LUKS2 keyslot. The
              keyslot cannot be used for device activation.   If  you  don't  pass  new  key  via
              --master-key-file  option, new random key is generated. Existing passphrase for any
              active keyslot is not required.

              <options>     can     be     [--key-file,     --keyfile-offset,     --keyfile-size,
              --new-keyfile-offset,     --new-keyfile-size,     --key-slot,    --master-key-file,
              --force-password,     --header,     --disable-locks,     --iter-time,      --pbkdf,
              --pbkdf-force-iterations, --unbound, --type, --keyslot-cipher, --keyslot-key-size].

       luksRemoveKey <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]

              Removes  the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device. The passphrase to be removed
              can be specified interactively, as the positional argument or via --key-file.

              <options>  can  be   [--key-file,   --keyfile-offset,   --keyfile-size,   --header,
              --disable-locks, --type]

              WARNING:  If  you  read the passphrase from stdin (without further argument or with
              '-' as an argument to --key-file), batch-mode (-q) will be implicitly  switched  on
              and  no  warning will be given when you remove the last remaining passphrase from a
              LUKS container. Removing the last passphrase makes the LUKS  container  permanently

       luksChangeKey <device> [<new key file>]

              Changes  an  existing  passphrase.  The  passphrase  to be changed must be supplied
              interactively or via --key-file.  The new passphrase can be supplied  interactively
              or in a file given as positional argument.

              If  a key-slot is specified (via --key-slot), the passphrase for that key-slot must
              be given and the new passphrase will overwrite the specified key-slot. If  no  key-
              slot  is specified and there is still a free key-slot, then the new passphrase will
              be put into a free key-slot before the key-slot containing the  old  passphrase  is
              purged.  If there is no free key-slot, then the key-slot with the old passphrase is
              overwritten directly.

              WARNING: If a key-slot is overwritten, a media failure during  this  operation  can
              cause  the  overwrite  to fail after the old passphrase has been wiped and make the
              LUKS container inaccessible.

              <options>     can     be     [--key-file,     --keyfile-offset,     --keyfile-size,
              --new-keyfile-offset,      --iter-time,      --pbkdf,     --pbkdf-force-iterations,
              --new-keyfile-size,  --key-slot,   --force-password,   --header,   --disable-locks,
              --type, --keyslot-cipher, --keyslot-key-size].

       luksConvertKey <device>

              Converts  an  existing  LUKS2  keyslot  to new pbkdf parameters. The passphrase for
              keyslot to be converted must be supplied interactively or  via  --key-file.  If  no
              --pbkdf parameters are specified LUKS2 default pbkdf values will apply.

              If a keyslot is specified (via --key-slot), the passphrase for that keyslot must be
              given. If no keyslot is specified and there is still a free keyslot, then  the  new
              parameters  will  be  put into a free keyslot before the keyslot containing the old
              parameters is purged. If there is no free keyslot, then the keyslot  with  the  old
              parameters is overwritten directly.

              WARNING:  If  a  keyslot  is overwritten, a media failure during this operation can
              cause the overwrite to fail after the old parameters have been wiped and  make  the
              LUKS container inaccessible.

              <options>   can   be  [--key-file,  --keyfile-offset,  --keyfile-size,  --key-slot,
              --header,   --disable-locks,   --iter-time,   --pbkdf,    --pbkdf-force-iterations,
              --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel, --keyslot-cipher, --keyslot-key-size].

       luksKillSlot <device> <key slot number>

              Wipe  the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device. Except running in batch-
              mode (-q) a remaining passphrase must be  supplied,  either  interactively  or  via
              --key-file.   This  command can remove the last remaining key-slot, but requires an
              interactive confirmation when doing so. Removing the last passphrase makes  a  LUKS
              container permanently inaccessible.

              <options>   can   be   [--key-file,   --keyfile-offset,  --keyfile-size,  --header,
              --disable-locks, --type].

              WARNING: If you read the passphrase from stdin (without further  argument  or  with
              '-'  as  an argument to --key-file), batch-mode (-q) will be implicitly switched on
              and no warning will be given when you remove the last remaining passphrase  from  a
              LUKS  container.  Removing the last passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently

              NOTE: If there is no passphrase provided (on stdin or through --key-file  argument)
              and batch-mode (-q) is active, the key-slot is removed without any other warning.

       erase <device>
       luksErase <device>

              Erase  all  keyslots  and make the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.  You do
              not need to provide any password for this operation.

              WARNING: This operation is irreversible.

       luksUUID <device>

              Print the UUID of a LUKS device.
              Set new UUID if --uuid option is specified.

       isLuks <device>

              Returns true, if <device> is a LUKS device, false otherwise.  Use option -v to  get
              human-readable feedback. 'Command successful.'  means the device is a LUKS device.

              By specifying --type you may query for specific LUKS version.

       luksDump <device>

              Dump the header information of a LUKS device.

              If  the  --dump-master-key  option  is  used,  the LUKS device master key is dumped
              instead of the keyslot info. Together with --master-key-file option, master key  is
              dumped  to  a file instead of standard output. Beware that the master key cannot be
              changed without reencryption and can be used to decrypt the data stored in the LUKS
              container without a passphrase and even without the LUKS header. This means that if
              the master key is compromised, the whole device has to be erased or reencrypted  to
              prevent further access. Use this option carefully.

              To  dump  the  master key, a passphrase has to be supplied, either interactively or
              via --key-file.

              To dump unbound key (LUKS2 format only), --unbound parameter,  specific  --key-slot
              id  and  proper  passphrase  has  to  be  supplied,  either  interactively  or  via
              --key-file.  Optional --master-key-file parameter enables unbound keyslot dump to a

              <options>  can be [--dump-master-key, --key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size,
              --header, --disable-locks, --master-key-file, --type, --unbound, --key-slot].

              WARNING:  If  --dump-master-key  is  used  with  --key-file  and  the  argument  to
              --key-file is '-', no validation question will be asked and no warning given.

       luksHeaderBackup <device> --header-backup-file <file>

              Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area.
              Note: Using '-' as filename writes the header backup to a file named '-'.

              WARNING:  This  backup  file  and  a  passphrase valid at the time of backup allows
              decryption of the LUKS data area, even if  the  passphrase  was  later  changed  or
              removed  from  the  LUKS  device.  Also note that with a header backup you lose the
              ability to securely wipe the LUKS device by just overwriting the  header  and  key-
              slots.  You  either  need  to  securely  erase  all  header  backups in addition or
              overwrite the encrypted data area as well.  The second option is  less  secure,  as
              some sectors can survive, e.g. due to defect management.

       luksHeaderRestore <device> --header-backup-file <file>

              Restores  a  binary  backup  of the LUKS header and keyslot area from the specified
              Note: Using '-' as filename reads the header backup from a file named '-'.

              WARNING: Header and keyslots will be replaced, only the passphrases from the backup
              will work afterward.

              This  command  requires that the master key size and data offset of the LUKS header
              already on the device and of the header backup match. Alternatively, if there is no
              LUKS header on the device, the backup will also be written to it.

       token <add|remove|import|export> <device>

              Action  add creates new keyring token to enable auto-activation of the device.  For
              the auto-activation, the passphrase must be stored in keyring  with  the  specified
              description.  Usually,  the  passphrase  should  be  stored in user or user-session
              keyring.  The token command is supported only for LUKS2.

              For adding new keyring token, option --key-description  is  mandatory.   Also,  new
              token is assigned to key slot specified with --key-slot option or to all active key
              slots in the case --key-slot option is omitted.

              To remove existing token, specify  the  token  ID  which  should  be  removed  with
              --token-id option.

              WARNING: The action token remove removes any token type, not just keyring type from
              token slot specified by --token-id option.

              Action import can store arbitrary valid token json  in  LUKS2  header.  It  may  be
              passed  via standard input or via file passed in --json-file option. If you specify
              --key-slot then successfully imported token is also assigned to the key slot.

              Action export writes requested token json to a file passed with --json-file  or  to
              standard output.

              <options>    can   be   [--header,   --token-id,   --key-slot,   --key-description,
              --disable-locks, --disable-keyring, --json-file].

       convert <device> --type <format>

              Converts the device between LUKS1 and LUKS2 format (if possible).   The  conversion
              will  not  be  performed  if  there  is  an  additional  LUKS2 feature or LUKS1 has
              unsupported header size.

              Conversion (both directions) must be performed on inactive device. There  must  not
              be active dm-crypt mapping established for LUKS header requested for conversion.

              --type option is mandatory with following accepted values: luks1 or luks2.

              WARNING:  The  convert  action  can  destroy the LUKS header in the case of a crash
              during conversion or if a media error occurs.  Always create a header backup before
              performing this operation!

              <options> can be [--header, --type].

       config <device>

              Set  permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header).  The config command is
              supported only for LUKS2.

              The permanent options can be --priority to set priority  (normal,  prefer,  ignore)
              for keyslot (specified by --key-slot) or --label and --subsystem.

              <options> can be [--priority, --label, --subsystem, --key-slot, --header].


       cryptsetup supports mapping loop-AES encrypted partition using a compatibility mode.

       open --type loopaes <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile>
       loopaesOpen <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile>  (old syntax)

              Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.

              If  the  key  file  is  encrypted with GnuPG, then you have to use --key-file=- and
              decrypt it before use, e.g. like this:
              gpg --decrypt <keyfile> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device> <name>

              WARNING: The loop-AES extension cannot use the direct input of  key  file  on  real
              terminal  because the keys are separated by end-of-line and only part of the multi-
              key file would be read.
              If you need it in script, just use the pipe redirection:
              echo $keyfile | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device> <name>

              Use --keyfile-size to specify the proper key length if needed.

              Use --offset to specify device offset. Note that the units need to be specified  in
              number of 512 byte sectors.

              Use  --skip to specify the IV offset. If the original device used an offset and but
              did not use it in IV sector calculations, you have to explicitly use  --skip  0  in
              addition to the offset parameter.

              Use  --hash to override the default hash function for passphrase hashing (otherwise
              it is detected according to key size).

              <options> can be [--key-file, --key-size,  --offset,  --skip,  --hash,  --readonly,
              --allow-discards, --refresh].

       See  also  section  7  of the FAQ and for more information
       regarding loop-AES.

TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible and VeraCrypt) EXTENSION

       cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt, tcplay or VeraCrypt  (with  --veracrypt  option)
       encrypted  partition using a native Linux kernel API.  Header formatting and TCRYPT header
       change is not supported, cryptsetup never changes TCRYPT header on-device.

       TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available (introduced in Linux
       kernel  2.6.38).  If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface for
       symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section  (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER
       .config option).

       Because  TCRYPT  header  is  encrypted,  you  have  to always provide valid passphrase and

       Cryptsetup should recognize all header variants, except legacy  cipher  chains  using  LRW
       encryption  mode  with  64  bits  encryption  block  (namely  Blowfish  in LRW mode is not
       recognized, this is limitation of kernel crypto API).

       To recognize a VeraCrypt device use the --veracrypt option.  VeraCrypt is  just  extension
       of  TrueCrypt  header  with increased iteration count so unlocking can take quite a lot of
       time (in comparison with TCRYPT device).

       To open a VeraCrypt device with  a  custom  Personal  Iteration  Multiplier  (PIM)  value,
       additionally  to  --veracrypt   use  either  the  --veracrypt-pim=<PIM> option to directly
       specify the PIM on the command- line or use --veracrypt-query-pim to be prompted  for  the

       The PIM value affects the number of iterations applied during key derivation. Please refer
       to   for
       more detailed information.

       NOTE:  Activation  with  tcryptOpen  is  supported only for cipher chains using LRW or XTS
       encryption modes.

       The tcryptDump command should work for all recognized TCRYPT devices and  doesn't  require
       superuser privilege.

       To  map  system  device (device with boot loader where the whole encrypted system resides)
       use --tcrypt-system option.  You can use partition device as the parameter (parameter must
       be real partition device, not an image in a file), then only this partition is mapped.

       If you have the whole TCRYPT device as a file image and you want to map multiple partition
       encrypted with system encryption, please create loopback  mapping  with  partitions  first
       (losetup  -P, see losetup(8) man page for more info), and use loop partition as the device

       If you use the whole base  device  as  a  parameter,  one  device  for  the  whole  system
       encryption  is  mapped.  This mode is available only for backward compatibility with older
       cryptsetup versions which mapped TCRYPT system encryption using the whole device.

       To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available), use --tcrypt-hidden option.

       To explicitly use backup (secondary) header, use --tcrypt-backup option.

       NOTE: There is no protection for a hidden volume if  the  outer  volume  is  mounted.  The
       reason  is  that  if  there were any protection, it would require some metadata describing
       what to protect in the outer volume and the hidden volume would become detectable.

       open --type tcrypt <device> <name>
       tcryptOpen <device> <name>  (old syntax)

              Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.

              <options> can be [--key-file,  --tcrypt-hidden,  --tcrypt-system,  --tcrypt-backup,
              --readonly,   --test-passphrase,  --allow-discards,  --veracrypt,  --veracrypt-pim,
              --veracrypt-query-pim, --header].

              The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the passphrase  and
              can  be  repeated.  Note  that  using  keyfiles  is  compatible  with TCRYPT and is
              different from LUKS keyfile logic.

              If you use --header in combination with hidden or system options, the  header  file
              must  contain  specific  headers  on  the  same positions as the original encrypted

              WARNING: Option --allow-discards cannot be combined  with  option  --tcrypt-hidden.
              For  normal  mapping,  it can cause the destruction of hidden volume (hidden volume
              appears as unused space for outer volume so this space can be discarded).

       tcryptDump <device>

              Dump the header information of a TCRYPT device.

              If the --dump-master-key option is used, the TCRYPT device  master  key  is  dumped
              instead  of  TCRYPT header info. Beware that the master key (or concatenated master
              keys if cipher chain is used) can be used to decrypt the data stored in the  TCRYPT
              container  without a passphrase.  This means that if the master key is compromised,
              the whole device has to be erased  to  prevent  further  access.  Use  this  option

              <options>  can be [--dump-master-key, --key-file, --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system,

              The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the passphrase  and
              can be repeated.

       See also for more information regarding TrueCrypt.

       Please  note  that  cryptsetup  does  not  use  TrueCrypt code, please report all problems
       related to this compatibility extension to the cryptsetup project.

BITLK (Windows BitLocker-compatible) EXTENSION (EXPERIMENTAL)

       cryptsetup supports mapping of BitLocker and BitLocker to Go encrypted partition  using  a
       native  Linux  kernel  API.  Header formatting and BITLK header changes are not supported,
       cryptsetup never changes BITLK header on-device.

       WARNING: This extension is EXPERIMENTAL.

       BITLK extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to  be  available  (for  details  see
       TCRYPT section).

       Cryptsetup  should  recognize  all  BITLK  header  variants,  except legacy header used in
       Windows Vista systems and partially decrypted BitLocker  devices.   Activation  of  legacy
       devices  encrypted  in CBC mode requires at least Linux kernel version 5.3 and for devices
       using Elephant diffuser kernel 5.6.

       The bitlkDump command should work for all recognized BITLK  devices  and  doesn't  require
       superuser privilege.

       For  unlocking  with  the open a password or a recovery passphrase must be provided. Other
       unlocking methods (TPM, SmartCard) are not supported.

       open --type bitlk <device> <name>
       bitlkOpen <device> <name>  (old syntax)

              Opens the BITLK (a BitLocker-compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.

              <options> can be [--key-file, --readonly, --test-passphrase, --allow-discards].

       bitlkDump <device>

              Dump the header information of a BITLK device.

              Please note that cryptsetup does not use any Windows BitLocker code, please  report
              all problems related to this compatibility extension to the cryptsetup project.


       repair <device>

              Tries  to repair the device metadata if possible. Currently supported only for LUKS
              device type.

              This command is useful to fix some known benign LUKS metadata  header  corruptions.
              Only basic corruptions of unused keyslot are fixable. This command will only change
              the LUKS header, not any key-slot data. You may  enforce  LUKS  version  by  adding
              --type option.

              WARNING:  Always  create a binary backup of the original header before calling this

       benchmark <options>

              Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function).  Without parameters, it tries
              to measure few common configurations.

              To  benchmark  other  ciphers or modes, you need to specify --cipher and --key-size
              options or --hash for KDF test.

              NOTE: This benchmark is using memory only and  is  only  informative.   You  cannot
              directly predict real storage encryption speed from it.

              For  testing  block ciphers, this benchmark requires kernel userspace crypto API to
              be available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38).  If you  are  configuring  kernel
              yourself,  enable  "User-space  interface  for  symmetric key cipher algorithms" in
              "Cryptographic API" section (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).

              <options> can be [--cipher, --key-size, --hash].


       --verbose, -v
              Print more information on command execution.

       --debug or --debug-json
              Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output lines are always prefixed
              by  '#'.   If  --debug-json  is  used,  additional  LUKS2  JSON data structures are

       --type <device-type>
              Specifies required device type, for more info read BASIC ACTIONS section.

       --hash, -h <hash-spec>
              Specifies the passphrase hash for open (for plain and loopaes device types).

              Specifies the hash used in the LUKS key setup scheme  and  volume  key  digest  for
              luksFormat.  The specified hash is used as hash-parameter for PBKDF2 and for the AF

              The specified hash name is passed to the  compiled-in  crypto  backend.   Different
              backends  may  support  different  hashes.  For luksFormat, the hash algorithm must
              provide at least 160 bits of output, which excludes, e.g., MD5. Do not use  a  non-
              crypto hash like "crc32" as this breaks security.

              Values  compatible  with  old version of cryptsetup are "ripemd160" for open --type
              plain and "sha1" for luksFormat.

              Use cryptsetup --help to show the defaults.

       --cipher, -c <cipher-spec>
              Set the cipher specification string.

              cryptsetup --help shows the compiled-in  defaults.   The  current  default  in  the
              distributed  sources  is  "aes-cbc-essiv:sha256"  for  plain dm-crypt and "aes-xts-
              plain64" for LUKS.

              If a hash is part of the cipher specification, then it is used as part  of  the  IV
              generation.  For example, ESSIV needs a hash function, while "plain64" does not and
              hence none is specified.

              For XTS mode you can optionally set a key size of 512 bits with the -s option.  Key
              size for XTS mode is twice that for other modes for the same security level.

              XTS  mode  requires  kernel  2.6.24  or later and plain64 requires kernel 2.6.33 or
              later. More information can be found in the FAQ.

       --verify-passphrase, -y
              When interactively asking for a passphrase, ask for it twice and complain  if  both
              inputs do not match. Advised when creating a regular mapping for the first time, or
              when running luksFormat. Ignored on input from file or stdin.

       --key-file, -d name
              Read the passphrase from file.

              If the name given is "-", then the passphrase will be read  from  stdin.   In  this
              case, reading will not stop at newline characters.

              With  LUKS, passphrases supplied via --key-file are always the existing passphrases
              requested by a command, except in  the  case  of  luksFormat  where  --key-file  is
              equivalent to the positional key file argument.

              If  you  want  to  set  a new passphrase via key file, you have to use a positional
              argument to luksAddKey.

              See section NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING for more information.

       --keyfile-offset value
              Skip value bytes at the beginning of the key file.  Works with  all  commands  that
              accept key files.

       --keyfile-size, -l value
              Read  a maximum of value bytes from the key file.  The default is to read the whole
              file up to the compiled-in maximum that can be queried with --help. Supplying  more
              data than the compiled-in maximum aborts the operation.

              This option is useful to cut trailing newlines, for example. If --keyfile-offset is
              also given, the size count starts after the offset.  Works with all  commands  that
              accept key files.

       --new-keyfile-offset value
              Skip  value  bytes  at  the  start  when adding a new passphrase from key file with

       --new-keyfile-size  value
              Read a maximum of value bytes when adding a  new  passphrase  from  key  file  with
              luksAddKey.   The  default  is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in maximum
              length that can be queried with  --help.   Supplying  more  than  the  compiled  in
              maximum  aborts  the  operation.   When --new-keyfile-offset is also given, reading
              starts after the offset.

              Use a master key stored in a file.

              For luksFormat this allows creating a LUKS header with this specific master key. If
              the  master key was taken from an existing LUKS header and all other parameters are
              the same, then the new header decrypts the  data  encrypted  with  the  header  the
              master key was taken from.

              Action  luksDump together with --dump-master-key option: The volume (master) key is
              stored in a file instead of being printed out to standard output.

              WARNING: If you create your own master key, you need to make sure to do  it  right.
              Otherwise,  you  can  end  up with a low-entropy or otherwise partially predictable
              master key which will compromise security.

              For luksAddKey this allows adding a  new  passphrase  without  having  to  know  an
              existing one.

              For open this allows one to open the LUKS device without giving a passphrase.

              For  luksDump this option includes the master key in the displayed information. Use
              with care, as the master key can be used to bypass the passphrases, see also option

              Read  token  json  from  a  file  or  write  token to it. See token action for more
              information. --json-file=- reads json from standard input or writes it to  standard
              output respectively.


              For  luksFormat  these  options define which kernel random number generator will be
              used to create the master key (which is a long-term key).

              See NOTES ON RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS for more information. Use  cryptsetup  --help
              to show the compiled-in default random number generator.

              WARNING:  In  a low-entropy situation (e.g. in an embedded system), both selections
              are problematic.  Using /dev/urandom can lead to weak keys.  Using /dev/random  can
              block  a  long time, potentially forever, if not enough entropy can be harvested by
              the kernel.

       --key-slot, -S <0-7>
              For LUKS operations that add key material, this options allows you to specify which
              key  slot is selected for the new key.  This option can be used for luksFormat, and
              In addition, for open, this option selects  a  specific  key-slot  to  compare  the
              passphrase against.  If the given passphrase would only match a different key-slot,
              the operation fails.

       --key-size, -s <bits>
              Sets key size in bits. The argument has to be a multiple of 8.  The  possible  key-
              sizes are limited by the cipher and mode used.

              See /proc/crypto for more information. Note that key-size in /proc/crypto is stated
              in bytes.

              This option can be used for open  --type  plain  or  luksFormat.   All  other  LUKS
              actions  will use the key-size specified in the LUKS header.  Use cryptsetup --help
              to show the compiled-in defaults.

       --size, -b <number of 512 byte sectors>
              Set the size of the device in sectors of 512 bytes.  This option is  only  relevant
              for the open and resize actions.

       --offset, -o <number of 512 byte sectors>
              Start  offset  in  the  backend  device  in  512-byte sectors.  This option is only
              relevant for the open action with plain or loopaes device types or for LUKS devices
              in luksFormat.

              For  LUKS,  the  --offset  option sets the data offset (payload) of data device and
              must be be aligned to 4096-byte sectors (must  be  multiple  of  8).   This  option
              cannot be combined with --align-payload option.

       --skip, -p <number of 512 byte sectors>
              Start  offset  used  in IV calculation in 512-byte sectors (how many sectors of the
              encrypted data to skip at the beginning).  This option is  only  relevant  for  the
              open action with plain or loopaes device types.

              Hence,  if  --offset  n,  and --skip s, sector n (the first sector of the encrypted
              device) will get a sector number of s for the IV calculation.

       --device-size size[units]
              Instead of real device size, use specified value.

              With reencrypt action it means that only specified area  (from  the  start  of  the
              device to the specified size) will be reencrypted.

              With resize action it sets new size of the device.

              If no unit suffix is specified, the size is in bytes.

              Unit  suffix  can be S for 512 byte sectors, K/M/G/T (or KiB,MiB,GiB,TiB) for units
              with 1024 base or KB/MB/GB/TB for 1000 base (SI scale).

              WARNING: This is destructive operation when used with reencrypt command.

       --readonly, -r
              set up a read-only mapping.

              Creates an additional mapping for one common ciphertext device. Arbitrary  mappings
              are  supported.  This option is only relevant for the open --type plain action. Use
              --offset, --size and --skip to specify the mapped area.

       --pbkdf <PBKDF spec>
              Set Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) algorithm for LUKS keyslot.  The
              PBKDF  can  be:  pbkdf2  (for  PBKDF2 according to RFC2898), argon2i for Argon2i or
              argon2id for  Argon2id  (see  for  more

              For  LUKS1,  only  PBKDF2  is  accepted  (no need to use this option).  The default
              PBKDF2 for LUKS2 is set during compilation time  and  is  available  in  cryptsetup
              --help output.

              A  PBKDF  is used for increasing dictionary and brute-force attack cost for keyslot
              passwords. The parameters can be time, memory and parallel cost.

              For PBKDF2, only time cost (number of iterations) applies.  For  Argon2i/id,  there
              is  also  memory  cost  (memory  required during the process of key derivation) and
              parallel cost (number of threads that run in parallel during the key derivation.

              Note that increasing memory cost also increases time, so the final parameter values
              are   measured  by  a  benchmark.  The  benchmark  tries  to  find  iteration  time
              (--iter-time) with required memory cost --pbkdf-memory. If it is not possible,  the
              memory  cost is decreased as well.  The parallel cost --pbkdf-parallel is constant,
              is is checked against available CPU cores (if not available, it is  decreased)  and
              the maximum parallel cost is 4.

              You  can  see  all  PBKDF  parameters  for  particular  LUKS2 keyslot with luksDump

              NOTE: If you do not want to use  benchmark  and  want  to  specify  all  parameters
              directly,  use  --pbkdf-force-iterations  with --pbkdf-memory and --pbkdf-parallel.
              This will override the values without benchmarking.  Note it  can  cause  extremely
              long  unlocking time. Use only in specific cases, for example, if you know that the
              formatted device will be used on some small embedded system.   In  this  case,  the
              LUKS PBKDF2 digest will be set to the minimum iteration count.

       --iter-time, -i <number of milliseconds>
              The  number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF passphrase processing.  This option
              is only relevant for LUKS operations  that  set  or  change  passphrases,  such  as
              luksFormat  or  luksAddKey.   Specifying  0  as  parameter  selects the compiled-in

       --pbkdf-memory <number>
              Set the memory cost for PBKDF (for Argon2i/id  the  number  represents  kilobytes).
              Note  that  it  is  maximal value, PBKDF benchmark or available physical memory can
              decrease it.  This option is not available for PBKDF2.

       --pbkdf-parallel <number>
              Set the parallel cost for PBKDF (number of threads, up to  4).   Note  that  it  is
              maximal  value,  it  is decreased automatically if CPU online count is lower.  This
              option is not available for PBKDF2.

       --pbkdf-force-iterations <num>
              Avoid PBKDF benchmark and set time cost (iterations) directly.  It can be used  for
              LUKS/LUKS2 device only.  See --pbkdf option for more info.

       --batch-mode, -q
              Suppresses all confirmation questions. Use with care!

              If  the  -y  option  is not specified, this option also switches off the passphrase
              verification for luksFormat.

       --progress-frequency <seconds>
              Print separate line every <seconds> with wipe progress.

       --timeout, -t <number of seconds>
              The number of seconds to wait before timeout on passphrase input via  terminal.  It
              is  relevant  every time a passphrase is asked, for example for open, luksFormat or
              luksAddKey.  It has no effect if used in conjunction with --key-file.
              This option is useful when the system should not stall if the user does not input a
              passphrase,  e.g.  during boot. The default is a value of 0 seconds, which means to
              wait forever.

       --tries, -T
              How often the input of the passphrase shall be retried.  This  option  is  relevant
              every  time  a passphrase is asked, for example for open, luksFormat or luksAddKey.
              The default is 3 tries.

       --align-payload <number of 512 byte sectors>
              Align payload at a boundary of value 512-byte sectors.  This option is relevant for

              If  not specified, cryptsetup tries to use the topology info provided by the kernel
              for the underlying device to get the optimal alignment.  If not available  (or  the
              calculated value is a multiple of the default) data is by default aligned to a 1MiB
              boundary (i.e. 2048 512-byte sectors).

              For a detached LUKS header, this option specifies the offset on  the  data  device.
              See also the --header option.

              WARNING:  This  option  is  DEPRECATED  and has often unexpected impact to the data
              offset and keyslot area size (for LUKS2) due to the complex  rounding.   For  fixed
              data device offset use --offset option instead.

              Use  the  provided UUID for the luksFormat command instead of generating a new one.
              Changes the existing UUID when used with the luksUUID command.

              The   UUID   must   be   provided   in   the    standard    UUID    format,    e.g.

              Allow  the  use  of  discard  (TRIM)  requests for the device.  This option is only
              relevant for open action.  This is also not supported for LUKS2 devices  with  data
              integrity protection.

              WARNING:  This  command  can  have  a  negative security impact because it can make
              filesystem-level  operations  visible  on  the  physical   device.   For   example,
              information  leaking  filesystem type, used space, etc. may be extractable from the
              physical device if the discarded blocks can be located later. If in doubt,  do  not
              use it.

              A  kernel  version  of  3.1 or later is needed. For earlier kernels, this option is

              Perform encryption using the same cpu that IO was submitted on.  The default is  to
              use  an unbound workqueue so that encryption work is automatically balanced between
              available CPUs.  This option is only relevant for open action.

              NOTE: This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning,  use
              only if you need a change to default dm-crypt behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.

              Disable  offloading  writes  to a separate thread after encryption.  There are some
              situations where offloading write bios from the  encryption  threads  to  a  single
              thread degrades performance significantly.  The default is to offload write bios to
              the same thread.  This option is only relevant for open action.

              NOTE: This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning,  use
              only if you need a change to default dm-crypt behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.

       --perf-no_read_workqueue, --perf-no_write_workqueue
              Bypass   dm-crypt   internal   workqueue   and   process  read  or  write  requests
              synchronously.  This option is only relevant for open action.

              NOTE: These options are available only for low-level dm-crypt  performance  tuning,
              use  only  if  you need a change to default dm-crypt behaviour. Needs kernel 5.9 or

              Do not activate the device, just verify passphrase.  This option is  only  relevant
              for open action (the device mapping name is not mandatory if this option is used).

       --header <device or file storing the LUKS header>
              Use a detached (separated) metadata device or file where the LUKS header is stored.
              This option allows one to store ciphertext and LUKS header on different devices.

              This option is only relevant for LUKS devices and can be used with the  luksFormat,
              open, luksSuspend, luksResume, status and resize commands.

              For  luksFormat  with  a  file  name  as the argument to --header, the file will be
              automatically created if it does not exist.  See the cryptsetup FAQ for header size

              For  other  commands  that  change  the  LUKS header (e.g. luksAddKey), specify the
              device or file with the LUKS header directly as the LUKS device.

              If used with luksFormat, the --align-payload option is  taken  as  absolute  sector
              alignment on ciphertext device and can be zero.

              WARNING: There is no check whether the ciphertext device specified actually belongs
              to the header given. In fact, you can specify an arbitrary device as the ciphertext
              device for open with the --header option. Use with care.

       --header-backup-file <file>
              Specify file with header backup for luksHeaderBackup or luksHeaderRestore actions.

              Do not use password quality checking for new LUKS passwords.

              This option applies only to luksFormat, luksAddKey and luksChangeKey and is ignored
              if cryptsetup is built without password quality checking support.

              For  more  info  about  password  quality  check,   see   the   manual   page   for
              pwquality.conf(5) and passwdqc.conf(5).

              Defers device removal in close command until the last user closes it.

              Disable  lock protection for metadata on disk.  This option is valid only for LUKS2
              and ignored for other formats.

              WARNING: Do not  use  this  option  unless  you  run  cryptsetup  in  a  restricted
              environment  where locking is impossible to perform (where /run directory cannot be

              Do not load volume key in kernel keyring and store  it  directly  in  the  dm-crypt
              target instead.  This option is supported only for the LUKS2 format.

       --key-description <text>
              Set key description in keyring for use with token command.

       --priority <normal|prefer|ignore>
              Set  a  priority  for  LUKS2  keyslot.   The prefer priority marked slots are tried
              before normal priority.  The ignored priority means, that slot is  never  used,  if
              not explicitly requested by --key-slot option.

              Specify  what  token  to  use  in  actions  token, open or resize.  If omitted, all
              available tokens will be checked before proceeding further with passphrase prompt.

              Do not proceed further with  action  (any  of  token,  open  or  resize)  if  token
              activation  failed.  Without  the  option,  action  asks  for passphrase to proceed

       --sector-size <bytes>
              Set sector size for use with disk encryption. It must be power of two and in  range
              512  - 4096 bytes. The default is 512 bytes sectors.  This option is available only
              in the LUKS2 mode.

              Note that if sector size is higher than underlying device hardware sector and there
              is  not integrity protection that uses data journal, using this option can increase
              risk on incomplete sector writes during a power fail.

              If used together with --integrity option and dm-integrity journal, the atomicity of
              writes  is  guaranteed in all cases (but it cost write performance - data has to be
              written twice).

              Increasing sector size from 512 bytes to 4096 bytes can provide better  performance
              on   most  of  the  modern  storage  devices  and  also  with  some  hw  encryption

              Count Initialization Vector (IV) in larger sector size  (if  set)  instead  of  512
              bytes  sectors.  This option can be used only for open command and plain encryption

              NOTE: This option does not have any performance or security impact, use it only for
              accessing  incompatible  existing  disk images from other systems that require this

              If used with LUKS2 devices and  activation  commands  like  open  or  refresh,  the
              specified  activation  flags  are  persistently written into metadata and used next
              time automatically even for normal activation.  (No need to use  cryptab  or  other
              system configuration files.)

              If you need to remove a persistent flag, use --persistent without the flag you want
              to remove (e.g. to disable  persistently  stored  discard  flag,  use  --persistent
              without --allow-discards).

              Only    --allow-discards,   --perf-same_cpu_crypt,   --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus,
              --perf-no_read_workqueue, --perf-no_write_workqueue and --integrity-no-journal  can
              be stored persistently.

              Refreshes  an  active  device  with  new  set  of  parameters.  See  action refresh
              description for more details.

       --label <LABEL>
              --subsystem <SUBSYSTEM> Set label and subsystem description for LUKS2  device,  can
              be  used in config and format actions.  The label and subsystem are optional fields
              and can be later used in udev scripts  for  triggering  user  actions  once  device
              marked by these labels is detected.

       --integrity <integrity algorithm>
              Specify integrity algorithm to be used for authenticated disk encryption in LUKS2.

              WARNING:  This  extension  is  EXPERIMENTAL and requires dm-integrity kernel target
              (available since kernel version 4.12).  For native AEAD modes, also  enable  "User-
              space  interface  for  AEAD  cipher  algorithms"  in  "Cryptographic  API"  section
              (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD .config option).

              For more info, see AUTHENTICATED DISK ENCRYPTION section.

       --luks2-metadata-size <size>
              This option can be used to enlarge  the  LUKS2  metadata  (JSON)  area.   The  size
              includes  4096 bytes for binary metadata (usable JSON area is smaller of the binary
              area).  According to LUKS2 specification, only these values are valid: 16, 32,  64,
              128,  256, 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 kB The <size> can be specified with unit suffix
              (for example 128k).

       --luks2-keyslots-size <size>
              This option can be used to set specific size of the LUKS2 binary keyslot area  (key
              material  is  encrypted there). The value must be aligned to multiple of 4096 bytes
              with maximum size 128MB.  The <size> can be specified with unit suffix (for example

       --keyslot-cipher <cipher-spec>
              This  option  can  be  used to set specific cipher encryption for the LUKS2 keyslot

       --keyslot-key-size <bits>
              This option can be used to set specific key size for the LUKS2 keyslot area.

              Activate device with integrity protection without using data journal (direct  write
              of  data  and integrity tags).  Note that without journal power fail can cause non-
              atomic write and data corruption.  Use  only  if  journalling  is  performed  on  a
              different storage layer.

              Skip  wiping  of  device  authentication  (integrity)  tags. If you skip this step,
              sectors will report invalid integrity tag until an application write to the sector.

              NOTE: Even some writes to the device can fail if the write is not aligned  to  page
              size and page-cache initiates read of a sector with invalid integrity tag.


              Creates  new  or  dumps  existing LUKS2 unbound keyslot. See luksAddKey or luksDump
              actions for more details.

              --tcrypt-system --tcrypt-backup Specify which TrueCrypt on-disk header will be used
              to open the device.  See TCRYPT section for more info.

              Allow VeraCrypt compatible mode. Only for TCRYPT extension.  See TCRYPT section for
              more info.

              --veracrypt-query-pim  Use  a  custom  Personal  Iteration  Multiplier  (PIM)   for
              VeraCrypt device.  See TCRYPT section for more info.

              Use a global lock to serialize unlocking of keyslots using memory-hard PBKDF.

              NOTE:  This is (ugly) workaround for a specific situation when multiple devices are
              activated in parallel  and  system  instead  of  reporting  out  of  memory  starts
              unconditionally stop processes using out-of-memory killer.

              DO  NOT  USE  this switch until you are implementing boot environment with parallel
              devices activation!

              Initialize (and run) device encryption (reencrypt action parameter)

              Initialize (and run) device decryption (reencrypt action parameter)

              Initialize reencryption (any variant) operation in LUKS2 metadata only and exit. If
              any  reencrypt  operation  is  already  initialized  in  metadata, the command with
              --init-only parameter fails.

              Resume reencryption (any variant) operation already described in LUKS2 metadata. If
              no  reencrypt  operation  is  initialized, the command with --resume-only parameter
              fails. Useful for resuming reencrypt operation without accidentally triggering  new
              reencryption operation.

       --resilience <mode>
              Reencryption resilience mode can be one of checksum, journal or none.

              checksum:  default  mode,  where individual checksums of ciphertext hotzone sectors
              are stored, so  the  recovery  process  can  detect  which  sectors  where  already
              reencrypted.  It requires that the device sector write is atomic.

              journal:  the  hotzone  is  journaled  in  the binary area (so the data are written

              none: performance mode. There is no protection  and  the  only  way  it's  safe  to
              interrupt  the  reencryption  is  similar  to  old  offline  reencryption  utility.

              The option is ignored if reencryption with datashift mode is in progress.

       --resilience-hash <hash>
              The hash algorithm used with "--resilience checksum" only.   The  default  hash  is
              sha256. With other resilience modes, the hash parameter is ignored.

       --hotzone-size <size>
              This  option  can  be  used  to set an upper limit on the size of reencryption area
              (hotzone).  The <size> can be specified with unit suffix (for  example  50M).  Note
              that actual hotzone size may be less than specified <size> due to other limitations
              (free space in keyslots area or available memory).

       --reduce-device-size <size>
              Initialize LUKS2 reencryption with  data  device  size  reduction  (currently  only
              --encrypt variant is supported).

              Last  <size>  sectors  of  <device>  will  be  used  to  properly initialize device
              reencryption.  That means any data at last <size> sectors will be lost.

              It could be useful if you added some  space  to  underlying  partition  or  logical
              volume (so last <size> sectors contains no data).

              Recommended    minimal    size   is   twice   the   default   LUKS2   header   size
              (--reduce-device-size 32M) for --encrypt use case. Be sure to have enough (at least
              --reduce-device-size value      of free space at the end of <device>).

              WARNING:  This is a destructive operation and cannot be reverted.  Use with extreme
              care - accidentally overwritten filesystems are usually unrecoverable.

              Show the program version.

              Show short option help.

       --help, -?
              Show help text and default parameters.


       Example 1: Create LUKS 2 container on block device /dev/sdX.
              sudo cryptsetup --type luks2 luksFormat /dev/sdX

       Example 2: Add an additional passphrase to key slot 5.
              sudo cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-slot 5 /dev/sdX

       Example 3: Create LUKS header backup and save it to file.
              sudo      cryptsetup      luksHeaderBackup      /dev/sdX       --header-backup-file

       Example 4: Open LUKS contaner on /dev/sdX and map it to sdX_crypt.
              sudo cryptsetup open /dev/sdX sdX_crypt

       WARNING: The command in example 5 will erase all key slots.
              Your  cannot use your luks container afterwards anymore unless you have a backup to

       Example 5: Erase all key slots on /dev/sdX.
              sudo cryptsetup erase /dev/sdX

       Example 6: Restore LUKS header from backup file.
              sudo      cryptsetup      luksHeaderRestore      /dev/sdX      --header-backup-file


       Cryptsetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.

       Error  codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission (bad passphrase), 3 out of memory, 4
       wrong device specified, 5 device already exists or device is busy.


       Note that no iterated hashing or salting is done in plain mode.  If hashing is done, it is
       a  single direct hash. This means that low-entropy passphrases are easy to attack in plain

       From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first newline,  i.e.  '\n'.   The  input
       without  the  newline  character  is processed with the default hash or the hash specified
       with --hash.  The hash result will be truncated to the key size of the used cipher, or the
       size specified with -s.

       From  stdin:  Reading  will  continue  until a newline (or until the maximum input size is
       reached), with the trailing newline stripped. The maximum input size  is  defined  by  the
       same  compiled-in  default  as  for the maximum key file size and can be overwritten using
       --keyfile-size option.

       The data read will be hashed with the default hash or the hash specified with --hash.  The
       hash  result  will  be truncated to the key size of the used cipher, or the size specified
       with -s.

       Note that if --key-file=- is used for reading the key from stdin,  trailing  newlines  are
       not stripped from the input.

       If  "plain"  is used as argument to --hash, the input data will not be hashed. Instead, it
       will be zero padded (if shorter than the key size) or truncated (if longer  than  the  key
       size) and used directly as the binary key. This is useful for directly specifying a binary
       key.  No warning will be given if the amount of data read from stdin is less than the  key

       From a key file: It will be truncated to the key size of the used cipher or the size given
       by -s and directly used as a binary key.

       WARNING: The --hash argument is being ignored.  The --hash option is usable only for stdin
       input in plain mode.

       If  the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup will quit with an error.  The maximum
       input size is defined by the same compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and
       can be overwritten using --keyfile-size option.


       LUKS uses PBKDF2 to protect against dictionary attacks and to give some protection to low-
       entropy passphrases (see RFC 2898 and the cryptsetup FAQ).

       From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first  newline  and  then  processed  by
       PBKDF2 without the newline character.

       From stdin: LUKS will read passphrases from stdin up to the first newline character or the
       compiled-in maximum key file length. If --keyfile-size is given, it is ignored.

       From key file: The complete keyfile is read up to the compiled-in  maximum  size.  Newline
       characters do not terminate the input. The --keyfile-size option can be used to limit what
       is read.

       Passphrase processing: Whenever a passphrase  is  added  to  a  LUKS  header  (luksAddKey,
       luksFormat),  the  user  may  specify  how  much the time the passphrase processing should
       consume. The time is used to determine the iteration count for  PBKDF2  and  higher  times
       will  offer  better  protection  for low-entropy passphrases, but open will take longer to
       complete. For passphrases that have entropy  higher  than  the  used  key  length,  higher
       iteration times will not increase security.

       The default setting of one or two seconds is sufficient for most practical cases. The only
       exception is a low-entropy passphrase used on a device with  a  slow  CPU,  as  this  will
       result  in  a  low  iteration count. On a slow device, it may be advisable to increase the
       iteration time using the --iter-time option in order to obtain a higher  iteration  count.
       This does slow down all later luksOpen operations accordingly.


       LUKS  checks  for a valid passphrase when an encrypted partition is unlocked. The behavior
       of plain dm-crypt is different.  It will always decrypt with the passphrase given. If  the
       given  passphrase  is  wrong,  the  device mapped by plain dm-crypt will essentially still
       contain encrypted data and will be unreadable.


       The available combinations of ciphers, modes,  hashes  and  key  sizes  depend  on  kernel
       support.  See  /proc/crypto  for  a  list  of  available  options.  You might need to load
       additional kernel crypto modules in order to get more options.

       For the --hash option, if the crypto backend is libgcrypt, then all  algorithms  supported
       by  the  gcrypt  library are available.  For other crypto backends, some algorithms may be


       Mathematics can't be bribed. Make sure you keep your passphrases safe.  There  are  a  few
       nice tricks for constructing a fallback, when suddenly out of the blue, your brain refuses
       to cooperate.  These fallbacks need LUKS, as it's only possible with LUKS to have multiple
       passphrases. Still, if your attacker model does not prevent it, storing your passphrase in
       a sealed envelope somewhere may be a good idea as well.


       Random Number Generators (RNG) used in cryptsetup are always the kernel RNGs  without  any
       modifications or additions to data stream produced.

       There  are  two  types  of  randomness  cryptsetup/LUKS needs. One type (which always uses
       /dev/urandom) is used for salts, the AF splitter and for wiping deleted keyslots.

       The second type is used for  the  volume  (master)  key.  You  can  switch  between  using
       /dev/random  and  /dev/urandom   here,  see  --use-random and --use-urandom options. Using
       /dev/random on a system without enough entropy sources can cause luksFormat to block until
       the  requested  amount  of  random  data is gathered. In a low-entropy situation (embedded
       system), this can take a very long time and potentially forever. At the same  time,  using
       /dev/urandom  in  a low-entropy situation will produce low-quality keys. This is a serious
       problem, but solving it is out of scope for a mere  man-page.   See  urandom(4)  for  more


       Since Linux kernel version 4.12 dm-crypt supports authenticated disk encryption.

       Normal  disk  encryption modes are length-preserving (plaintext sector is of the same size
       as a  ciphertext  sector)  and  can  provide  only  confidentiality  protection,  but  not
       cryptographically sound data integrity protection.

       Authenticated  modes  require  additional  space per-sector for authentication tag and use
       Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithms.

       If you configure LUKS2 device with data integrity protection, there will be an  underlying
       dm-integrity  device, which provides additional per-sector metadata space and also provide
       data journal protection to ensure atomicity of data and metadata  update.   Because  there
       must be additional space for metadata and journal, the available space for the device will
       be smaller than for length-preserving modes.

       The dm-crypt device then resides on top of such a dm-integrity device.  All activation and
       deactivation  of  this  device stack is performed by cryptsetup, there is no difference in
       using luksOpen for integrity protected devices.  If you want to format LUKS2  device  with
       data integrity protection, use --integrity option.

       Since  dm-integrity doesn't support discards (TRIM), dm-crypt device on top of it inherits
       this, so integrity protection mode doesn't support discards either.

       Some  integrity  modes  requires  two  independent  keys  (key  for  encryption  and   for
       authentication). Both these keys are stored in one LUKS keyslot.

       WARNING: All support for authenticated modes is experimental and there are only some modes
       available for now. Note that there are a very few authenticated encryption algorithms that
       are suitable for disk encryption. You also cannot use CRC32 or any other non-cryptographic
       checksums (other than the special integrity mode "none"). If for some reason you  want  to
       have  integrity  control  without  using  authentication  mode, then you should separately
       configure dm-integrity independently of LUKS2.


       Cryptsetup is usually used directly on a block device  (disk  partition  or  LVM  volume).
       However,  if the device argument is a file, cryptsetup tries to allocate a loopback device
       and map it into this file. This mode requires Linux kernel 2.6.25  or  more  recent  which
       supports the loop autoclear flag (loop device is cleared on the last close automatically).
       Of course, you can always map a file to a loop-device manually. See the cryptsetup FAQ for
       an example.

       When  device  mapping  is  active, you can see the loop backing file in the status command
       output. Also see losetup(8).

LUKS2 header locking

       The LUKS2 on-disk metadata is updated in  several  steps  and  to  achieve  proper  atomic
       update,  there  is  a  locking mechanism.  For an image in file, code uses flock(2) system
       call.  For a block device, lock is performed over a  special  file  stored  in  a  locking
       directory (by default /run/lock/cryptsetup).  The locking directory should be created with
       the proper security context by the distribution during the boot-up phase.  Only LUKS2 uses
       locks, other formats do not use this mechanism.


       The  reload  action is no longer supported.  Please use dmsetup(8) if you need to directly
       manipulate with the device mapping table.

       The luksDelKey was replaced with luksKillSlot.


       Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on the cryptsetup mailing list  at  <dm->  or  in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.  Please attach the output of
       the failed command with the --debug option added.


       cryptsetup originally written by Jana Saout <>
       The  LUKS  extensions  and  original  man  page  were   written   by   Clemens   Fruhwirth
       Man page extensions by Milan Broz <>.
       Man page rewrite and extension by Arno Wagner <>.


       Copyright © 2004 Jana Saout
       Copyright © 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth
       Copyright © 2012-2014 Arno Wagner
       Copyright © 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc.
       Copyright © 2009-2021 Milan Broz

       This  is  free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO warranty; not


       The LUKS website at

       The  cryptsetup   FAQ,   contained   in   the   distribution   package   and   online   at

       The cryptsetup mailing list and list archive, see FAQ entry 1.6.

       The     LUKS     version     1     on-disk     format     specification    available    at  and  LUKS   version   2   at