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NAME

     random — the entropy device

SYNOPSIS

     device random
     options RANDOM_LOADABLE
     options RANDOM_ENABLE_UMA

DESCRIPTION

     The random device returns an endless supply of random bytes when read.  It also accepts and reads data as
     any ordinary file.

     The generator will start in an unseeded state, and will block reads until it is seeded for the first time.
     This may cause trouble at system boot when keys and the like are generated from random so steps should be
     taken to ensure a seeding as soon as possible.

     It is also possible to read random bytes by using the KERN_ARND sysctl.  On the command line this could be
     done by

           sysctl -x -B 16 kern.arandom

     This sysctl will not return random bytes unless the random device is seeded.

     This initial seeding of random number generators is a bootstrapping problem that needs very careful
     attention.  In some cases, it may be difficult to find enough randomness to seed a random number generator
     until a system is fully operational, but the system requires random numbers to become fully operational.
     It is (or more accurately should be) critically important that the random device is seeded before the first
     time it is used.  In the case where a dummy or "blocking-only" device is used, it is the responsibility of
     the system architect to ensure that no blocking reads hold up critical processes.

     To see the current settings of the software random device, use the command line:

           sysctl kern.random

     which results in something like:

           kern.random.fortuna.minpoolsize: 64
           kern.random.harvest.mask_symbolic: [HIGH_PERFORMANCE], ... ,CACHED
           kern.random.harvest.mask_bin: 00111111111
           kern.random.harvest.mask: 511
           kern.random.random_sources: 'Intel Secure Key RNG'

     Other than
           kern.random.fortuna.minpoolsize
     and
           kern.random.harvest.mask
     all settings are read-only.

     The kern.random.fortuna.minpoolsize sysctl is used to set the seed threshold.  A smaller number gives a
     faster seed, but a less secure one.  In practice, values between 64 and 256 are acceptable.

     The kern.random.harvest.mask bitmask is used to select the possible entropy sources.  A 0 (zero) value
     means the corresponding source is not considered as an entropy source.  Set the bit to 1 (one) if you wish
     to use that source.  The kern.random.harvest.mask_bin and kern.random.harvest.mask_symbolic sysctls can be
     used to confirm that the choices are correct.  Note that disabled items in the latter item are listed in
     square brackets.  See random_harvest(9) for more on the harvesting of entropy.

     When options RANDOM_LOADABLE is used, the /dev/random device is not created until an "algorithm module" is
     loaded.  The only module built by default is random_fortuna.  The random_yarrow module was removed in
     FreeBSD 12.  Note that this loadable module is slightly less efficient than its compiled-in equivalent.
     This is because some functions must be locked against load and unload events, and also must be indirect
     calls to allow for removal.

     When options RANDOM_ENABLE_UMA is used, the /dev/random device will obtain entropy from the zone allocator.
     This is potentially very high rate, and if so will be of questionable use.  If this is the case, use of
     this option is not recommended.  Determining this is not trivial, so experimenting and measurement using
     tools such as dtrace(1) will be required.

RANDOMNESS

     The use of randomness in the field of computing is a rather subtle issue because randomness means different
     things to different people.  Consider generating a password randomly, simulating a coin tossing experiment
     or choosing a random back-off period when a server does not respond.  Each of these tasks requires random
     numbers, but the random numbers in each case have different requirements.

     Generation of passwords, session keys and the like requires cryptographic randomness.  A cryptographic
     random number generator should be designed so that its output is difficult to guess, even if a lot of
     auxiliary information is known (such as when it was seeded, subsequent or previous output, and so on).  On
     FreeBSD, seeding for cryptographic random number generators is provided by the random device, which
     provides real randomness.  The arc4random(3) library call provides a pseudo-random sequence which is
     generally reckoned to be suitable for simple cryptographic use.  The OpenSSL library also provides
     functions for managing randomness via functions such as RAND_bytes(3) and RAND_add(3).  Note that OpenSSL
     uses the random device for seeding automatically.

     Randomness for simulation is required in engineering or scientific software and games.  The first
     requirement of these applications is that the random numbers produced conform to some well-known, usually
     uniform, distribution.  The sequence of numbers should also appear numerically uncorrelated, as simulation
     often assumes independence of its random inputs.  Often it is desirable to reproduce the results of a
     simulation exactly, so that if the generator is seeded in the same way, it should produce the same results.
     A peripheral concern for simulation is the speed of a random number generator.

     Another issue in simulation is the size of the state associated with the random number generator, and how
     frequently it repeats itself.  For example, a program which shuffles a pack of cards should have 52!
     possible outputs, which requires the random number generator to have 52! starting states.  This means the
     seed should have at least log_2(52!) ~ 226 bits of state if the program is to stand a chance of outputting
     all possible sequences, and the program needs some unbiased way of generating these bits.  Again, the
     random device could be used for seeding here, but in practice, smaller seeds are usually considered
     acceptable.

     FreeBSD provides two families of functions which are considered suitable for simulation.  The random(3)
     family of functions provides a random integer between 0 to (2**31)−1.  The functions srandom(3),
     initstate(3) and setstate(3) are provided for deterministically setting the state of the generator and the
     function srandomdev(3) is provided for setting the state via the random device.  The drand48(3) family of
     functions are also provided, which provide random floating point numbers in various ranges.

     Randomness that is used for collision avoidance (for example, in certain network protocols) has slightly
     different semantics again.  It is usually expected that the numbers will be uniform, as this produces the
     lowest chances of collision.  Here again, the seeding of the generator is very important, as it is required
     that different instances of the generator produce independent sequences.  However, the guessability or
     reproducibility of the sequence is unimportant, unlike the previous cases.

     FreeBSD does also provide the traditional rand(3) library call, for compatibility purposes.  However, it is
     known to be poor for simulation and absolutely unsuitable for cryptographic purposes, so its use is
     discouraged.

FILES

     /dev/random

SEE ALSO

     arc4random(3), drand48(3), rand(3), RAND_add(3), RAND_bytes(3), random(3), sysctl(8), random(9)

     Ferguson, Schneier, and Kohno, Cryptography Engineering, Wiley, ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2.

HISTORY

     A random device appeared in FreeBSD 2.2.  The current software implementation, introduced in FreeBSD 10.0,
     is by Mark R V Murray, and is an implementation of the Fortuna algorithm by Ferguson et al.  It replaces
     the previous Yarrow implementation, introduced in FreeBSD 5.0.  The Yarrow algorithm is no longer supported
     by its authors, and is therefore no longer available.