NAME

       snap-confine - internal tool for confining snappy applications

SYNOPSIS

          snap-confine [--classic] [--base BASE] SECURITY_TAG COMMAND [...ARGUMENTS]

DESCRIPTION

       The  snap-confine  is  a  program  used  internally  by  snapd  to construct the execution
       environment for snap applications.

OPTIONS

       The snap-confine program accepts two options:
          --classic requests the so-called _classic_ _confinement_ in which applications are  not
          confined  at  all (like in classic systems, hence the name). This disables the use of a
          dedicated, per-snap mount namespace. The snapd service  generates  permissive  apparmor
          and seccomp profiles that allow everything.

          --base  BASE directs snap-confine to use the given base snap as the root filesystem. If
          omitted it defaults to the core snap. This is derived from snap meta-data by snapd when
          starting the application process.

FEATURES

   Apparmor profiles
       snap-confine  switches to the apparmor profile $SECURITY_TAG. The profile is mandatory and
       snap-confine will refuse to run without it.

       The profile has to be loaded into the kernel prior to using snap-confine.  Typically  this
       is  arranged  for  by snapd. The profile contains rich description of what the application
       process is allowed to do, this includes system calls, file paths, access  patterns,  linux
       capabilities,  etc.  The  apparmor  profile can also do extensive dbus mediation. Refer to
       apparmor documentation for more details.

   Seccomp profiles
       snap-confine looks for the /var/lib/snapd/seccomp/bpf/$SECURITY_TAG.bin file. This file is
       mandatory  and  snap-confine will refuse to run without it. This file contains the seccomp
       bpf binary program that is loaded into the kernel by snap-confine.

       The  file  is  generated  with   the   /usr/lib/snapd/snap-seccomp   compiler   from   the
       $SECURITY_TAG.src  file that uses a custom syntax that describes the set of allowed system
       calls and optionally their arguments. The profile is then  used  to  confine  the  started
       application.

       As  a security precaution disallowed system calls cause the started application executable
       to be killed by the kernel. In the future this restriction may be lifted to  return  EPERM
       instead.

   Mount profiles
       snap-confine  uses  a helper process, snap-update-ns, to apply the mount namespace profile
       to    freshly    constructed    mount    namespace.    That    tool    looks    for    the
       /var/lib/snapd/mount/snap.$SNAP_NAME.fstab  file.   If  present  it  is  read,  parsed and
       treated like a mostly-typical fstab(5)  file.   The  mount  directives  listed  there  are
       executed in order. All directives must succeed as any failure will abort execution.

       By  default  all  mount  entries  start with the following flags: bind, ro, nodev, nosuid.
       Some of those flags can be reversed by an appropriate option (e.g. rw can cause the  mount
       point to be writable).

       Certain  additional  features  are  enabled  and conveyed through the use of mount options
       prefixed with x-snapd-.

       As a security precaution only bind mounts are supported at this time.

   Sharing of the mount namespace
       As of version 1.0.41 all the applications from the same snap will  share  the  same  mount
       namespace. Applications from different snaps continue to use separate mount namespaces.

ENVIRONMENT

       snap-confine responds to the following environment variables

       SNAP_CONFINE_DEBUG:
              When  defined  the  program  will print additional diagnostic information about the
              actions being performed. All the output goes to stderr.

       The following variables are only used when snap-confine is not setuid root.  This is  only
       applicable when testing the program itself.

       SNAPPY_LAUNCHER_INSIDE_TESTS:
              Internal variable that should not be relied upon.

       SNAPPY_LAUNCHER_SECCOMP_PROFILE_DIR:
              Internal variable that should not be relied upon.

       SNAP_USER_DATA:
              Full path to the directory like /home/$LOGNAME/snap/$SNAP_NAME/$SNAP_REVISION.

              This  directory  is created by snap-confine on startup. This is a temporary feature
              that will be merged into snapd's snap-run command. The set of directories that  can
              be created is confined with apparmor.

FILES

       snap-confine and snap-update-ns use the following files:

       /var/lib/snapd/mount/snap.*.fstab:
          Description of the mount profile.

       /var/lib/snapd/seccomp/bpf/*.src:
          Input for the /usr/lib/snapd/snap-seccomp profile compiler.

       /var/lib/snapd/seccomp/bpf/*.bin:
          Compiled seccomp bpf profile programs.

       /run/snapd/ns/:
          Directory used to keep shared mount namespaces.

          snap-confine  internally converts this directory to a private bind mount.  Semantically
          the behavior is identical to the following mount commands:

          mount --bind /run/snapd/ns /run/snapd/ns mount --make-private /run/snapd/ns

       /run/snapd/ns/.lock:
          A flock(2)-based lock file acquired to create and convert /run/snapd/ns/ to  a  private
          bind mount.

       /run/snapd/ns/$SNAP_NAME.lock:
          A  flock(2)-based  lock file acquired to create or join the mount namespace represented
          as /run/snaps/ns/$SNAP_NAME.mnt.

       /run/snapd/ns/$SNAP_NAME.mnt:
          This file can be either:

          • An empty file that may be seen before the mount namespace is preserved  or  when  the
            mount namespace is unmounted.

          • A  file  belonging  to  the  nsfs  file  system, representing a fully populated mount
            namespace of a given snap. The file is bind mounted from /proc/self/ns/mnt  from  the
            first process in any snap.

       /proc/self/mountinfo:
          This  file  is  read to decide if /run/snapd/ns/ needs to be created and converted to a
          private bind mount, as described above.

       Note that the apparmor profile is external to snap-confine and is loaded directly into the
       kernel. The actual apparmor profile is managed by snapd.

BUGS

       Please report all bugs with https://bugs.launchpad.net/snapd/+filebug

AUTHOR

       zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com

COPYRIGHT

       Canonical Ltd.