Provided by: openiked_7.2-1_amd64 
NAME
iked.conf — IKEv2 configuration file
DESCRIPTION
iked.conf is the configuration file for iked(8), the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2)
daemon for IPsec. IPsec itself is a pair of protocols: Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP), which provides integrity and confidentiality; and Authentication Header (AH), which
provides integrity. The IPsec protocol itself is described in ipsec(4).
In its most basic form, a flow is established between hosts and/or networks, and then
Security Associations (SA) are established, which detail how the desired protection will be
achieved. IPsec uses flows to determine whether to apply security services to an IP packet
or not. iked(8) is used to set up flows and establish SAs automatically, by specifying
‘ikev2’ policies in iked.conf (see AUTOMATIC KEYING POLICIES, below).
Alternative methods of setting up flows and SAs are also possible using manual keying or
automatic keying using the older ISAKMP/Oakley a.k.a. IKEv1 protocol. Manual keying is not
recommended, but can be convenient for quick setups and testing. See ipsec.conf(5) and
isakmpd(8) for more information about manual keying and ISAKMP support.
IKED.CONF FILE FORMAT
iked.conf is divided into three main sections:
Macros
User-defined macros may be defined and used later, simplifying the configuration file.
Global Configuration
Global settings for iked(8).
Automatic Keying Policies
Policies to set up IPsec flows and SAs automatically.
Lines beginning with ‘#’ and empty lines are regarded as comments, and ignored. Lines may
be split using the ‘\’ character.
Argument names not beginning with a letter, digit, or underscore must be quoted.
Addresses can be specified in CIDR notation (matching netblocks), as symbolic host names,
interface names, or interface group names.
Additional configuration files can be included with the include keyword, for example:
include "/etc/macros.conf"
Certain parameters can be expressed as lists, in which case iked(8) generates all the
necessary flow combinations. For example:
ikev2 esp proto { tcp, udp } \
from 192.168.1.1 to 10.0.0.18 \
peer 192.168.10.1
MACROS
Macros can be defined that will later be expanded in context. Macro names must start with a
letter, digit, or underscore, and may contain any of those characters. Macro names may not
be reserved words (for example flow, from, esp). Macros are not expanded inside quotes.
For example:
remote_gw = "192.168.3.12"
ikev2 esp from 192.168.7.0/24 to 192.168.8.0/24 peer $remote_gw
GLOBAL CONFIGURATION
Here are the settings that can be set globally:
set active
Set iked(8) to global active mode. In active mode the per-policy mode setting is
respected. iked(8) will initiate policies set to active and wait for incoming
requests for policies set to passive. This is the default.
set passive
Set iked(8) to global passive mode. In passive mode no packets are sent to peers and
no connections are initiated by iked(8), even for active policies. This option is
used for setups using sasyncd(8) and carp(4) to provide redundancy. iked(8) will run
in passive mode until sasyncd has determined that the host is the master and can
switch to active mode.
set couple
Load the negotiated security associations (SAs) and flows into the kernel. This is
the default.
set decouple
Don't load the negotiated SAs and flows from the kernel. This mode is only useful for
testing and debugging.
set dpd_check_interval time
Specify the liveness check interval, in seconds. Setting time to 0 disables DPD. The
default value is 60 seconds.
set enforcesingleikesa
Allow only a single active IKE SA for each dstid. When a new SA with the same dstid
is established, it replaces the old SA.
set noenforcesingleikesa
Don't limit the number of IKE SAs per dstid. This is the default.
set fragmentation
Enable IKEv2 Message Fragmentation (RFC 7383) support. This allows IKEv2 to operate
in environments that might block IP fragments.
set nofragmentation
Disables IKEv2 Message Fragmentation support. This is the default.
set mobike
Enable MOBIKE (RFC 4555) support. This is the default. MOBIKE allows the peer IP
address to be changed for IKE and IPsec SAs. Currently iked(8) only supports MOBIKE
when acting as a responder.
set nomobike
Disables MOBIKE support.
set cert_partial_chain
Allow partial certificate chain if at least one certificate is a trusted CA from
/etc/iked/ca/.
set ocsp URL [tolerate time [maxage time]]
Enable OCSP and set the fallback URL of the OCSP responder. This fallback will be
used if the trusted CA from /etc/iked/ca/ does not have an OCSP-URL extension. The
matching responder certificates have to be placed in /etc/iked/ocsp/responder.crt.
The optional tolerate parameter specifies how much the OCSP response attribute
‘thisUpdate’ may be in the future and how much ‘nextUpdate’ may be in the past, with
respect to the local time. The optional maxage parameter specifies how much
‘thisUpdate’ may be in the past. If tolerate is set to 0 then the times are not
verified at all. This is the default setting.
set vendorid
Send OpenIKED Vendor ID payload. This is the default.
set novendorid
Don't send a Vendor ID payload.
user name password
iked(8) supports user-based authentication by tunneling the Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) over IKEv2. In its most basic form, the users will be authenticated
against a local, integrated password database that is configured with the user lines
in iked.conf and the name and password arguments. The password has to be specified in
plain text which is required to support different challenge-based EAP methods like
EAP-MD5 or EAP-MSCHAPv2.
AUTOMATIC KEYING POLICIES
This section is used to configure policies that will be used by iked(8) to set up flows and
SAs automatically. Some examples of setting up automatic keying:
# Set up a VPN:
# First between the gateway machines 192.168.3.1 and 192.168.3.2
# Second between the networks 10.1.1.0/24 and 10.1.2.0/24
ikev2 esp from 192.168.3.1 to 192.168.3.2
ikev2 esp from 10.1.1.0/24 to 10.1.2.0/24 peer 192.168.3.2
For incoming connections from remote peers, the policies are evaluated in sequential order,
from first to last. The last matching policy decides what action is taken; if no policy
matches the connection, the default action is to ignore the connection attempt or to use the
default policy, if set. See the EXAMPLES section for a detailed example of the policy
evaluation.
The first time an IKEv2 connection matches a policy, an IKE SA is created; for subsequent
packets the connection is identified by the IKEv2 parameters that are stored in the SA
without evaluating any policies. After the connection is closed or times out, the IKE SA is
automatically removed.
The commands are as follows:
ikev2 [name]
The mandatory ikev2 keyword will identify an IKEv2 automatic keying policy. name is
an optional arbitrary string identifying the policy. The name should only occur once
in iked.conf or any included files. If omitted, a name will be generated
automatically for the policy.
[eval]
The eval option modifies the policy evaluation for this policy. It can be one of
quick, skip or default. If a new incoming connection matches a policy with the quick
option set, that policy is considered the last matching policy, and evaluation of
subsequent policies is skipped. The skip option will disable evaluation of this
policy for incoming connections. The default option sets the default policy and
should only be specified once.
[mode]
mode specifies the IKEv2 mode to use: one of passive or active. When passive is
specified, iked(8) will not immediately start negotiation of this tunnel, but wait for
an incoming request from the remote peer. When active is specified, negotiation will
be started at once. If omitted, passive mode will be used.
[ipcomp]
The keyword ipcomp specifies that ipcomp(4), the IP Payload Compression protocol, is
negotiated in addition to encapsulation. The optional compression is applied before
packets are encapsulated. IPcomp must be enabled in the kernel:
# sysctl net.inet.ipcomp.enable=1
[tmode]
tmode describes the encapsulation mode to be used. Possible modes are tunnel and
transport; the default is tunnel.
[encap]
encap specifies the encapsulation protocol to be used. Possible protocols are esp and
ah; the default is esp.
[af] This policy only applies to endpoints of the specified address family which can be
either inet or inet6. This only matters for IKEv2 endpoints and does not restrict the
traffic selectors to negotiate flows with different address families, e.g. IPv6 flows
negotiated by IPv4 endpoints.
proto protocol
proto { protocol ... }
The optional proto parameter restricts the flow to a specific IP protocol. Common
protocols are icmp(4), tcp(4), and udp(4). For a list of all the protocol name to
number mappings used by iked(8), see the file /etc/protocols.
Multiple protocol entries can be specified, separated by commas or whitespace, if
enclosed in curly brackets:
proto { tcp, udp }
rdomain number
Specify a different routing domain for unencrypted traffic. The resulting IPsec SAs
will match outgoing packets in the specified rdomain number and move the encrypted
packets to the rdomain the iked(8) instance is running in. Vice versa, incoming
ipsec(4) traffic is moved to rdomain number after decryption.
from src [port sport] [(srcnat)] to dst [port dport]
Specify one or more traffic selectors for this policy which will be used to negotiate
the IPsec flows between the IKEv2 peers. During the negotiation, the peers may decide
to narrow a flow to a subset of the configured traffic selector networks to match the
policies on each side.
Each traffic selector will apply for packets with source address src and destination
address dst. If the src argument specifies a fictional source ID, the srcnat
parameter can be used to specify the actual source address. This can be used in
outgoing NAT/BINAT scenarios as described below. The keyword any will match any
address (i.e. 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0). If the config address option is specified, the
dynamic keyword can be used to create flows from or to the dynamically assigned
address.
The optional port modifiers restrict the traffic selectors to the specified ports.
They are only valid in conjunction with the tcp(4) and udp(4) protocols. Ports can be
specified by number or by name. For a list of all port name to number mappings used
by ipsecctl(8), see the file /etc/services.
local localip peer remote
The local parameter specifies the address or FQDN of the local endpoint. Unless the
gateway is multi-homed or uses address aliases, this option is generally not needed.
The peer parameter specifies the address or FQDN of the remote endpoint. For host-to-
host connections where dst is identical to remote, this option is generally not needed
as it will be set to dst automatically. If it is not specified or if the keyword any
is given, the default peer is used.
ikesa auth algorithm enc algorithm prf algorithm group group
These parameters define the mode and cryptographic transforms to be used for the IKE
SA negotiation, also known as phase 1. The IKE SA will be used to authenticate the
machines and to set up an encrypted channel for the IKEv2 protocol.
Possible values for auth, enc, prf, group, and the default proposals are described
below in CRYPTO TRANSFORMS. If omitted, iked(8) will use the default proposals for
the IKEv2 protocol.
The keyword ikesa can be used multiple times as a delimiter between IKE SA proposals.
The order of the proposals depend on the order in the configuration. The keywords
auth, enc, prf and group can be used multiple times within a single proposal to
configure multiple crypto transforms.
childsa auth algorithm enc algorithm group group esn
These parameters define the cryptographic transforms to be used for the Child SA
negotiation, also known as phase 2. Each Child SA will be used to negotiate the
actual IPsec SAs. The initial Child SA is always negotiated with the initial IKEv2
key exchange; additional Child SAs may be negotiated with additional Child SA key
exchanges for an established IKE SA.
Possible values for auth, enc, group, esn, and the default proposals are described
below in CRYPTO TRANSFORMS. If omitted, iked(8) will use the default proposals for
the ESP or AH protocol.
The group option will only be used to enable Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) for
additional Child SAs exchanges that are not part of the initial key exchange.
The keyword childsa can be used multiple times as a delimiter between Child SA
proposals. The order of the proposals depend on the order in the configuration. The
keywords auth, enc and group can be used multiple times within a single proposal to
configure multiple crypto transforms.
srcid string dstid string
srcid defines an ID of type “FQDN”, “ASN1_DN”, “IPV4”, “IPV6”, or “UFQDN” that will be
used by iked(8) as the identity of the local peer. If the argument is an email
address (reyk@example.com), iked(8) will use UFQDN as the ID type. The ASN1_DN type
will be used if the string starts with a slash ‘/’
(/C=DE/../CN=10.0.0.1/emailAddress=reyk@example.com). If the argument is an IPv4
address or a compressed IPv6 address, the ID types IPV4 or IPV6 will be used.
Anything else is considered to be an FQDN.
If srcid is omitted, the default is to use the hostname of the local machine, see
hostname(1) to set or print the hostname.
dstid is similar to srcid, but instead specifies the ID to be used by the remote peer.
ikelifetime time
The optional ikelifetime parameter defines the IKE SA expiration timeout by the time
SA was created. A zero value disables active IKE SA rekeying. This is the default.
The accepted format of the time specification is described below.
lifetime time [bytes bytes]
The optional lifetime parameter defines the Child SA expiration timeout by the time SA
was in use and by the number of bytes that were processed using the SA. Default
values are 3 hours and 4 gigabytes which means that SA will be rekeyed before reaching
the time limit or 4 gigabytes of data will pass through. Zero values disable
rekeying.
Several unit specifiers are recognized (ignoring case): ‘m’ and ‘h’ for minutes and
hours, and ‘K’, ‘M’ and ‘G’ for kilo-, mega- and gigabytes accordingly.
Rekeying must happen at least several times a day as IPsec security heavily depends on
frequent key renewals.
[ikeauth]
Specify a method to be used to authenticate the remote peer. iked(8) will
automatically determine a method based on public keys or certificates configured for
the peer. ikeauth can be used to override this behaviour. Non-psk modes will require
setting up certificates and RSA or ECDSA public keys; see iked(8) for more
information.
eap type
Use EAP to authenticate the initiator. The only supported EAP type is
currently MSCHAP-V2. The responder will use RSA public key
authentication.
ecdsa256
Use ECDSA with a 256-bit elliptic curve key and SHA2-256 for
authentication.
ecdsa384
Use ECDSA with a 384-bit elliptic curve key and SHA2-384 for
authentication.
ecdsa521
Use ECDSA with a 521-bit elliptic curve key and SHA2-512 for
authentication.
psk string
Use a pre-shared key string or hex value (starting with 0x) for
authentication.
rfc7427 Only use RFC 7427 signatures for authentication. RFC 7427 signatures
currently only support SHA2-256 as the hash.
rsa Use RSA public key authentication with SHA1 as the hash.
The default is to allow any signature authentication.
config option address
request option address
Request or serve one or more optional configuration payloads (CP). The configuration
option can be one of the following with the expected address format:
address address
Assign a static address on the internal network.
address address/prefix
Assign a dynamic address on the internal network. The address will be
assigned from an address pool with the size specified by prefix.
netmask netmask
The IPv4 netmask of the internal network.
name-server address
The DNS server address within the internal network.
netbios-server address
The NetBIOS name server (WINS) within the internal network. This option
is provided for compatibility with legacy clients.
dhcp-server address
The address of an internal DHCP server for further configuration.
protected-subnet address/prefix
The address of an additional IPv4 or IPv6 subnet reachable over the
gateway. This option is used to notify the peer of a subnet behind the
gateway (that might require a second SA). Networks specified in this
SA's "from" or "to" options do not need to be included.
access-server address
The address of an internal remote access server.
iface interface
Enable automatic network configuration as initiator. Received addresses, routes and
nameservers will be installed on the specified interface.
tag string
Add a pf(4) tag to all packets of IPsec SAs created for this connection. This will
allow matching packets for this connection by defining rules in pf.conf(5) using the
tagged keyword.
The following variables can be used in tags to include information from the remote
peer on runtime:
$id The dstid that was proposed by the remote peer to identify itself. It
will be expanded to id-value, e.g. FQDN/foo.example.com. To limit the
size of the derived tag, iked(8) will extract the common name ‘CN=’
from ASN1_DN IDs, for example ASN1_ID//C=DE/../CN=10.1.1.1/.. will be
expanded to 10.1.1.1.
$eapid For a connection using EAP, the identity (username) used by the remote
peer.
$domain Extract the domain from IDs of type FQDN, UFQDN or ASN1_DN.
$name The name of the IKEv2 policy that was configured in iked.conf or
automatically generated by iked(8).
For example, if the ID is FQDN/foo.example.com or UFQDN/user@example.com,
“ipsec-$domain” expands to “ipsec-example.com”. The variable expansion for the tag
directive occurs only at runtime (not when the file is parsed) and must be quoted, or
it will be interpreted as a macro.
tap interface
Send the decapsulated IPsec traffic to the specified enc(4) interface instead of enc0
for filtering and monitoring. The traffic will be blocked if the specified interface
does not exist.
PACKET FILTERING
IPsec traffic appears unencrypted on the enc(4) interface and can be filtered accordingly
using the OpenBSD packet filter, pf(4). The grammar for the packet filter is described in
pf.conf(5).
The following components are relevant to filtering IPsec traffic:
external interface
Interface for IKE traffic and encapsulated IPsec traffic.
proto udp port 500
IKE traffic on the external interface.
proto udp port 4500
IKE NAT-Traversal traffic on the external interface.
proto ah | esp
Encapsulated IPsec traffic on the external interface.
enc0
Default interface for outgoing traffic before it's been encapsulated, and incoming
traffic after it's been decapsulated. State on this interface should be interface
bound; see enc(4) for further information.
proto ipencap
[tunnel mode only] IP-in-IP traffic flowing between gateways on the enc0 interface.
tagged ipsec-example.org
Match traffic of IPsec SAs using the tag keyword.
If the filtering rules specify to block everything by default, the following rule would
ensure that IPsec traffic never hits the packet filtering engine, and is therefore passed:
set skip on enc0
In the following example, all traffic is blocked by default. IPsec-related traffic from
gateways {192.168.3.1, 192.168.3.2} and networks {10.0.1.0/24, 10.0.2.0/24} is permitted.
block on ix0
block on enc0
pass in on ix0 proto udp from 192.168.3.2 to 192.168.3.1 \
port {500, 4500}
pass out on ix0 proto udp from 192.168.3.1 to 192.168.3.2 \
port {500, 4500}
pass in on ix0 proto esp from 192.168.3.2 to 192.168.3.1
pass out on ix0 proto esp from 192.168.3.1 to 192.168.3.2
pass in on enc0 proto ipencap from 192.168.3.2 to 192.168.3.1 \
keep state (if-bound)
pass out on enc0 proto ipencap from 192.168.3.1 to 192.168.3.2 \
keep state (if-bound)
pass in on enc0 from 10.0.2.0/24 to 10.0.1.0/24 \
keep state (if-bound)
pass out on enc0 from 10.0.1.0/24 to 10.0.2.0/24 \
keep state (if-bound)
pf(4) has the ability to filter IPsec-related packets based on an arbitrary tag specified
within a ruleset. The tag is used as an internal marker which can be used to identify the
packets later on. This could be helpful, for example, in scenarios where users are
connecting in from differing IP addresses, or to support queue-based bandwidth control,
since the enc0 interface does not support it.
The following pf.conf(5) fragment uses queues for all IPsec traffic with special handling
for developers and employees:
queue std on ix0 bandwidth 100M
queue deflt parent std bandwidth 10M default
queue developers parent std bandwidth 75M
queue employees parent std bandwidth 5M
queue ipsec parent std bandwidth 10M
pass out on ix0 proto esp set queue ipsec
pass out on ix0 tagged ipsec-developers.example.com \
set queue developers
pass out on ix0 tagged ipsec-employees.example.com \
set queue employees
The following example assigns the tags in the iked.conf configuration and also sets an
alternative enc(4) device:
ikev2 esp from 10.1.1.0/24 to 10.1.2.0/24 peer 192.168.3.2 \
tag "ipsec-$domain" tap "enc1"
OUTGOING NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION
In some network topologies it is desirable to perform NAT on traffic leaving through the VPN
tunnel. In order to achieve that, the src argument is used to negotiate the desired network
ID with the peer and the srcnat parameter defines the true local subnet, so that a correct
SA can be installed on the local side.
For example, if the local subnet is 192.168.1.0/24 and all the traffic for a specific VPN
peer should appear as coming from 10.10.10.1, the following configuration is used:
ikev2 esp from 10.10.10.1 (192.168.1.0/24) to 192.168.2.0/24 \
peer 10.10.20.1
Naturally, a relevant NAT rule is required in pf.conf(5). For the example above, this would
be:
match out on enc0 from 192.168.1.0/24 to 192.168.2.0/24 \
nat-to 10.10.10.1
From the peer's point of view, the local end of the VPN tunnel is declared to be 10.10.10.1
and all the traffic arrives with that source address.
CRYPTO TRANSFORMS
The following authentication types are permitted with the auth keyword:
Authentication Key Length Truncated Length Default
hmac-md5 128 bits 96 bits
hmac-sha1 160 bits 96 bits x
hmac-sha2-256 256 bits 128 bits x
hmac-sha2-384 384 bits 192 bits x
hmac-sha2-512 512 bits 256 bits x
The following pseudo-random function types are permitted with the prf keyword:
PRF Key Length Default
hmac-md5 128 bits [IKE only]
hmac-sha1 160 bits x [IKE only]
hmac-sha2-256 256 bits x [IKE only]
hmac-sha2-384 384 bits x [IKE only]
hmac-sha2-512 512 bits x [IKE only]
The following cipher types are permitted with the enc keyword:
Cipher Key Length Default
3des 168 bits x
aes-128 128 bits x
aes-192 192 bits x
aes-256 256 bits x
aes-128-ctr 160 bits [ESP only]
aes-192-ctr 224 bits [ESP only]
aes-256-ctr 288 bits [ESP only]
aes-128-gcm 160 bits x
aes-192-gcm 224 bits [ESP only]
aes-256-gcm 288 bits x
aes-128-gcm-12 160 bits [IKE only]
aes-256-gcm-12 288 bits [IKE only]
blowfish 160 bits [ESP only]
cast 128 bits [ESP only]
chacha20-poly1305 288 bits [ESP only]
The following cipher types provide only authentication, not encryption:
aes-128-gmac 160 bits [ESP only]
aes-192-gmac 224 bits [ESP only]
aes-256-gmac 288 bits [ESP only]
null [ESP only]
The Extended Sequence Numbers option can be enabled or disabled with the esn or noesn
keywords:
ESN Default
esn x [ESP only]
noesn x [ESP only]
Transforms followed by [IKE only] can only be used with the ikesa keyword, transforms with
[ESP only] can only be used with the childsa keyword.
Using AES-GMAC or NULL with ESP will only provide authentication. This is useful in setups
where AH cannot be used, e.g. when NAT is involved.
The following group types are permitted with the group keyword:
Name Group Size Type Default
modp768 grp1 768 MODP [insecure]
modp1024 grp2 1024 MODP x [weak]
modp1536 grp5 1536 MODP x [weak]
modp2048 grp14 2048 MODP x
modp3072 grp15 3072 MODP x
modp4096 grp16 4096 MODP x
modp6144 grp17 6144 MODP
modp8192 grp18 8192 MODP
ecp256 grp19 256 ECP x
ecp384 grp20 384 ECP x
ecp521 grp21 521 ECP x
ecp192 grp25 192 ECP
ecp224 grp26 224 ECP
brainpool224 grp27 224 ECP
brainpool256 grp28 256 ECP
brainpool384 grp29 384 ECP
brainpool512 grp30 512 ECP
curve25519 grp31 256 Curve25519 x
sntrup761x25519 1190 B Hybrid PQKE
The currently supported group types are either MODP (exponentiation groups modulo a prime),
ECP (elliptic curve groups modulo a prime), or Curve25519. MODP groups of less than 2048
bits are considered as weak or insecure (see RFC 8247 section 2.4) and only provided for
backwards compatibility.
FILES
/etc/iked.conf
/etc/examples/iked.conf
EXAMPLES
The first example is intended for a server with clients connecting to iked(8) as an IPsec
gateway, or IKEv2 responder, using mutual public key authentication and additional
challenge-based EAP-MSCHAPv2 password authentication:
user "test" "password123"
ikev2 "win7" esp \
from dynamic to 172.16.2.0/24 \
peer 10.0.0.0/8 local 192.168.56.0/24 \
eap "mschap-v2" \
config address 172.16.2.1 \
tag "$name-$id"
The next example allows peers to authenticate using a pre-shared key ‘foobar’:
ikev2 "big test" \
esp proto tcp \
from 10.0.0.0/8 port 23 to 20.0.0.0/8 port 40 \
from 192.168.1.1 to 192.168.2.2 \
peer any local any \
ikesa \
enc aes-128-gcm \
group ecp256 group curve25519 \
ikesa \
enc aes-128 auth hmac-sha2-256 \
group ecp256 group curve25519 \
childsa enc aes-128-gcm \
childsa enc aes-128 auth hmac-sha2-256 \
srcid host.example.com \
dstid 192.168.0.254 \
psk "foobar"
The following example illustrates the last matching policy evaluation for incoming
connections on an IKEv2 gateway. The peer 192.168.1.34 will always match the first policy
because of the quick keyword; connections from the peers 192.168.1.3 and 192.168.1.2 will be
matched by one of the last two policies; any other connections from 192.168.1.0/24 will be
matched by the ‘subnet’ policy; and any other connection will be matched by the ‘catch all’
policy.
ikev2 quick esp from 10.10.10.0/24 to 10.20.20.0/24 \
peer 192.168.1.34
ikev2 "catch all" esp from 10.0.1.0/24 to 10.0.2.0/24 \
peer any
ikev2 "subnet" esp from 10.0.3.0/24 to 10.0.4.0/24 \
peer 192.168.1.0/24
ikev2 esp from 10.0.5.0/30 to 10.0.5.4/30 peer 192.168.1.2
ikev2 esp from 10.0.5.8/30 to 10.0.5.12/30 peer 192.168.1.3
This example encrypts a gre(4) tunnel from local machine A (2001:db8::aa:1) to peer D
(2001:db8::dd:4) based on FQDN-based public key authentication; transport mode avoids double
encapsulation:
ikev2 transport \
proto gre \
from 2001:db8::aa:1 to 2001:db8::dd:4 \
peer D.example.com
SEE ALSO
enc(4), ipsec(4), ipsec.conf(5), pf.conf(5), ikectl(8), iked(8)
HISTORY
The iked.conf file format first appeared in OpenBSD 4.8.
AUTHORS
The iked(8) program was written by Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>.