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NAME

       unix - sockets for local interprocess communication

SYNOPSIS

       #include <sys/socket.h>
       #include <sys/un.h>

       unix_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, type, 0);
       error = socketpair(AF_UNIX, type, 0, int *sv);

DESCRIPTION

       The  AF_UNIX  (also  known  as  AF_LOCAL)  socket  family  is  used to communicate between
       processes on the same machine efficiently.  Traditionally,  UNIX  domain  sockets  can  be
       either unnamed, or bound to a filesystem pathname (marked as being of type socket).  Linux
       also supports an abstract namespace which is independent of the filesystem.

       Valid socket types in the UNIX domain are:  SOCK_STREAM,  for  a  stream-oriented  socket;
       SOCK_DGRAM,  for  a datagram-oriented socket that preserves message boundaries (as on most
       UNIX implementations, UNIX domain datagram sockets are always reliable and  don't  reorder
       datagrams);  and (since Linux 2.6.4) SOCK_SEQPACKET, for a sequenced-packet socket that is
       connection-oriented, preserves message boundaries, and delivers messages in the order that
       they were sent.

       UNIX  domain  sockets  support  passing  file  descriptors or process credentials to other
       processes using ancillary data.

   Address format
       A UNIX domain socket address is represented in the following structure:

           struct sockaddr_un {
               sa_family_t sun_family;               /* AF_UNIX */
               char        sun_path[108];            /* Pathname */
           };

       The sun_family field always contains AF_UNIX.  On Linux, sun_path is 108  bytes  in  size;
       see also BUGS, below.

       Various systems calls (for example, bind(2), connect(2), and sendto(2)) take a sockaddr_un
       argument as input.  Some other system calls (for example, getsockname(2),  getpeername(2),
       recvfrom(2), and accept(2)) return an argument of this type.

       Three types of address are distinguished in the sockaddr_un structure:

       pathname
              a  UNIX  domain  socket can be bound to a null-terminated filesystem pathname using
              bind(2).  When the address of a pathname socket is returned (by one of  the  system
              calls noted above), its length is

                  offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(sun_path) + 1

              and   sun_path  contains  the  null-terminated  pathname.   (On  Linux,  the  above
              offsetof() expression equates to the same value as  sizeof(sa_family_t),  but  some
              other  implementations  include  other  fields  before  sun_path, so the offsetof()
              expression more portably describes the size of the address structure.)

              For further details of pathname sockets, see below.

       unnamed
              A stream socket that has not been bound to a pathname using bind(2)  has  no  name.
              Likewise,  the  two sockets created by socketpair(2) are unnamed.  When the address
              of an unnamed socket is returned, its length is sizeof(sa_family_t),  and  sun_path
              should not be inspected.

       abstract
              an  abstract  socket  address is distinguished (from a pathname socket) by the fact
              that sun_path[0] is a null byte ('\0').  The socket's address in this namespace  is
              given  by the additional bytes in sun_path that are covered by the specified length
              of the address structure.  (Null bytes in the name have no  special  significance.)
              The  name  has  no  connection  with  filesystem pathnames.  When the address of an
              abstract   socket   is   returned,   the   returned   addrlen   is   greater   than
              sizeof(sa_family_t) (i.e., greater than 2), and the name of the socket is contained
              in the first (addrlen - sizeof(sa_family_t)) bytes of sun_path.

   Pathname sockets
       When binding a socket  to  a  pathname,  a  few  rules  should  be  observed  for  maximum
       portability and ease of coding:

       •  The pathname in sun_path should be null-terminated.

       •  The  length of the pathname, including the terminating null byte, should not exceed the
          size of sun_path.

       •  The addrlen argument that describes the enclosing sockaddr_un structure should  have  a
          value of at least:

              offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path)+strlen(addr.sun_path)+1

          or, more simply, addrlen can be specified as sizeof(struct sockaddr_un).

       There is some variation in how implementations handle UNIX domain socket addresses that do
       not follow the above rules.  For example, some (but not all) implementations append a null
       terminator if none is present in the supplied sun_path.

       When coding portable applications, keep in mind that some implementations have sun_path as
       short as 92 bytes.

       Various system  calls  (accept(2),  recvfrom(2),  getsockname(2),  getpeername(2))  return
       socket  address structures.  When applied to UNIX domain sockets, the value-result addrlen
       argument supplied to the call should be initialized as above.  Upon return,  the  argument
       is  set to indicate the actual size of the address structure.  The caller should check the
       value returned in this argument: if the output value exceeds the input value,  then  there
       is no guarantee that a null terminator is present in sun_path.  (See BUGS.)

   Pathname socket ownership and permissions
       In  the Linux implementation, pathname sockets honor the permissions of the directory they
       are in.  Creation of a new socket fails if the process does  not  have  write  and  search
       (execute) permission on the directory in which the socket is created.

       On  Linux,  connecting to a stream socket object requires write permission on that socket;
       sending a datagram to a datagram socket likewise requires write permission on that socket.
       POSIX  does  not  make any statement about the effect of the permissions on a socket file,
       and on some systems (e.g., older BSDs), the  socket  permissions  are  ignored.   Portable
       programs should not rely on this feature for security.

       When  creating  a  new socket, the owner and group of the socket file are set according to
       the usual rules.  The socket file has all permissions enabled, other than those  that  are
       turned off by the process umask(2).

       The  owner, group, and permissions of a pathname socket can be changed (using chown(2) and
       chmod(2)).

   Abstract sockets
       Socket permissions have no meaning for abstract  sockets:  the  process  umask(2)  has  no
       effect  when binding an abstract socket, and changing the ownership and permissions of the
       object (via fchown(2) and fchmod(2)) has no effect on the accessibility of the socket.

       Abstract sockets automatically disappear when  all  open  references  to  the  socket  are
       closed.

       The abstract socket namespace is a nonportable Linux extension.

   Socket options
       For  historical  reasons,  these  socket options are specified with a SOL_SOCKET type even
       though they are AF_UNIX specific.  They can  be  set  with  setsockopt(2)  and  read  with
       getsockopt(2) by specifying SOL_SOCKET as the socket family.

       SO_PASSCRED
              Enabling  this  socket  option  causes  receipt  of  the credentials of the sending
              process in an SCM_CREDENTIALS  ancillary  message  in  each  subsequently  received
              message.   The  returned  credentials  are  those  specified  by  the  sender using
              SCM_CREDENTIALS, or a default that includes the sender's PID,  real  user  ID,  and
              real group ID, if the sender did not specify SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data.

              When  this  option is set and the socket is not yet connected, a unique name in the
              abstract namespace will be generated automatically.

              The value given as an argument to setsockopt(2)  and  returned  as  the  result  of
              getsockopt(2) is an integer boolean flag.

       SO_PASSSEC
              Enables  receiving of the SELinux security label of the peer socket in an ancillary
              message of type SCM_SECURITY (see below).

              The value given as an argument to setsockopt(2)  and  returned  as  the  result  of
              getsockopt(2) is an integer boolean flag.

              The  SO_PASSSEC  option  is  supported for UNIX domain datagram sockets since Linux
              2.6.18; support for UNIX domain stream sockets was added in Linux 4.2.

       SO_PEEK_OFF
              See socket(7).

       SO_PEERCRED
              This read-only socket option returns the credentials of the peer process  connected
              to this socket.  The returned credentials are those that were in effect at the time
              of the call to connect(2) or socketpair(2).

              The argument to getsockopt(2) is  a  pointer  to  a  ucred  structure;  define  the
              _GNU_SOURCE  feature  test  macro  to  obtain the definition of that structure from
              <sys/socket.h>.

              The use of this option is possible only for connected AF_UNIX  stream  sockets  and
              for AF_UNIX stream and datagram socket pairs created using socketpair(2).

       SO_PEERSEC
              This  read-only  socket  option  returns  the  security  context of the peer socket
              connected to this socket.  By default, this  will  be  the  same  as  the  security
              context of the process that created the peer socket unless overridden by the policy
              or by a process with the required permissions.

              The argument to getsockopt(2) is a pointer to a buffer of the specified  length  in
              bytes  into which the security context string will be copied.  If the buffer length
              is less than the length of the security context string, then getsockopt(2)  returns
              -1,  sets  errno to ERANGE, and returns the required length via optlen.  The caller
              should allocate at least NAME_MAX bytes for the buffer initially, although this  is
              not  guaranteed  to  be sufficient.  Resizing the buffer to the returned length and
              retrying may be necessary.

              The security context string  may  include  a  terminating  null  character  in  the
              returned  length, but is not guaranteed to do so: a security context "foo" might be
              represented as either {'f','o','o'} of length 3 or {'f','o','o','\0'} of length  4,
              which  are  considered  to  be  interchangeable.  The string is printable, does not
              contain non-terminating null characters, and is  in  an  unspecified  encoding  (in
              particular, it is not guaranteed to be ASCII or UTF-8).

              The use of this option for sockets in the AF_UNIX address family is supported since
              Linux 2.6.2 for connected stream sockets, and since Linux 4.18 also for stream  and
              datagram socket pairs created using socketpair(2).

   Autobind feature
       If  a  bind(2)  call  specifies  addrlen as sizeof(sa_family_t), or the SO_PASSCRED socket
       option was specified for a socket that was not explicitly bound to an  address,  then  the
       socket  is autobound to an abstract address.  The address consists of a null byte followed
       by 5 bytes in the character set [0-9a-f].   Thus,  there  is  a  limit  of  2^20  autobind
       addresses.   (From  Linux  2.1.15, when the autobind feature was added, 8 bytes were used,
       and the limit was thus 2^32 autobind addresses.  The change  to  5  bytes  came  in  Linux
       2.3.15.)

   Sockets API
       The  following paragraphs describe domain-specific details and unsupported features of the
       sockets API for UNIX domain sockets on Linux.

       UNIX domain sockets do not support the transmission of out-of-band data (the MSG_OOB  flag
       for send(2) and recv(2)).

       The send(2) MSG_MORE flag is not supported by UNIX domain sockets.

       Before  Linux 3.4, the use of MSG_TRUNC in the flags argument of recv(2) was not supported
       by UNIX domain sockets.

       The SO_SNDBUF socket option does have an effect for UNIX domain sockets, but the SO_RCVBUF
       option  does not.  For datagram sockets, the SO_SNDBUF value imposes an upper limit on the
       size of outgoing datagrams.  This limit is  calculated  as  the  doubled  (see  socket(7))
       option value less 32 bytes used for overhead.

   Ancillary messages
       Ancillary  data  is  sent  and  received  using sendmsg(2) and recvmsg(2).  For historical
       reasons, the ancillary message types listed below are specified  with  a  SOL_SOCKET  type
       even  though  they  are  AF_UNIX  specific.  To send them, set the cmsg_level field of the
       struct cmsghdr to SOL_SOCKET and the cmsg_type field to the type.  For  more  information,
       see cmsg(3).

       SCM_RIGHTS
              Send  or  receive  a  set  of open file descriptors from another process.  The data
              portion contains an integer array of the file descriptors.

              Commonly, this operation is referred to as "passing a file descriptor"  to  another
              process.   However, more accurately, what is being passed is a reference to an open
              file description (see open(2)), and in the receiving process it is  likely  that  a
              different  file  descriptor  number  will be used.  Semantically, this operation is
              equivalent to duplicating (dup(2)) a file descriptor into the file descriptor table
              of another process.

              If the buffer used to receive the ancillary data containing file descriptors is too
              small (or is absent), then the ancillary data is truncated (or discarded)  and  the
              excess file descriptors are automatically closed in the receiving process.

              If  the  number  of file descriptors received in the ancillary data would cause the
              process to exceed its RLIMIT_NOFILE resource limit (see getrlimit(2)),  the  excess
              file descriptors are automatically closed in the receiving process.

              The kernel constant SCM_MAX_FD defines a limit on the number of file descriptors in
              the array.  Attempting to send an array larger than this limit causes sendmsg(2) to
              fail  with  the  error  EINVAL.   SCM_MAX_FD has the value 253 (or 255 before Linux
              2.6.38).

       SCM_CREDENTIALS
              Send or receive UNIX credentials.   This  can  be  used  for  authentication.   The
              credentials  are  passed  as  a  struct ucred ancillary message.  This structure is
              defined in <sys/socket.h> as follows:

                  struct ucred {
                      pid_t pid;    /* Process ID of the sending process */
                      uid_t uid;    /* User ID of the sending process */
                      gid_t gid;    /* Group ID of the sending process */
                  };

              Since glibc 2.8, the  _GNU_SOURCE  feature  test  macro  must  be  defined  (before
              including any header files) in order to obtain the definition of this structure.

              The credentials which the sender specifies are checked by the kernel.  A privileged
              process is allowed to specify values that do not match its own.   The  sender  must
              specify  its  own  process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN, in which
              case the PID of any existing process may be specified), its real user ID, effective
              user  ID,  or  saved set-user-ID (unless it has CAP_SETUID), and its real group ID,
              effective group ID, or saved set-group-ID (unless it has CAP_SETGID).

              To receive a struct ucred message, the SO_PASSCRED option must be  enabled  on  the
              socket.

       SCM_SECURITY
              Receive  the SELinux security context (the security label) of the peer socket.  The
              received ancillary  data  is  a  null-terminated  string  containing  the  security
              context.   The receiver should allocate at least NAME_MAX bytes in the data portion
              of the ancillary message for this data.

              To receive the security context, the SO_PASSSEC  option  must  be  enabled  on  the
              socket (see above).

       When  sending ancillary data with sendmsg(2), only one item of each of the above types may
       be included in the sent message.

       At least one byte of real data should be sent when sending ancillary data.  On Linux, this
       is  required  to  successfully send ancillary data over a UNIX domain stream socket.  When
       sending ancillary data over a UNIX domain datagram socket, it is not necessary on Linux to
       send  any  accompanying  real data.  However, portable applications should also include at
       least one byte of real data when sending ancillary data over a datagram socket.

       When receiving from a stream socket, ancillary data  forms  a  kind  of  barrier  for  the
       received data.  For example, suppose that the sender transmits as follows:

              (1)  sendmsg(2) of four bytes, with no ancillary data.
              (2)  sendmsg(2) of one byte, with ancillary data.
              (3)  sendmsg(2) of four bytes, with no ancillary data.

       Suppose  that  the  receiver  now  performs recvmsg(2) calls each with a buffer size of 20
       bytes.  The first call will receive five bytes of data, along with the ancillary data sent
       by  the  second  sendmsg(2)  call.  The next call will receive the remaining four bytes of
       data.

       If the space allocated for receiving  incoming  ancillary  data  is  too  small  then  the
       ancillary  data is truncated to the number of headers that will fit in the supplied buffer
       (or, in the case of an SCM_RIGHTS file descriptor list, the list of file  descriptors  may
       be  truncated).   If  no  buffer  is  provided  for  incoming  ancillary  data  (i.e., the
       msg_control field of the msghdr structure  supplied  to  recvmsg(2)  is  NULL),  then  the
       incoming ancillary data is discarded.  In both of these cases, the MSG_CTRUNC flag will be
       set in the msg.msg_flags value returned by recvmsg(2).

   Ioctls
       The following ioctl(2) calls return information in value.  The correct syntax is:

              int value;
              error = ioctl(unix_socket, ioctl_type, &value);

       ioctl_type can be:

       SIOCINQ
              For SOCK_STREAM sockets, this call returns  the  number  of  unread  bytes  in  the
              receive  buffer.   The  socket  must  not  be  in  LISTEN state, otherwise an error
              (EINVAL) is returned.  SIOCINQ is defined in <linux/sockios.h>.  Alternatively, you
              can use the synonymous FIONREAD, defined in <sys/ioctl.h>.  For SOCK_DGRAM sockets,
              the returned value is the same as for Internet domain datagram sockets; see udp(7).

ERRORS

       EADDRINUSE
              The specified local address is already in  use  or  the  filesystem  socket  object
              already exists.

       EBADF  This  error  can  occur  for sendmsg(2) when sending a file descriptor as ancillary
              data over a UNIX domain socket (see the  description  of  SCM_RIGHTS,  above),  and
              indicates that the file descriptor number that is being sent is not valid (e.g., it
              is not an open file descriptor).

       ECONNREFUSED
              The remote address specified by connect(2) was not a listening socket.  This  error
              can also occur if the target pathname is not a socket.

       ECONNRESET
              Remote socket was unexpectedly closed.

       EFAULT User memory address was not valid.

       EINVAL Invalid  argument  passed.   A  common  cause  is  that  the  value AF_UNIX was not
              specified in the sun_type field of passed  addresses,  or  the  socket  was  in  an
              invalid state for the applied operation.

       EISCONN
              connect(2)  called on an already connected socket or a target address was specified
              on a connected socket.

       ENFILE The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been reached.

       ENOENT The pathname in the remote address specified to connect(2) did not exist.

       ENOMEM Out of memory.

       ENOTCONN
              Socket operation needs a target address, but the socket is not connected.

       EOPNOTSUPP
              Stream operation called on non-stream oriented socket or tried to use  the  out-of-
              band data option.

       EPERM  The sender passed invalid credentials in the struct ucred.

       EPIPE  Remote  socket  was  closed  on  a stream socket.  If enabled, a SIGPIPE is sent as
              well.  This can  be  avoided  by  passing  the  MSG_NOSIGNAL  flag  to  send(2)  or
              sendmsg(2).

       EPROTONOSUPPORT
              Passed protocol is not AF_UNIX.

       EPROTOTYPE
              Remote socket does not match the local socket type (SOCK_DGRAM versus SOCK_STREAM).

       ESOCKTNOSUPPORT
              Unknown socket type.

       ESRCH  While  sending  an  ancillary message containing credentials (SCM_CREDENTIALS), the
              caller specified a PID that does not match any existing process.

       ETOOMANYREFS
              This error can occur for sendmsg(2) when sending a  file  descriptor  as  ancillary
              data  over  a  UNIX  domain  socket (see the description of SCM_RIGHTS, above).  It
              occurs if the number of "in-flight"  file  descriptors  exceeds  the  RLIMIT_NOFILE
              resource  limit  and  the caller does not have the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability.  An
              in-flight file descriptor is one that has been sent using sendmsg(2)  but  has  not
              yet been accepted in the recipient process using recvmsg(2).

              This  error  is  diagnosed  since  mainline  Linux  4.5 (and in some earlier kernel
              versions where the fix has been backported).  In earlier kernel  versions,  it  was
              possible  to  place  an  unlimited number of file descriptors in flight, by sending
              each file descriptor with sendmsg(2) and then closing the file descriptor  so  that
              it was not accounted against the RLIMIT_NOFILE resource limit.

       Other  errors  can  be  generated  by  the generic socket layer or by the filesystem while
       generating a filesystem  socket  object.   See  the  appropriate  manual  pages  for  more
       information.

VERSIONS

       SCM_CREDENTIALS  and  the abstract namespace were introduced with Linux 2.2 and should not
       be used in portable programs.  (Some BSD-derived systems also support credential  passing,
       but the implementation details differ.)

NOTES

       Binding  to  a  socket  with  a  filename  creates a socket in the filesystem that must be
       deleted by the caller when it is no longer  needed  (using  unlink(2)).   The  usual  UNIX
       close-behind  semantics  apply; the socket can be unlinked at any time and will be finally
       removed from the filesystem when the last reference to it is closed.

       To pass file descriptors or credentials over  a  SOCK_STREAM  socket,  you  must  send  or
       receive at least one byte of nonancillary data in the same sendmsg(2) or recvmsg(2) call.

       UNIX domain stream sockets do not support the notion of out-of-band data.

BUGS

       When  binding  a  socket to an address, Linux is one of the implementations that appends a
       null terminator if none is supplied in sun_path.  In most  cases  this  is  unproblematic:
       when  the  socket address is retrieved, it will be one byte longer than that supplied when
       the socket was bound.  However, there is one case where confusing behavior can result:  if
       108  non-null  bytes  are  supplied  when a socket is bound, then the addition of the null
       terminator takes the length of the pathname beyond sizeof(sun_path).   Consequently,  when
       retrieving  the socket address (for example, via accept(2)), if the input addrlen argument
       for the retrieving call is specified as  sizeof(struct  sockaddr_un),  then  the  returned
       address structure won't have a null terminator in sun_path.

       In  addition,  some  implementations don't require a null terminator when binding a socket
       (the addrlen argument is used to determine the length of sun_path)  and  when  the  socket
       address is retrieved on these implementations, there is no null terminator in sun_path.

       Applications  that retrieve socket addresses can (portably) code to handle the possibility
       that there is no null terminator in sun_path by respecting the fact  that  the  number  of
       valid bytes in the pathname is:

           strnlen(addr.sun_path, addrlen - offsetof(sockaddr_un, sun_path))

       Alternatively,  an  application  can retrieve the socket address by allocating a buffer of
       size sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)+1 that is zeroed out before the retrieval.  The retrieving
       call  can  specify  addrlen as sizeof(struct sockaddr_un), and the extra zero byte ensures
       that there will be a null terminator for the string returned in sun_path:

           void *addrp;

           addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un);
           addrp = malloc(addrlen + 1);
           if (addrp == NULL)
               /* Handle error */ ;
           memset(addrp, 0, addrlen + 1);

           if (getsockname(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) addrp, &addrlen)) == -1)
               /* handle error */ ;

           printf("sun_path = %s\n", ((struct sockaddr_un *) addrp)->sun_path);

       This sort of messiness can be avoided if it  is  guaranteed  that  the  applications  that
       create pathname sockets follow the rules outlined above under Pathname sockets.

EXAMPLES

       The following code demonstrates the use of sequenced-packet sockets for local interprocess
       communication.  It consists of two programs.  The server program waits  for  a  connection
       from  the client program.  The client sends each of its command-line arguments in separate
       messages.  The server treats the incoming messages as integers  and  adds  them  up.   The
       client sends the command string "END".  The server sends back a message containing the sum
       of the client's integers.  The client prints the sum and exits.  The server waits for  the
       next  client  to  connect.  To stop the server, the client is called with the command-line
       argument "DOWN".

       The following output  was  recorded  while  running  the  server  in  the  background  and
       repeatedly  executing  the  client.  Execution of the server program ends when it receives
       the "DOWN" command.

   Example output
           $ ./server &
           [1] 25887
           $ ./client 3 4
           Result = 7
           $ ./client 11 -5
           Result = 6
           $ ./client DOWN
           Result = 0
           [1]+  Done                    ./server
           $

   Program source

       /*
        * File connection.h
        */

       #define SOCKET_NAME "/tmp/9Lq7BNBnBycd6nxy.socket"
       #define BUFFER_SIZE 12

       /*
        * File server.c
        */

       #include <stdio.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>
       #include <string.h>
       #include <sys/socket.h>
       #include <sys/un.h>
       #include <unistd.h>
       #include "connection.h"

       int
       main(int argc, char *argv[])
       {
           struct sockaddr_un name;
           int down_flag = 0;
           int ret;
           int connection_socket;
           int data_socket;
           int result;
           char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

           /* Create local socket. */

           connection_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
           if (connection_socket == -1) {
               perror("socket");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           /*
            * For portability clear the whole structure, since some
            * implementations have additional (nonstandard) fields in
            * the structure.
            */

           memset(&name, 0, sizeof(name));

           /* Bind socket to socket name. */

           name.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
           strncpy(name.sun_path, SOCKET_NAME, sizeof(name.sun_path) - 1);

           ret = bind(connection_socket, (const struct sockaddr *) &name,
                      sizeof(name));
           if (ret == -1) {
               perror("bind");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           /*
            * Prepare for accepting connections. The backlog size is set
            * to 20. So while one request is being processed other requests
            * can be waiting.
            */

           ret = listen(connection_socket, 20);
           if (ret == -1) {
               perror("listen");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           /* This is the main loop for handling connections. */

           for (;;) {

               /* Wait for incoming connection. */

               data_socket = accept(connection_socket, NULL, NULL);
               if (data_socket == -1) {
                   perror("accept");
                   exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
               }

               result = 0;
               for (;;) {

                   /* Wait for next data packet. */

                   ret = read(data_socket, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
                   if (ret == -1) {
                       perror("read");
                       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
                   }

                   /* Ensure buffer is 0-terminated. */

                   buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = 0;

                   /* Handle commands. */

                   if (!strncmp(buffer, "DOWN", sizeof(buffer))) {
                       down_flag = 1;
                       break;
                   }

                   if (!strncmp(buffer, "END", sizeof(buffer))) {
                       break;
                   }

                   /* Add received summand. */

                   result += atoi(buffer);
               }

               /* Send result. */

               sprintf(buffer, "%d", result);
               ret = write(data_socket, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
               if (ret == -1) {
                   perror("write");
                   exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
               }

               /* Close socket. */

               close(data_socket);

               /* Quit on DOWN command. */

               if (down_flag) {
                   break;
               }
           }

           close(connection_socket);

           /* Unlink the socket. */

           unlink(SOCKET_NAME);

           exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
       }

       /*
        * File client.c
        */

       #include <errno.h>
       #include <stdio.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>
       #include <string.h>
       #include <sys/socket.h>
       #include <sys/un.h>
       #include <unistd.h>
       #include "connection.h"

       int
       main(int argc, char *argv[])
       {
           struct sockaddr_un addr;
           int ret;
           int data_socket;
           char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

           /* Create local socket. */

           data_socket = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
           if (data_socket == -1) {
               perror("socket");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           /*
            * For portability clear the whole structure, since some
            * implementations have additional (nonstandard) fields in
            * the structure.
            */

           memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));

           /* Connect socket to socket address. */

           addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
           strncpy(addr.sun_path, SOCKET_NAME, sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);

           ret = connect(data_socket, (const struct sockaddr *) &addr,
                          sizeof(addr));
           if (ret == -1) {
               fprintf(stderr, "The server is down.\n");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           /* Send arguments. */

           for (size_t i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
               ret = write(data_socket, argv[i], strlen(argv[i]) + 1);
               if (ret == -1) {
                   perror("write");
                   break;
               }
           }

           /* Request result. */

           strcpy(buffer, "END");
           ret = write(data_socket, buffer, strlen(buffer) + 1);
           if (ret == -1) {
               perror("write");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           /* Receive result. */

           ret = read(data_socket, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
           if (ret == -1) {
               perror("read");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           /* Ensure buffer is 0-terminated. */

           buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = 0;

           printf("Result = %s\n", buffer);

           /* Close socket. */

           close(data_socket);

           exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
       }

       For examples of the use of SCM_RIGHTS, see cmsg(3) and seccomp_unotify(2).

SEE ALSO

       recvmsg(2),    sendmsg(2),    socket(2),    socketpair(2),    cmsg(3),    capabilities(7),
       credentials(7), socket(7), udp(7)