NAME

     mac_seeotheruids — simple policy controlling whether users see other users

SYNOPSIS

     To compile the policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS

     Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

     The mac_seeotheruids policy module, when enabled, denies users to see processes or sockets owned by other
     users.

     To enable mac_seeotheruids, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled to 1.  To permit superuser
     awareness of other credentials by virtue of privilege, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged to 1.

     To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary group, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled to 1.

     To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled to 1, and security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid to the group
     ID to be exempted.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_seeotheruids.

SEE ALSO

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4),
     mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_test(4), mac(9)

HISTORY

     The mac_seeotheruids policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD
     Project.

AUTHORS

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research
     Division of Network Associates Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack
     channels are currently protected by entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be
     relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.