NAME

       apt-secure - Archive authentication support for APT

DESCRIPTION

       Starting with version 0.6, APT contains code that does signature checking of the Release
       file for all repositories. This ensures that data like packages in the archive can't be
       modified by people who have no access to the Release file signing key. Starting with
       version 1.1 APT requires repositories to provide recent authentication information for
       unimpeded usage of the repository. Since version 1.5 changes in the information contained
       in the Release file about the repository need to be confirmed before APT continues to
       apply updates from this repository.

       Note: All APT-based package management front-ends like apt-get(8), aptitude(8) and
       synaptic(8) support this authentication feature, so this manpage uses APT to refer to them
       all for simplicity only.

USER CONFIGURATION

       Keys should usually be included inside their corresponding .sources by embedding the
       ASCII-armored key in the Signed-By option. To do so, replace the empty line with a dot,
       and then indent all lines by two spaces. See sources.list(5) for more information.

       Alternatively, keys may be placed in /etc/apt/keyrings for local keys, or
       /usr/share/keyrings for keys managed by packages, and then referenced by Signed-By:
       /etc/apt/keyrings/example-archive-keyring.asc option in a .sources file or using deb
       [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/example-archive-keyring.asc] ...  in the legacy .list format.
       This may be useful for APT versions prior to 2.4, which do not support embedded keys.
       ASCII-armored keys must use an extension of .asc, and unarmored keys an extension of .gpg.

       To generate keys suitable for use in APT using GnuPG, you will need to use the gpg
       --export-options export-minimal [--armor] --export command. Earlier solutions involving
       --keyring file --import no longer work with recent GnuPG versions as they use a new
       internal format ("GPG keybox database").

       Note that a default installation already contains all keys to securely acquire packages
       from the default repositories, so managing keys is only needed if third-party repositories
       are added. The extrepo package can be used to manage several external repositories with
       ease.

UNSIGNED REPOSITORIES

       If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all current APT versions
       will refuse to download data from them by default in update operations and even if forced
       to download front-ends like apt-get(8) will require explicit confirmation if an
       installation request includes a package from such an unauthenticated archive.

       You can force all APT clients to raise only warnings by setting the configuration option
       Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories to true. Individual repositories can also be allowed to
       be insecure via the sources.list(5) option allow-insecure=yes. Note that insecure
       repositories are strongly discouraged and all options to force apt to continue supporting
       them will eventually be removed. Users also have the Trusted option available to disable
       even the warnings, but be sure to understand the implications as detailed in
       sources.list(5).

       A repository which previously was authenticated but would loose this state in an update
       operation raises an error in all APT clients irrespective of the option to allow or forbid
       usage of insecure repositories. The error can be overcome by additionally setting
       Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories to true or for Individual repositories with
       the sources.list(5) option allow-downgrade-to-insecure=yes.

SIGNED REPOSITORIES

       The chain of trust from an APT archive to the end user is made up of several steps.
       apt-secure is the last step in this chain; trusting an archive does not mean that you
       trust its packages not to contain malicious code, but means that you trust the archive
       maintainer. It's the archive maintainer's responsibility to ensure that the archive's
       integrity is preserved.

       apt-secure does not review signatures at a package level. If you require tools to do this
       you should look at debsig-verify and debsign (provided in the debsig-verify and devscripts
       packages respectively).

       The chain of trust in Debian starts (e.g.) when a maintainer uploads a new package or a
       new version of a package to the Debian archive. In order to become effective, this upload
       needs to be signed by a key contained in one of the Debian package maintainer keyrings
       (available in the debian-keyring package). Maintainers' keys are signed by other
       maintainers following pre-established procedures to ensure the identity of the key holder.
       Similar procedures exist in all Debian-based distributions.

       Once the uploaded package is verified and included in the archive, the maintainer
       signature is stripped off, and checksums of the package are computed and put in the
       Packages file. The checksums of all of the Packages files are then computed and put into
       the Release file. The Release file is then signed by the archive key for this Ubuntu
       release, and distributed alongside the packages and the Packages files on Ubuntu mirrors.
       The keys are in the Ubuntu archive keyring available in the ubuntu-keyring package.

       End users can check the signature of the Release file, extract a checksum of a package
       from it and compare it with the checksum of the package they downloaded by hand - or rely
       on APT doing this automatically.

       Notice that this is distinct from checking signatures on a per package basis. It is
       designed to prevent two possible attacks:

       •   Network "man in the middle" attacks. Without signature checking, malicious agents can
           introduce themselves into the package download process and provide malicious software
           either by controlling a network element (router, switch, etc.) or by redirecting
           traffic to a rogue server (through ARP or DNS spoofing attacks).

       •   Mirror network compromise. Without signature checking, a malicious agent can
           compromise a mirror host and modify the files in it to propagate malicious software to
           all users downloading packages from that host.

       However, it does not defend against a compromise of the master server itself (which signs
       the packages) or against a compromise of the key used to sign the Release files. In any
       case, this mechanism can complement a per-package signature.

INFORMATION CHANGES

       A Release file contains beside the checksums for the files in the repository also general
       information about the repository like the origin, codename or version number of the
       release.

       This information is shown in various places so a repository owner should always ensure
       correctness. Further more user configuration like apt_preferences(5) can depend and make
       use of this information. Since version 1.5 the user must therefore explicitly confirm
       changes to signal that the user is sufficiently prepared e.g. for the new major release of
       the distribution shipped in the repository (as e.g. indicated by the codename).

REPOSITORY CONFIGURATION

       If you want to provide archive signatures in an archive under your maintenance you have
       to:

       •   Create a toplevel Release file, if it does not exist already. You can do this by
           running apt-ftparchive release (provided in apt-utils).

       •   Sign it. You can do this by running gpg --clearsign -o InRelease Release and gpg -abs
           -o Release.gpg Release.

       •   Publish the key fingerprint, so that your users will know what key they need to import
           in order to authenticate the files in the archive. It is best to ship your key in its
           own keyring package like Ubuntu does with ubuntu-keyring to be able to distribute
           updates and key transitions automatically later.

       •   Provide instructions on how to add your archive and key. If your users can't acquire
           your key securely the chain of trust described above is broken. How you can help users
           add your key depends on your archive and target audience ranging from having your
           keyring package included in another archive users already have configured (like the
           default repositories of their distribution) to leveraging the web of trust.

       Whenever the contents of the archive change (new packages are added or removed) the
       archive maintainer has to follow the first two steps outlined above.

SEE ALSO

       apt.conf(5), apt-get(8), sources.list(5), apt-ftparchive(1), debsign(1), debsig-verify(1),
       gpg(1)

       For more background information you might want to review the Debian Security
       Infrastructure[1] chapter of the Securing Debian Manual (also available in the harden-doc
       package) and the Strong Distribution HOWTO[2] by V. Alex Brennen.

BUGS

       APT bug page[3]. If you wish to report a bug in APT, please see
       /usr/share/doc/debian/bug-reporting.txt or the reportbug(1) command.

AUTHOR

       APT was written by the APT team <apt@packages.debian.org>.

MANPAGE AUTHORS

       This man-page is based on the work of Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña, Isaac Jones, Colin
       Walters, Florian Weimer and Michael Vogt.

AUTHORS

       Jason Gunthorpe

       APT team

NOTES

        1. Debian Security Infrastructure
           https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-manual/ch07

        2. Strong Distribution HOWTO
           http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/strong_distro.html

        3. APT bug page
           https://bugs.debian.org/src:apt