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NAME
kill - send a signal to a process or a group of processes
SYNOPSIS
#include <signal.h> int kill(pid_t pid, int sig);
DESCRIPTION
The kill() function shall send a signal to a process or a group of processes specified by pid. The signal
to be sent is specified by sig and is either one from the list given in <signal.h> or 0. If sig is 0 (the
null signal), error checking is performed but no signal is actually sent. The null signal can be used to
check the validity of pid.
For a process to have permission to send a signal to a process designated by pid, unless the sending
process has appropriate privileges, the real or effective user ID of the sending process shall match the
real or saved set-user-ID of the receiving process.
If pid is greater than 0, sig shall be sent to the process whose process ID is equal to pid.
If pid is 0, sig shall be sent to all processes (excluding an unspecified set of system processes) whose
process group ID is equal to the process group ID of the sender, and for which the process has permission
to send a signal.
If pid is -1, sig shall be sent to all processes (excluding an unspecified set of system processes) for
which the process has permission to send that signal.
If pid is negative, but not -1, sig shall be sent to all processes (excluding an unspecified set of
system processes) whose process group ID is equal to the absolute value of pid, and for which the process
has permission to send a signal.
If the value of pid causes sig to be generated for the sending process, and if sig is not blocked for the
calling thread and if no other thread has sig unblocked or is waiting in a sigwait() function for sig,
either sig or at least one pending unblocked signal shall be delivered to the sending thread before
kill() returns.
The user ID tests described above shall not be applied when sending SIGCONT to a process that is a member
of the same session as the sending process.
An implementation that provides extended security controls may impose further implementation-defined
restrictions on the sending of signals, including the null signal. In particular, the system may deny the
existence of some or all of the processes specified by pid.
The kill() function is successful if the process has permission to send sig to any of the processes
specified by pid. If kill() fails, no signal shall be sent.
RETURN VALUE
Upon successful completion, 0 shall be returned. Otherwise, -1 shall be returned and errno set to
indicate the error.
ERRORS
The kill() function shall fail if:
EINVAL The value of the sig argument is an invalid or unsupported signal number.
EPERM The process does not have permission to send the signal to any receiving process.
ESRCH No process or process group can be found corresponding to that specified by pid.
The following sections are informative.
EXAMPLES
None.
APPLICATION USAGE
None.
RATIONALE
The semantics for permission checking for kill() differed between System V and most other
implementations, such as Version 7 or 4.3 BSD. The semantics chosen for this volume of
IEEE Std 1003.1-2001 agree with System V. Specifically, a set-user-ID process cannot protect itself
against signals (or at least not against SIGKILL) unless it changes its real user ID. This choice allows
the user who starts an application to send it signals even if it changes its effective user ID. The other
semantics give more power to an application that wants to protect itself from the user who ran it.
Some implementations provide semantic extensions to the kill() function when the absolute value of pid is
greater than some maximum, or otherwise special, value. Negative values are a flag to kill(). Since most
implementations return [ESRCH] in this case, this behavior is not included in this volume of
IEEE Std 1003.1-2001, although a conforming implementation could provide such an extension.
The implementation-defined processes to which a signal cannot be sent may include the scheduler or init.
There was initially strong sentiment to specify that, if pid specifies that a signal be sent to the
calling process and that signal is not blocked, that signal would be delivered before kill() returns.
This would permit a process to call kill() and be guaranteed that the call never return. However,
historical implementations that provide only the signal() function make only the weaker guarantee in this
volume of IEEE Std 1003.1-2001, because they only deliver one signal each time a process enters the
kernel. Modifications to such implementations to support the sigaction() function generally require entry
to the kernel following return from a signal-catching function, in order to restore the signal mask. Such
modifications have the effect of satisfying the stronger requirement, at least when sigaction() is used,
but not necessarily when signal() is used. The developers of this volume of IEEE Std 1003.1-2001
considered making the stronger requirement except when signal() is used, but felt this would be
unnecessarily complex. Implementors are encouraged to meet the stronger requirement whenever possible. In
practice, the weaker requirement is the same, except in the rare case when two signals arrive during a
very short window. This reasoning also applies to a similar requirement for sigprocmask().
In 4.2 BSD, the SIGCONT signal can be sent to any descendant process regardless of user-ID security
checks. This allows a job control shell to continue a job even if processes in the job have altered their
user IDs (as in the su command). In keeping with the addition of the concept of sessions, similar
functionality is provided by allowing the SIGCONT signal to be sent to any process in the same session
regardless of user ID security checks. This is less restrictive than BSD in the sense that ancestor
processes (in the same session) can now be the recipient. It is more restrictive than BSD in the sense
that descendant processes that form new sessions are now subject to the user ID checks. A similar
relaxation of security is not necessary for the other job control signals since those signals are
typically sent by the terminal driver in recognition of special characters being typed; the terminal
driver bypasses all security checks.
In secure implementations, a process may be restricted from sending a signal to a process having a
different security label. In order to prevent the existence or nonexistence of a process from being used
as a covert channel, such processes should appear nonexistent to the sender; that is, [ESRCH] should be
returned, rather than [EPERM], if pid refers only to such processes.
Existing implementations vary on the result of a kill() with pid indicating an inactive process (a
terminated process that has not been waited for by its parent). Some indicate success on such a call
(subject to permission checking), while others give an error of [ESRCH]. Since the definition of process
lifetime in this volume of IEEE Std 1003.1-2001 covers inactive processes, the [ESRCH] error as described
is inappropriate in this case. In particular, this means that an application cannot have a parent process
check for termination of a particular child with kill(). (Usually this is done with the null signal; this
can be done reliably with waitpid().)
There is some belief that the name kill() is misleading, since the function is not always intended to
cause process termination. However, the name is common to all historical implementations, and any change
would be in conflict with the goal of minimal changes to existing application code.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
None.
SEE ALSO
getpid() , raise() , setsid() , sigaction() , sigqueue() , the Base Definitions volume of
IEEE Std 1003.1-2001, <signal.h>, <sys/types.h>
COPYRIGHT
Portions of this text are reprinted and reproduced in electronic form from IEEE Std 1003.1, 2003 Edition,
Standard for Information Technology -- Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX), The Open Group Base
Specifications Issue 6, Copyright (C) 2001-2003 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Inc and The Open Group. In the event of any discrepancy between this version and the original IEEE and
The Open Group Standard, the original IEEE and The Open Group Standard is the referee document. The
original Standard can be obtained online at http://www.opengroup.org/unix/online.html .