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NAME

       mac_none — null MAC policy module

SYNOPSIS

       To compile the null policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

             options MAC
             options MAC_NONE

       Alternately,  to load the none module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration
       file:

             options MAC

       and in loader.conf(5):

             mac_none_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

       The mac_none policy module implements a none MAC policy that has no  effect  on  access  control  in  the
       system.  Unlike mac_stub(4), none of the MAC entry points are defined.

   Label Format
       No labels are defined for mac_none.

SEE ALSO

       mac(4),   mac_biba(4),  mac_bsdextended(4),  mac_ifoff(4),  mac_lomac(4),  mac_mls(4),  mac_partition(4),
       mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_stub(4), mac_test(4), mac(9)

HISTORY

       The mac_none policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

       This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs,  the  Security  Research
       Division  of  Network Associates Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of
       the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

       See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.  The TrustedBSD  MAC  Framework  is  considered
       experimental in FreeBSD.

       While  the  MAC  Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack
       channels are currently protected by entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies  should  not  be
       relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

Debian                                          December 1, 2002                                     MAC_NONE(4)