Provided by: scrub_2.6.1-1_amd64 bug


       scrub - write patterns on disk/file


       scrub [OPTIONS] special-file [special-file ...]
       scrub [OPTIONS] file [file ...]
       scrub -X [OPTIONS] directory


       Scrub  iteratively  writes  patterns  on files or disk devices to make retrieving the data
       more difficult.  Scrub operates in one of three modes:

       1) The special file corresponding to an entire disk is scrubbed and  all  data  on  it  is
       destroyed.   This  mode is selected if file is a character or block special file.  This is
       the most effective method.

       2) A regular file is scrubbed and only the data in the file (and optionally  its  name  in
       the  directory entry) is destroyed.  The file size is rounded up to fill out the last file
       system block.  This mode is selected if file is a regular file.  See CAVEATS below.

       3) directory is created and filled with files until the file  system  is  full,  then  the
       files are scrubbed as in 2). This mode is selected with the -X option.  See CAVEATS below.


       Scrub accepts the following options:

       -v, --version
              Print scrub version and exit.

       -r, --remove
              Remove the file after scrubbing.

       -p, --pattern PATTERN
              Select  the  patterns  to  write.   See SCRUB METHODS below.  The default, nnsa, is
              reasonable for sanitizing modern PRML/EPRML encoded disk devices.

       -b, --blocksize blocksize
              Perform read(2) and write(2) calls using the specified blocksize (in bytes).  K, M,
              or  G  may  be  appended  to the number to change the units to KiBytes, MiBytes, or
              GiBytes, respectively.  Default: 4M.

       -f, --force
              Scrub even if target contains signature indicating it has already been scrubbed.

       -S, --no-signature
              Do not write scrub signature.  Later, scrub will not be able to  ascertain  if  the
              disk has already been scrubbed.

       -X, --freespace
              Create  specified directory and fill it with files until write returns ENOSPC (file
              system full), then scrub the files as usual.  The size of each file can be set with
              -s, otherwise it will be the maximum file size creatable given the user's file size
              limit or 1g if unlimited.

       -D, --dirent newname
              After scrubbing the file, scrub its name in the directory entry, then rename it  to
              the  new  name.   The scrub patterns used on the directory entry are constrained by
              the operating system and thus are not compliant with cited standards.  This  option
              only works with a single target.

       -s, --device-size size
              Override  the  device  size (in bytes). Without this option, scrub determines media
              capacity using OS-specific ioctl(2) calls.  K, M, or  G  may  be  appended  to  the
              number to change the units to KiBytes, MiBytes, or GiBytes, respectively.

       -L, --no-link
              If  file  is a symbolic link, do not scrub the link target.  Do remove it, however,
              if --remove is specified.

       -R, --no-hwrand
              Don't use a hardware random number generator even if one is available.

       -t, --no-threads
              Don't generate random data in parallel with I/O.

       -n, --dry-run
              Do everything but write to targets.

       -h, --help
              Print a summary of command line options on stderr.


       nnsa   4-pass NNSA Policy Letter NAP-14.1-C (XVI-8)  for  sanitizing  removable  and  non-
              removable  hard disks, which requires overwriting all locations with a pseudorandom
              pattern twice and then with a known pattern: random(x2), 0x00, verify.

       dod    4-pass DoD 5220.22-M section 8-306 procedure (d) for sanitizing removable and  non-
              removable  rigid  disks which requires overwriting all addressable locations with a
              character, its complement, a random character, then verify.  NOTE:  scrub  performs
              the random pass first to make verification easier: random, 0x00, 0xff, verify.

       bsi    9-pass  method  recommended  by  the  German  Center  of  Security  in  Information
              Technologies ( 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfb,  0xf7,  0xef,  0xdf,
              0xbf, 0x7f.

              The canonical 35-pass sequence described in Gutmann's paper cited below.

              7-pass  method  described by Bruce Schneier in "Applied Cryptography" (1996): 0x00,
              0xff, random(x5)

              Roy Pfitzner's 7-random-pass method: random(x7).

              Roy Pfitzner's 33-random-pass method: random(x33).

       usarmy US Army AR380-19 method: 0x00, 0xff, random.   (Note:  identical  to  DoD  522.22-M
              section 8-306 procedure (e) for sanitizing magnetic core memory).

              1-pass pattern: 0x00.

       fillff 1-pass pattern: 0xff.

       random 1-pass pattern: random(x1).

              2-pass pattern: random(x2).

       old    6-pass pre-version 1.7 scrub method: 0x00, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x00, 0x55, verify.

              5-pass pattern: 0x00, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x55, verify.

              1-pass  custom pattern.  String may contain C-style numerical escapes: \nnn (octal)
              or \xnn (hex).


       Scrub may be insufficient to thwart heroic efforts to recover  data  in  an  appropriately
       equipped  lab.   If  you  need this level of protection, physical destruction is your best

       The effectiveness of scrubbing regular files through a file system will be limited by  the
       OS  and  file  system.   File  systems that are known to be problematic are journaled, log
       structured, copy-on-write, versioned, and network file systems.  If in  doubt,  scrub  the
       raw disk device.

       Scrubbing  free  blocks in a file system with the -X method is subject to the same caveats
       as scrubbing regular files, and in addition, is only useful to the extent the file  system
       allows  you  to  reallocate  the target blocks as data blocks in a new file.  If in doubt,
       scrub the raw disk device.

       On MacOS X HFS file system, scrub attempts to overwrite  a  file's  resource  fork  if  it
       exists.   Although  MacOS  X  claims it will support additional named forks in the future,
       scrub is only aware of the traditional data and resource forks.

       scrub cannot access disk blocks that have been spared out by  the  disk  controller.   For
       SATA/PATA  drives, the ATA "security erase" command built into the drive controller can do
       this.  Similarly, the ATA "enhanced security erase" can erase  data  on  track  edges  and
       between  tracks.   The  DOS  utility  HDDERASE from the UCSD Center for Magnetic Recording
       Research can issue these commands, as can modern versions of Linux hdparm.  Unfortunately,
       the analogous SCSI command is optional according to T-10, and not widely implemented.


       To scrub a raw device /dev/sdf1 with default NNSA patterns:

              # scrub /dev/sdf1
              scrub: using NNSA NAP-14.1-C patterns
              scrub: please verify that device size below is correct!
              scrub: scrubbing /dev/sdf1 1995650048 bytes (~1GB)
              scrub: random  |................................................|
              scrub: random  |................................................|
              scrub: 0x00    |................................................|
              scrub: verify  |................................................|

       To scrub the file /tmp/scrubme with a sequence of 0xff 0xaa bytes:

              # scrub -p custom="\xff\xaa" /tmp/scrubme
              scrub: using Custom single-pass patterns
              scrub: scrubbing /tmp/scrubme 78319616 bytes (~74MB)
              scrub: 0xffaa  |................................................|


       Jim Garlick <>

       This  work  was  produced  at  the  University  of California, Lawrence Livermore National
       Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-ENG-48 with the DOE.  Designated  UCRL-CODE-2003-006,
       scrub is licensed under terms of the GNU General Public License.


       DoD  5220.22-M,  "National  Industrial  Security  Program  Operating  Manual",  Chapter 8,

       NNSA Policy Letter: NAP-14.1-C, "Clearing, Sanitizing, and Destroying  Information  System
       Storage Media, Memory Devices, and other Related Hardware", 05-02-08, page XVI-8.

       "Secure  Deletion  of  Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory", by Peter Gutmann, Sixth
       USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose, CA, July 22-25, 1996.

       "Gutmann Method", Wikipedia,

       Darik's boot and Nuke FAQ:

       "Tutorial on Disk Drive Data Sanitization", by Gordon Hugues and Tom Coughlin,

       "Guidelines for Media Sanitization",  NIST  special  publication  800-88,  Kissel  et  al,
       September, 2006.

       shred(1), hdparm(8)