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     mac_none — null MAC policy module


     To compile the null policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel
     configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_NONE

     Alternately, to load the none module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel
     configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):



     The mac_none policy module implements a none MAC policy that has no effect on access control
     in the system.  Unlike mac_stub(4), none of the MAC entry points are defined.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_none.


     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4),
     mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_stub(4), mac_test(4), mac(9)


     The mac_none policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD


     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the
     Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract
     N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.


     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.  The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is
     considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not
     all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks.  As such, MAC Framework
     policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged