sudo, sudoedit
- Provided by: sudo-ldap (Version: 1.8.16-0ubuntu1.10)
- Source: sudo
- Report a bug
sudo |
-h | -K |
-k | -V |
sudo |
-v [-AknS]
[-a type]
[-g group]
[-h host]
[-p prompt]
[-u user] |
sudo |
-l [-AknS]
[-a type]
[-g group]
[-h host]
[-p prompt]
[-U user]
[-u user]
[command] |
sudo |
[-AbEHnPS] [-a
type] [-C
num] [-c
class] [-g
group] [-h
host] [-p
prompt] [-r
role] [-t
type] [-u
user]
[VAR=value]
[-i | -s]
[command] |
sudoedit |
[-AknS] [-a
type] [-C
num] [-c
class] [-g
group] [-h
host] [-p
prompt] [-u
user] file ... |
sudo allows a permitted user to execute a
command as the superuser or another user, as specified
by the security policy. The invoking user's real (not
effective) user ID is used to determine the user name with which to query
the security policy.
sudo supports a plugin architecture for
security policies and input/output logging. Third parties can develop and
distribute their own policy and I/O logging plugins to work seamlessly with
the sudo front end. The default security policy is
sudoers, which is configured via the file
/etc/sudoers, or via LDAP. See the
Plugins section for more information.
The security policy determines what privileges, if any, a user has
to run sudo. The policy may require that users
authenticate themselves with a password or another authentication mechanism.
If authentication is required, sudo will exit if the
user's password is not entered within a configurable time limit. This limit
is policy-specific; the default password prompt timeout for the
sudoers security policy is unlimited.
Security policies may support credential caching to allow the user
to run sudo again for a period of time without
requiring authentication. The sudoers policy caches
credentials for 15 minutes, unless overridden in
sudoers(5). By running sudo with
the -v option, a user can update the cached
credentials without running a command.
When invoked as sudoedit, the
-e option (described below), is implied.
Security policies may log successful and failed attempts to use
sudo. If an I/O plugin is configured, the running
command's input and output may be logged as well.
The options are as follows:
-A,
--askpasssudo requires a password, it will
read it from the user's terminal. If the -A
(askpass)
option is specified, a (possibly graphical) helper program is executed to
read the user's password and output the password to the standard output.
If the SUDO_ASKPASS environment variable is set,
it specifies the path to the helper program. Otherwise, if
sudo.conf(5) contains a line specifying the askpass
program, that value will be used. For example:
# Path to askpass helper program Path askpass /usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass
If no askpass program is available,
sudo will exit with an error.
-b,
--backgroundsudo. Most interactive commands will fail to work
properly in background mode.-C
num,
--close-from=numsudo will
close all open file descriptors other than standard input, standard output
and standard error when executing a command. The security policy may
restrict the user's ability to use this option. The
sudoers policy only permits use of the
-C option when the administrator has enabled the
closefrom_override
option.-E,
--preserve-env-e,
--editSUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL
and EDITOR environment variables (in that
order). If none of SUDO_EDITOR,
VISUAL or EDITOR are
set, the first program listed in the
editor
sudoers(5) option is used.To help prevent the editing of unauthorized files, the following restrictions are enforced unless explicitly allowed by the security policy:
Users are never allowed to edit device special files.
If the specified file does not exist, it will be
created. Note that unlike most commands run by
sudo, the editor
is run with the invoking user's environment unmodified. If, for some
reason, sudo is unable to update a file with its
edited version, the user will receive a warning and the edited copy will
remain in a temporary file.
-g
group,
--group=group#’ character (e.g.
#0 for GID 0). When running a command as a GID,
many shells require that the ‘#’ be
escaped with a backslash (‘\’). If
no -u option is specified, the command will be run
as the invoking user. In either case, the primary group will be set to
group.-H,
--set-homeHOME
environment variable to the home directory specified by the target user's
password database entry. Depending on the policy, this may be the default
behavior.-h,
--help-h
host,
--host=host-l option to list a user's privileges for the
remote host.-i,
--login-c option. If no
command is specified, an interactive shell is executed.
sudo attempts to change to that user's home
directory before running the shell. The command is run with an environment
similar to the one a user would receive at log in. The
Command
environment section in the sudoers(5) manual
documents how the -i option affects the
environment in which a command is run when the sudoers
policy is in use.-K,
--remove-timestamp-k option, except that it removes
the user's cached credentials entirely and may not be used in conjunction
with a command or other option. This option does not require a password.
Not all security policies support credential caching.-k,
--reset-timestampsudo is run a password
will be required. This option does not require a password and was added to
allow a user to revoke sudo permissions from a
.logout file.
When used in conjunction with a command or an option that may
require a password, this option will cause sudo
to ignore the user's cached credentials. As a result,
sudo will prompt for a password (if one is
required by the security policy) and will not update the user's cached
credentials.
Not all security policies support credential caching.
-l,
--list-U option) on the current host. A longer list
format is used if this option is specified multiple times and the security
policy supports a verbose output format.
If a command is specified and is
permitted by the security policy, the fully-qualified path to the
command is displayed along with any command line arguments. If
command is specified but not allowed,
sudo will exit with a status value of 1.
-n,
--non-interactivesudo will display an error
message and exit.-P,
--preserve-groups-p
prompt,
--prompt=prompt%’) escape sequences are
supported by the sudoers policy:
%H%h%p%U-u option is also
specified)%u%%%’ characters
are collapsed into a single ‘%’
characterThe custom prompt will override the system password prompt on systems that support PAM unless the passprompt_override flag is disabled in sudoers.
-r
role,
--role=role-S,
--stdin-s,
--shellSHELL environment
variable if it is set or the shell specified by the invoking user's
password database entry. If a command is specified, it is passed to the
shell for execution via the shell's -c option. If
no command is specified, an interactive shell is executed.-t
type,
--type=type-U
user,
--other-user=user-l option to list the
privileges for user instead of for the invoking
user. The security policy may restrict listing other users' privileges.
The sudoers policy only allows root or a user with the
ALL privilege on the current host to use this
option.-u
user,
--user=user#’
character (e.g. #0 for UID 0). When running
commands as a UID, many shells require that the
‘#’ be escaped with a backslash
(‘\’). Some security policies may
restrict UIDs to those listed in the password database. The
sudoers policy allows UIDs that are not in the password
database as long as the targetpw option is not set.
Other security policies may not support this.-V,
--versionsudo version string as well as the
version string of the security policy plugin and any I/O plugins. If the
invoking user is already root the -V option will
display the arguments passed to configure when
sudo was built and plugins may display more
verbose information such as default options.-v,
--validatesudo timeout for another
15 minutes by default, but does not run a command.
Not all security policies support cached credentials.---- option indicates that
sudo should stop processing command line
arguments.Environment variables to be set for the command may
also be passed on the command line in the form of
VAR=value, e.g.
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/local/pkg/lib.
Variables passed on the command line are subject to restrictions imposed by
the security policy plugin. The sudoers policy subjects
variables passed on the command line to the same restrictions as normal
environment variables with one important exception. If the
setenv option is
set in sudoers, the command to be run has the
SETENV tag set or the command matched is
ALL, the user may set variables that would otherwise
be forbidden. See sudoers(5) for more information.
When sudo executes a command, the security
policy specifies the execution environment for the command. Typically, the
real and effective user and group and IDs are set to match those of the
target user, as specified in the password database, and the group vector is
initialized based on the group database (unless the
-P option was specified).
The following parameters may be specified by security policy:
When sudo runs a command, it calls
fork(2), sets up the execution environment as described
above, and calls the execve system call in the child
process. The main sudo process waits until the
command has completed, then passes the command's exit status to the security
policy's close function and exits. If an I/O logging plugin is configured or
if the security policy explicitly requests it, a new pseudo-terminal
(“pty”) is created and a second sudo
process is used to relay job control signals between the user's existing pty
and the new pty the command is being run in. This extra process makes it
possible to, for example, suspend and resume the command. Without it, the
command would be in what POSIX terms an “orphaned process
group” and it would not receive any job control signals. As a special
case, if the policy plugin does not define a close function and no pty is
required, sudo will execute the command directly
instead of calling fork(2) first. The
sudoers policy plugin will only define a close function
when I/O logging is enabled, a pty is required, or the
pam_session or pam_setcred options are
enabled. Note that pam_session and
pam_setcred are enabled by default on systems using
PAM.
When the command is run as a child of the
sudo process, sudo will
relay signals it receives to the command. The SIGINT
and SIGQUIT signals are only relayed when the
command is being run in a new pty or when the signal was sent by a user
process, not the kernel. This prevents the command from receiving
SIGINT twice each time the user enters control-C.
Some signals, such as SIGSTOP and
SIGKILL, cannot be caught and thus will not be
relayed to the command. As a general rule, SIGTSTP
should be used instead of SIGSTOP when you wish to
suspend a command being run by sudo.
As a special case, sudo will not
relay signals that were sent by the command it is running. This prevents the
command from accidentally killing itself. On some systems, the
reboot(8) command sends SIGTERM to
all non-system processes other than itself before rebooting the system. This
prevents sudo from relaying the
SIGTERM signal it received back to
reboot(8), which might then exit before the system was
actually rebooted, leaving it in a half-dead state similar to single user
mode. Note, however, that this check only applies to the command run by
sudo and not any other processes that the command
may create. As a result, running a script that calls
reboot(8) or shutdown(8) via
sudo may cause the system to end up in this
undefined state unless the reboot(8) or
shutdown(8) are run using the
exec() family
of functions instead of
system()
(which interposes a shell between the command and the calling process).
If no I/O logging plugins are loaded and the policy
plugin has not defined a
close()
function, set a command timeout or required that the command be run in a new
pty, sudo may execute the command directly instead
of running it as a child process.
Plugins may be specified via Plugin
directives in the sudo.conf(5) file. They may be loaded as
dynamic shared objects (on systems that support them), or compiled directly
into the sudo binary. If no
sudo.conf(5) file is present, or it contains no
Plugin lines, sudo will use
the traditional sudoers security policy and I/O logging.
See the sudo.conf(5) manual for details of the
/etc/sudo.conf file and the
sudo_plugin(8) manual for more information about the
sudo plugin architecture.
Upon successful execution of a command, the exit status from
sudo will be the exit status of the program that was
executed. If the command terminated due to receipt of a signal,
sudo will send itself the signal that terminated the
command.
Otherwise, sudo exits with a value of 1 if
there is a configuration/permission problem or if
sudo cannot execute the given command. In the latter
case, the error string is printed to the standard error. If
sudo cannot stat(2) one or more
entries in the user's PATH, an error is printed to
the standard error. (If the directory does not exist or if it is not really
a directory, the entry is ignored and no error is printed.) This should not
happen under normal circumstances. The most common reason for
stat(2) to return “permission denied” is if
you are running an automounter and one of the directories in your
PATH is on a machine that is currently
unreachable.
sudo tries to be safe when executing
external commands.
To prevent command spoofing, sudo checks
"." and "" (both denoting current directory) last when
searching for a command in the user's PATH (if one
or both are in the PATH). Note, however, that the
actual PATH environment variable is
not modified and is passed unchanged to the program that
sudo executes.
Users should
never be granted
sudo privileges to execute files that are writable
by the user or that reside in a directory that is writable by the user. If
the user can modify or replace the command there is no way to limit what
additional commands they can run.
Please note that sudo will
normally only log the command it explicitly runs. If a user runs a command
such as sudo su or sudo sh,
subsequent commands run from that shell are not subject to
sudo's security policy. The same is true for
commands that offer shell escapes (including most editors). If I/O logging
is enabled, subsequent commands will have their input and/or output logged,
but there will not be traditional logs for those commands. Because of this,
care must be taken when giving users access to commands via
sudo to verify that the command does not
inadvertently give the user an effective root shell. For more information,
please see the
Preventing shell
escapes section in sudoers(5).
To prevent the disclosure of potentially sensitive information,
sudo disables core dumps by default while it is
executing (they are re-enabled for the command that is run). This historical
practice dates from a time when most operating systems allowed setuid
processes to dump core by default. To aid in debugging
sudo crashes, you may wish to re-enable core dumps
by setting “disable_coredump” to false in the
sudo.conf(5) file as follows:
Set disable_coredump false
See the sudo.conf(5) manual for more information.
sudo utilizes the following environment
variables. The security policy has control over the actual content of the
command's environment.
EDITOR-e (sudoedit) mode if
neither SUDO_EDITOR nor
VISUAL is set.MAIL-i option is specified or when
env_reset is enabled in sudoers
(unless MAIL is present in the
env_keep list).HOME-i or -H options are
specified, when the -s option is specified and
set_home
is set in sudoers, when
always_set_home
is enabled in sudoers, or when
env_reset is enabled in sudoers and
HOME is not present in the env_keep
list.LOGNAME-i option is specified, when the
set_logname
option is enabled in sudoers or when the
env_reset option is enabled in sudoers
(unless LOGNAME is present in the
env_keep list).PATHSHELL-s
option.SUDO_ASKPASS-A option is
specified.SUDO_COMMANDSUDO_EDITOR-e (sudoedit) mode.SUDO_GIDSUDO_PROMPTSUDO_PS1PS1 will be set to its value for the
program being run.SUDO_UIDSUDO_USERUSERLOGNAME, described
above.USERNAMEUSER.VISUAL-e (sudoedit) mode if
SUDO_EDITOR is not set.sudo front end configurationNote: the following examples assume a properly configured security policy.
To get a file listing of an unreadable directory:
$ sudo ls /usr/local/protected
To list the home directory of user yaz on a machine where the file system holding ~yaz is not exported as root:
$ sudo -u yaz ls ~yaz
To edit the index.html file as user www:
$ sudo -u www vi ~www/htdocs/index.html
To view system logs only accessible to root and users in the adm group:
$ sudo -g adm view /var/log/syslog
To run an editor as jim with a different primary group:
$ sudo -u jim -g audio vi ~jim/sound.txt
To shut down a machine:
$ sudo shutdown -r +15 "quick reboot"
To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home partition.
Note that this runs the commands in a sub-shell to make the
cd and file redirection work.
$ sudo sh -c "cd /home ; du -s * | sort -rn > USAGE"
su(1), stat(2), passwd(5), sudo.conf(5), sudoers(5), sudo_plugin(8), sudoreplay(8), visudo(8)
See the HISTORY file in the sudo
distribution (https://www.sudo.ws/history.html) for a brief history of
sudo.
Many people have worked on sudo over the
years; this version consists of code written primarily by:
See the CONTRIBUTORS file in the sudo
distribution (https://www.sudo.ws/contributors.html) for an exhaustive list
of people who have contributed to sudo.
There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell
if that user is allowed to run arbitrary commands via
sudo. Also, many programs (such as editors) allow
the user to run commands via shell escapes, thus avoiding
sudo's checks. However, on most systems it is
possible to prevent shell escapes with the sudoers(5)
plugin's
noexec
functionality.
It is not meaningful to run the cd command
directly via sudo, e.g.,
$ sudo cd /usr/local/protected
since when the command exits the parent process (your shell) will still be the same. Please see the EXAMPLES section for more information.
Running shell scripts via sudo can expose
the same kernel bugs that make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating
systems (if your OS has a /dev/fd/ directory, setuid shell scripts are
generally safe).
If you feel you have found a bug in sudo,
please submit a bug report at https://bugzilla.sudo.ws/
Limited free support is available via the sudo-users mailing list, see https://www.sudo.ws/mailman/listinfo/sudo-users to subscribe or search the archives.
sudo is provided “AS IS” and
any express or implied warranties, including, but not limited to, the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose
are disclaimed. See the LICENSE file distributed with
sudo or https://www.sudo.ws/license.html for
complete details.