setpriv [options] program [arguments]
Sets or queries various Linux privilege settings that are
inherited across execve(2).
The difference between the commands setpriv and su (or runuser) is
that setpriv does not use open PAM session and does not ask for password.
It's simple non-set-user-ID wrapper around execve system call.
- --clear-groups
- Clear supplementary groups.
- -d, --dump
- Dump current privilege state. Can be specified more than once to show
extra, mostly useless, information. Incompatible with all other
options.
- --groups
group...
- Set supplementary groups. The argument is a comma-separated list.
- --inh-caps
(+|-)cap... or
--ambient-caps
(+|-)cap...
or --bounding-set
(+|-)cap...
- Set the inheritable capabilities, ambient capabilities or the capability
bounding set. See capabilities(7). The argument is a
comma-separated list of +cap and -cap entries,
which add or remove an entry respectively. cap can either be a
human-readable name as seen in capabilities(7) without the
cap_ prefix or of the format cap_N, where N is
the internal capability index used by Linux. +all and -all
can be used to add or remove all caps. The set of capabilities starts out
as the current inheritable set for --inh-caps, the current ambient
set for --ambient-caps and the current bounding set for
--bounding-set. If you drop something from the bounding set without
also dropping it from the inheritable set, you are likely to become
confused. Do not do that.
- --keep-groups
- Preserve supplementary groups. Only useful in conjunction with
--rgid, --egid, or --regid.
- --init-groups
- Initialize supplementary groups using initgroups(3). Only useful in
conjunction with --ruid or --reuid.
- --list-caps
- List all known capabilities. This option must be specified alone.
- --no-new-privs
- Set the no_new_privs bit. With this bit set, execve(2) will
not grant new privileges. For example, the set-user-ID and set-group-ID
bits as well as file capabilities will be disabled. (Executing binaries
with these bits set will still work, but they will not gain privileges.
Certain LSMs, especially AppArmor, may result in failures to execute
certain programs.) This bit is inherited by child processes and cannot be
unset. See prctl(2) and Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt
in the Linux kernel source.
The no_new_privs bit is supported since Linux 3.5.
- --rgid gid,
--egid gid, --regid gid
- Set the real, effective, or both GIDs. The gid argument can be
given as textual group name.
For safety, you must specify one of --clear-groups,
--groups, or --keep-groups if you set any primary
gid.
- --ruid uid,
--euid uid, --reuid uid
- Set the real, effective, or both UIDs. The uid argument can be
given as textual login name.
Setting a uid or gid does not change
capabilities, although the exec call at the end might change
capabilities. This means that, if you are root, you probably want to do
something like:
setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --caps=-all
- --securebits
(+|-)securebit...
- Set or clear securebits. The argument is a comma-separated list. The valid
securebits are noroot, noroot_locked,
no_setuid_fixup, no_setuid_fixup_locked, and
keep_caps_locked. keep_caps is cleared by execve(2)
and is therefore not allowed.
- --selinux-label
label
- Request a particular SELinux transition (using a transition on exec, not
dyntrans). This will fail and cause setpriv(1) to abort if SELinux
is not in use, and the transition may be ignored or cause execve(2)
to fail at SELinux's whim. (In particular, this is unlikely to work in
conjunction with no_new_privs.) This is similar to
runcon(1).
- --apparmor-profile
profile
- Request a particular AppArmor profile (using a transition on exec). This
will fail and cause setpriv(1) to abort if AppArmor is not in use,
and the transition may be ignored or cause execve(2) to fail at
AppArmor's whim.
- -V, --version
- Display version information and exit.
- -h, --help
- Display help text and exit.
If applying any specified option fails, program will not be
run and setpriv will return with exit code 127.
Be careful with this tool -- it may have unexpected security
consequences. For example, setting no_new_privs and then execing a program
that is SELinux-confined (as this tool would do) may prevent the SELinux
restrictions from taking effect.