Provided by: scrub_2.6.1-1build2_amd64 bug

NAME

       scrub - write patterns on disk/file

SYNOPSIS

       scrub [OPTIONS] special-file [special-file ...]
       scrub [OPTIONS] file [file ...]
       scrub -X [OPTIONS] directory

DESCRIPTION

       Scrub  iteratively  writes  patterns on files or disk devices to make retrieving the data more difficult.
       Scrub operates in one of three modes:

       1) The special file corresponding to an entire disk is scrubbed and all data on it  is  destroyed.   This
       mode is selected if file is a character or block special file.  This is the most effective method.

       2)  A  regular  file  is scrubbed and only the data in the file (and optionally its name in the directory
       entry) is destroyed.  The file size is rounded up to fill out the last file system block.  This  mode  is
       selected if file is a regular file.  See CAVEATS below.

       3)  directory is created and filled with files until the file system is full, then the files are scrubbed
       as in 2). This mode is selected with the -X option.  See CAVEATS below.

OPTIONS

       Scrub accepts the following options:

       -v, --version
              Print scrub version and exit.

       -r, --remove
              Remove the file after scrubbing.

       -p, --pattern PATTERN
              Select the patterns to write.  See SCRUB METHODS below.  The  default,  nnsa,  is  reasonable  for
              sanitizing modern PRML/EPRML encoded disk devices.

       -b, --blocksize blocksize
              Perform  read(2)  and  write(2) calls using the specified blocksize (in bytes).  K, M, or G may be
              appended to the number to  change  the  units  to  KiBytes,  MiBytes,  or  GiBytes,  respectively.
              Default: 4M.

       -f, --force
              Scrub even if target contains signature indicating it has already been scrubbed.

       -S, --no-signature
              Do  not write scrub signature.  Later, scrub will not be able to ascertain if the disk has already
              been scrubbed.

       -X, --freespace
              Create specified directory and fill it with files until write returns ENOSPC (file  system  full),
              then scrub the files as usual.  The size of each file can be set with -s, otherwise it will be the
              maximum file size creatable given the user's file size limit or 1g if unlimited.

       -D, --dirent newname
              After scrubbing the file, scrub its name in the directory entry, then rename it to the  new  name.
              The  scrub  patterns  used on the directory entry are constrained by the operating system and thus
              are not compliant with cited standards.  This option only works with a single target.

       -s, --device-size size
              Override the device size (in bytes). Without this option, scrub determines  media  capacity  using
              OS-specific  ioctl(2)  calls.   K,  M,  or  G may be appended to the number to change the units to
              KiBytes, MiBytes, or GiBytes, respectively.

       -L, --no-link
              If file is a symbolic link, do not scrub the link target.  Do remove it, however, if  --remove  is
              specified.

       -R, --no-hwrand
              Don't use a hardware random number generator even if one is available.

       -t, --no-threads
              Don't generate random data in parallel with I/O.

       -n, --dry-run
              Do everything but write to targets.

       -h, --help
              Print a summary of command line options on stderr.

SCRUB METHODS

       nnsa   4-pass  NNSA  Policy  Letter  NAP-14.1-C  (XVI-8)  for sanitizing removable and non-removable hard
              disks, which requires overwriting all locations with a pseudorandom pattern twice and then with  a
              known pattern: random(x2), 0x00, verify.

       dod    4-pass  DoD 5220.22-M section 8-306 procedure (d) for sanitizing removable and non-removable rigid
              disks which requires overwriting all addressable locations with a  character,  its  complement,  a
              random  character,  then  verify.  NOTE: scrub performs the random pass first to make verification
              easier: random, 0x00, 0xff, verify.

       bsi    9-pass  method  recommended  by  the  German  Center  of  Security  in  Information   Technologies
              (http://www.bsi.bund.de): 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfb, 0xf7, 0xef, 0xdf, 0xbf, 0x7f.

       gutmann
              The canonical 35-pass sequence described in Gutmann's paper cited below.

       schneier
              7-pass method described by Bruce Schneier in "Applied Cryptography" (1996): 0x00, 0xff, random(x5)

       pfitzner7
              Roy Pfitzner's 7-random-pass method: random(x7).

       pfitzner33
              Roy Pfitzner's 33-random-pass method: random(x33).

       usarmy US  Army  AR380-19  method:  0x00,  0xff,  random.  (Note: identical to DoD 522.22-M section 8-306
              procedure (e) for sanitizing magnetic core memory).

       fillzero
              1-pass pattern: 0x00.

       fillff 1-pass pattern: 0xff.

       random 1-pass pattern: random(x1).

       random2
              2-pass pattern: random(x2).

       old    6-pass pre-version 1.7 scrub method: 0x00, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x00, 0x55, verify.

       fastold
              5-pass pattern: 0x00, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x55, verify.

       custom=string
              1-pass custom pattern.  String may contain C-style numerical escapes: \nnn (octal) or \xnn (hex).

CAVEATS

       Scrub may be insufficient to thwart heroic efforts to recover data in an appropriately equipped lab.   If
       you need this level of protection, physical destruction is your best bet.

       The  effectiveness  of  scrubbing  regular files through a file system will be limited by the OS and file
       system.  File systems that are known to be problematic  are  journaled,  log  structured,  copy-on-write,
       versioned, and network file systems.  If in doubt, scrub the raw disk device.

       Scrubbing  free  blocks  in  a file system with the -X method is subject to the same caveats as scrubbing
       regular files, and in addition, is only useful to the extent the file system allows you to reallocate the
       target blocks as data blocks in a new file.  If in doubt, scrub the raw disk device.

       On  MacOS  X  HFS file system, scrub attempts to overwrite a file's resource fork if it exists.  Although
       MacOS X claims it will support additional named  forks  in  the  future,  scrub  is  only  aware  of  the
       traditional data and resource forks.

       scrub  cannot access disk blocks that have been spared out by the disk controller.  For SATA/PATA drives,
       the ATA "security erase" command built into the  drive  controller  can  do  this.   Similarly,  the  ATA
       "enhanced  security  erase"  can  erase data on track edges and between tracks.  The DOS utility HDDERASE
       from the UCSD Center for Magnetic Recording Research can issue these commands, as can modern versions  of
       Linux  hdparm.   Unfortunately,  the analogous SCSI command is optional according to T-10, and not widely
       implemented.

EXAMPLES

       To scrub a raw device /dev/sdf1 with default NNSA patterns:

              # scrub /dev/sdf1
              scrub: using NNSA NAP-14.1-C patterns
              scrub: please verify that device size below is correct!
              scrub: scrubbing /dev/sdf1 1995650048 bytes (~1GB)
              scrub: random  |................................................|
              scrub: random  |................................................|
              scrub: 0x00    |................................................|
              scrub: verify  |................................................|

       To scrub the file /tmp/scrubme with a sequence of 0xff 0xaa bytes:

              # scrub -p custom="\xff\xaa" /tmp/scrubme
              scrub: using Custom single-pass patterns
              scrub: scrubbing /tmp/scrubme 78319616 bytes (~74MB)
              scrub: 0xffaa  |................................................|

AUTHOR

       Jim Garlick <garlick@llnl.gov>

       This work was produced at the University of California,  Lawrence  Livermore  National  Laboratory  under
       Contract No. W-7405-ENG-48 with the DOE.  Designated UCRL-CODE-2003-006, scrub is licensed under terms of
       the GNU General Public License.

SEE ALSO

       DoD 5220.22-M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual", Chapter 8, 01/1995.

       NNSA Policy Letter: NAP-14.1-C, "Clearing, Sanitizing, and Destroying Information System  Storage  Media,
       Memory Devices, and other Related Hardware", 05-02-08, page XVI-8.

       "Secure  Deletion  of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory", by Peter Gutmann, Sixth USENIX Security
       Symposium, San Jose, CA, July 22-25, 1996.

       "Gutmann Method", Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gutmann_method.

       Darik's boot and Nuke FAQ: http://dban.sourceforge.net/faq/index.html

       "Tutorial on Disk Drive Data Sanitization", by Gordon Hugues and Tom Coughlin,
       http://cmrr.ucsd.edu/people/Hughes/DataSanitizationTutorial.pdf.

       "Guidelines for Media Sanitization", NIST special publication 800-88, Kissel et al, September, 2006.

       shred(1), hdparm(8)