oracular (7) ossl-guide-tls-introduction.7ssl.gz

NAME

       ossl-guide-tls-introduction - OpenSSL Guide: An introduction to SSL/TLS in OpenSSL

INTRODUCTION

       This page will provide an introduction to some basic SSL/TLS concepts and background and how it is used
       within OpenSSL. It assumes that you have a basic understanding of TCP/IP and sockets.

WHAT IS TLS?

       TLS stands for Transport Layer Security. TLS allows applications to securely communicate with each other
       across a network such that the confidentiality of the information exchanged is protected (i.e. it
       prevents eavesdroppers from listening in to the communication). Additionally it protects the integrity of
       the information exchanged to prevent an attacker from changing it. Finally it provides authentication so
       that one or both parties can be sure that they are talking to who they think they are talking to and not
       some imposter.

       Sometimes TLS is referred to by its predecessor's name SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). OpenSSL dates from a
       time when the SSL name was still in common use and hence many of the functions and names used by OpenSSL
       contain the "SSL" abbreviation. Nonetheless OpenSSL contains a fully fledged TLS implementation.

       TLS is based on a client/server model. The application that initiates a communication is known as the
       client. The application that responds to a remotely initiated communication is the server. The term
       "endpoint" refers to either of the client or the server in a communication. The term "peer" refers to the
       endpoint at the other side of the communication that we are currently referring to. So if we are
       currently talking about the client then the peer would be the server.

       TLS is a standardised protocol and there are numerous different implementations of it. Due to the
       standards an OpenSSL client or server is able to communicate seamlessly with an application using some
       different implementation of TLS. TLS (and its predecessor SSL) have been around for a significant period
       of time and the protocol has undergone various changes over the years. Consequently there are different
       versions of the protocol available. TLS includes the ability to perform version negotiation so that the
       highest protocol version that the client and server share in common is used.

       TLS acts as a security layer over some lower level transport protocol. Typically the transport layer will
       be TCP.

SSL AND TLS VERSIONS

       SSL was initially developed by Netscape Communications and its first publicly released version was SSLv2
       in 1995. Note that SSLv1 was never publicly released.  SSLv3 came along quickly afterwards in 1996.
       Subsequently development of the protocol moved to the IETF which released the first version of TLS
       (TLSv1.0) in 1999 as RFC2246. TLSv1.1 was released in 2006 as RFC4346 and TLSv1.2 came along in 2008 as
       RFC5246. The most recent version of the standard is TLSv1.3 which was released in 2018 as RFC8446.

       Today TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.2 are the most commonly deployed versions of the protocol. The IETF have formally
       deprecated TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.0, so anything below TLSv1.2 should be avoided since the older protocol
       versions are susceptible to security problems.

       OpenSSL does not support SSLv2 (it was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0). Support for SSLv3 is available as a
       compile time option - but it is not built by default.  Support for TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3
       are all available by default in a standard build of OpenSSL. However special run-time configuration is
       required in order to make TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 work successfully.

       OpenSSL will always try to negotiate the highest protocol version that it has been configured to support.
       In most cases this will mean either TLSv1.3 or TLSv1.2 is chosen.

CERTIFICATES

       In order for a client to establish a connection to a server it must authenticate the identify of that
       server, i.e. it needs to confirm that the server is really the server that it claims to be and not some
       imposter. In order to do this the server will send to the client a digital certificate (also commonly
       referred to as an X.509 certificate). The certificate contains various information about the server
       including its full DNS hostname. Also within the certificate is the server's public key. The server
       operator will have a private key which is linked to the public key and must not be published.

       Along with the certificate the server will also send to the client proof that it knows the private key
       associated with the public key in the certificate. It does this by digitally signing a message to the
       client using that private key. The client can verify the signature using the public key from the
       certificate. If the signature verifies successfully then the client knows that the server is in
       possession of the correct private key.

       The certificate that the server sends will also be signed by a Certificate Authority. The Certificate
       Authority (commonly known as a CA) is a third party organisation that is responsible for verifying the
       information in the server's certificate (including its DNS hostname). The CA should only sign the
       certificate if it has been able to confirm that the server operator does indeed have control of the
       server associated with its DNS hostname and that the server operator has control of the private key.

       In this way, if the client trusts the CA that has signed the server's certificate and it can verify that
       the server has the right private key then it can trust that the server truly does represent the DNS
       hostname given in the certificate. The client must also verify that the hostname given in the certificate
       matches the hostname that it originally sent the request to.

       Once all of these checks have been done the client has successfully verified the identify of the server.
       OpenSSL can perform all of these checks automatically but it must be provided with certain information in
       order to do so, i.e. the set of CAs that the client trusts as well as the DNS hostname for the server
       that this client is trying to connect to.

       Note that it is common for certificates to be built up into a chain. For example a server's certificate
       may be signed by a key owned by a an intermediate CA.  That intermediate CA also has a certificate
       containing its public key which is in turn signed by a key owned by a root CA. The client may only trust
       the root CA, but if the server sends both its own certificate and the certificate for the intermediate CA
       then the client can still successfully verify the identity of the server. There is a chain of trust
       between the root CA and the server.

       By default it is only the client that authenticates the server using this method. However it is also
       possible to set things up such that the server additionally authenticates the client. This is known as
       "client authentication".  In this approach the client will still authenticate the server in the same way,
       but the server will request a certificate from the client. The client sends the server its certificate
       and the server authenticates it in the same way that the client does.

TRUSTED CERTIFICATE STORE

       The system described above only works if a chain of trust can be built between the set of CAs that the
       endpoint trusts and the certificate that the peer is using. The endpoint must therefore have a set of
       certificates for CAs that it trusts before any communication can take place. OpenSSL itself does not
       provide such a set of certificates. Therefore you will need to make sure you have them before you start
       if you are going to be verifying certificates (i.e. always if the endpoint is a client, and only if
       client authentication is in use for a server).

       Fortunately other organisations do maintain such a set of certificates. If you have obtained your copy of
       OpenSSL from an Operating System (OS) vendor (e.g. a Linux distribution) then normally the set of CA
       certificates will also be distributed with that copy.

       You can check this by running the OpenSSL command line application like this:

        openssl version -d

       This will display a value for OPENSSLDIR. Look in the certs sub directory of OPENSSLDIR and check its
       contents. For example if OPENSSLDIR is "/usr/local/ssl", then check the contents of the
       "/usr/local/ssl/certs" directory.

       You are expecting to see a list of files, typically with the suffix ".pem" or ".0". If they exist then
       you already have a suitable trusted certificate store.

       If you are running your version of OpenSSL on Windows then OpenSSL (from version 3.2 onwards) will use
       the default Windows set of trusted CAs.

       If you have built your version of OpenSSL from source, or obtained it from some other location and it
       does not have a set of trusted CA certificates then you will have to obtain them yourself. One such
       source is the Curl project. See the page <https://curl.se/docs/caextract.html> where you can download
       trusted certificates in a single file. Rename the file to "cert.pem" and store it directly in OPENSSLDIR.
       For example if OPENSSLDIR is "/usr/local/ssl", then save it as "/usr/local/ssl/cert.pem".

       You can also use environment variables to override the default location that OpenSSL will look for its
       trusted certificate store. Set the SSL_CERT_PATH environment variable to give the directory where OpenSSL
       should looks for its certificates or the SSL_CERT_FILE environment variable to give the name of a single
       file containing all of the certificates. See openssl-env(7) for further details about OpenSSL environment
       variables. For example you could use this capability to have multiple versions of OpenSSL all installed
       on the same system using different values for OPENSSLDIR but all using the same trusted certificate
       store.

       You can test that your trusted certificate store is setup correctly by using it via the OpenSSL command
       line. Use the following command to connect to a TLS server:

        openssl s_client www.openssl.org:443

       Once the command has connected type the letter "Q" followed by "<enter>" to exit the session. This will
       print a lot of information on the screen about the connection. Look for a block of text like this:

        SSL handshake has read 4584 bytes and written 403 bytes
        Verification: OK

       Hopefully if everything has worked then the "Verification" line will say "OK".  If its not working as
       expected then you might see output like this instead:

        SSL handshake has read 4584 bytes and written 403 bytes
        Verification error: unable to get local issuer certificate

       The "unable to get local issuer certificate" error means that OpenSSL has been unable to find a trusted
       CA for the chain of certificates provided by the server in its trusted certificate store. Check your
       trusted certificate store configuration again.

       Note that s_client is a testing tool and will still allow you to connect to the TLS server regardless of
       the verification error. Most applications should not do this and should abort the connection in the event
       of a verification error.

IMPORTANT OBJECTS FOR AN OPENSSL TLS APPLICATION

       A TLS connection is represented by the SSL object in an OpenSSL based application. Once a connection with
       a remote peer has been established an endpoint can "write" data to the SSL object to send data to the
       peer, or "read" data from it to receive data from the server.

       A new SSL object is created from an SSL_CTX object. Think of an SSL_CTX as a "factory" for creating SSL
       objects. You can create a single SSL_CTX object and then create multiple connections (i.e. SSL objects)
       from it.  Typically you can set up common configuration options on the SSL_CTX so that all the SSL object
       created from it inherit the same configuration options.

       Note that internally to OpenSSL various items that are shared between multiple SSL objects are cached in
       the SSL_CTX for performance reasons. Therefore it is considered best practice to create one SSL_CTX for
       use by multiple SSL objects instead of having one SSL_CTX for each SSL object that you create.

       Each SSL object is also associated with two BIO objects. A BIO object is used for sending or receiving
       data from the underlying transport layer. For example you might create a BIO to represent a TCP socket.
       The SSL object uses one BIO for reading data and one BIO for writing data. In most cases you would use
       the same BIO for each direction but there could be some circumstances where you want them to be
       different.

       It is up to the application programmer to create the BIO objects that are needed and supply them to the
       SSL object. See ossl-guide-tls-client-block(7) for further information.

       Finally, an endpoint can establish a "session" with its peer. The session holds various TLS parameters
       about the connection between the client and the server.  The session details can then be reused in a
       subsequent connection attempt to speed up the process of connecting. This is known as "resumption".
       Sessions are represented in OpenSSL by the SSL_SESSION object. In TLSv1.2 there is always exactly one
       session per connection. In TLSv1.3 there can be any number per connection including none.

PHASES OF A TLS CONNECTION

       A TLS connection starts with an initial "set up" phase. The endpoint creates the SSL_CTX (if one has not
       already been created) and configures it.

       A client then creates an SSL object to represent the new TLS connection. Any connection specific
       configuration parameters are then applied and the underlying socket is created and associated with the
       SSL via BIO objects.

       A server will create a socket for listening for incoming connection attempts from clients. Once a
       connection attempt is made the server will create an SSL object in the same way as for a client and
       associate it with a BIO for the newly created incoming socket.

       After set up is complete the TLS "handshake" phase begins. A TLS handshake consists of the client and
       server exchanging a series of TLS handshake messages to establish the connection. The client starts by
       sending a "ClientHello" handshake message and the server responds with a "ServerHello". The handshake is
       complete once an endpoint has sent its last message (known as the "Finished" message) and received a
       Finished message from its peer. Note that this might occur at slightly different times for each peer. For
       example in TLSv1.3 the server always sends its Finished message before the client. The client later
       responds with its Finished message. At this point the client has completed the handshake because it has
       both sent and received a Finished message. The server has sent its Finished message but the Finished
       message from the client may still be in-flight, so the server is still in the handshake phase. It is even
       possible that the server will fail to complete the handshake (if it considers there is some problem with
       the messages sent from the client), even though the client may have already progressed to sending
       application data. In TLSv1.2 this can happen the other way around, i.e. the server finishes first and the
       client finishes second.

       Once the handshake is complete the application data transfer phase begins.  Strictly speaking there are
       some situations where the client can start sending application data even earlier (using the TLSv1.3
       "early data" capability) - but we're going to skip over that for this basic introduction.

       During application data transfer the client and server can read and write data to the connection freely.
       The details of this are typically left to some higher level application protocol (for example HTTP). Not
       all information exchanged during this phase is application data. Some protocol level messages may still
       be exchanged - so it is not necessarily the case that, just because the underlying socket is "readable",
       that application data will be available to read.

       When the connection is no longer required then it should be shutdown. A shutdown may be initiated by
       either the client or the server via a message known as a "close_notify" alert. The client or server that
       receives a close_notify may respond with one and then the connection is fully closed and application data
       can no longer be sent or received.

       Once shutdown is complete a TLS application must clean up by freeing the SSL object.

FURTHER READING

       See ossl-guide-tls-client-block(7) to see an example of applying these concepts in order to write a
       simple TLS client based on a blocking socket.  See ossl-guide-quic-introduction(7) for an introduction to
       QUIC in OpenSSL.

SEE ALSO

       ossl-guide-introduction(7), ossl-guide-libraries-introduction(7), ossl-guide-libssl-introduction(7),
       ossl-guide-tls-client-block(7), ossl-guide-quic-introduction(7)

COPYRIGHT

       Copyright 2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use this file except in compliance
       with the License.  You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
       <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.