plucky (2) openat2.2.gz

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NAME

       openat2 - open and possibly create a file (extended)

LIBRARY

       Standard C library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS

       #include <fcntl.h>          /* Definition of O_* and S_* constants */
       #include <linux/openat2.h>  /* Definition of RESOLVE_* constants */
       #include <sys/syscall.h>    /* Definition of SYS_* constants */
       #include <unistd.h>

       long syscall(SYS_openat2, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
                    struct open_how *how, size_t size);

       Note: glibc provides no wrapper for openat2(), necessitating the use of syscall(2).

DESCRIPTION

       The openat2() system call is an extension of openat(2) and provides a superset of its functionality.

       The openat2() system call opens the file specified by pathname.  If the specified file does not exist, it
       may optionally (if O_CREAT is specified in how.flags) be created.

       As with openat(2), if pathname is a relative pathname, then it is interpreted relative to  the  directory
       referred  to  by  the  file descriptor dirfd (or the current working directory of the calling process, if
       dirfd is the special value AT_FDCWD).  If pathname is an absolute pathname, then dirfd is ignored (unless
       how.resolve contains RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, in which case pathname is resolved relative to dirfd).

       Rather  than  taking a single flags argument, an extensible structure (how) is passed to allow for future
       extensions.  The size argument must be specified as sizeof(struct open_how).

   The open_how structure
       The how argument specifies how pathname should be opened, and acts as a superset of the  flags  and  mode
       arguments   to   openat(2).   This  argument  is  a  pointer  to  an  open_how  structure,  described  in
       open_how(2type).

       Any future extensions to openat2() will be implemented as new fields appended to the open_how  structure,
       with  a zero value in a new field resulting in the kernel behaving as though that extension field was not
       present.   Therefore,  the  caller  must  zero-fill  this  structure   on   initialization.    (See   the
       "Extensibility" section of the NOTES for more detail on why this is necessary.)

       The fields of the open_how structure are as follows:

       flags  This field specifies the file creation and file status flags to use when opening the file.  All of
              the O_* flags defined for openat(2) are valid openat2() flag values.

              Whereas openat(2) ignores unknown bits in its  flags  argument,  openat2()  returns  an  error  if
              unknown or conflicting flags are specified in how.flags.

       mode   This  field  specifies the mode for the new file, with identical semantics to the mode argument of
              openat(2).

              Whereas openat(2) ignores bits other than those in the range 07777 in its mode argument, openat2()
              returns  an  error if how.mode contains bits other than 07777.  Similarly, an error is returned if
              openat2() is called with a nonzero how.mode and how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

       resolve
              This is a bit-mask of flags that modify the way in  which  all  components  of  pathname  will  be
              resolved.  (See path_resolution(7) for background information.)

              The  primary use case for these flags is to allow trusted programs to restrict how untrusted paths
              (or paths inside untrusted directories) are resolved.  The  full  list  of  resolve  flags  is  as
              follows:

              RESOLVE_BENEATH
                     Do  not  permit  the path resolution to succeed if any component of the resolution is not a
                     descendant of the directory indicated by dirfd.  This causes absolute symbolic  links  (and
                     absolute values of pathname) to be rejected.

                     Currently,  this  flag  also disables magic-link resolution (see below).  However, this may
                     change in the future.  Therefore, to ensure that magic links are not resolved,  the  caller
                     should explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

              RESOLVE_IN_ROOT
                     Treat  the  directory  referred to by dirfd as the root directory while resolving pathname.
                     Absolute symbolic links are interpreted relative  to  dirfd.   If  a  prefix  component  of
                     pathname  equates  to dirfd, then an immediately following .. component likewise equates to
                     dirfd (just as /.. is traditionally equivalent to /).  If pathname is an absolute path,  it
                     is also interpreted relative to dirfd.

                     The  effect  of  this  flag  is  as  though  the  calling  process  had  used  chroot(2) to
                     (temporarily) modify its root directory (to the directory referred to by dirfd).   However,
                     unlike   chroot(2)   (which  changes  the  filesystem  root  permanently  for  a  process),
                     RESOLVE_IN_ROOT allows a program to efficiently restrict  path  resolution  on  a  per-open
                     basis.

                     Currently,  this flag also disables magic-link resolution.  However, this may change in the
                     future.  Therefore, to ensure  that  magic  links  are  not  resolved,  the  caller  should
                     explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

              RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS
                     Disallow all magic-link resolution during path resolution.

                     Magic links are symbolic link-like objects that are most notably found in proc(5); examples
                     include /proc/pid/exe and /proc/pid/fd/*.  (See symlink(7) for more details.)

                     Unknowingly opening magic links can be risky for some applications.  Examples of such risks
                     include the following:

                     •  If  the  process  opening  a  pathname  is  a  controlling process that currently has no
                        controlling terminal (see credentials(7)), then opening a magic link inside /proc/pid/fd
                        that  happens  to  refer  to a terminal would cause the process to acquire a controlling
                        terminal.

                     •  In a containerized environment, a magic link inside /proc may refer to an object outside
                        the container, and thus may provide a means to escape from the container.

                     Because of such risks, an application may prefer to disable magic link resolution using the
                     RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS flag.

                     If the trailing component (i.e.,  basename)  of  pathname  is  a  magic  link,  how.resolve
                     contains  RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS, and how.flags contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW, then an
                     O_PATH file descriptor referencing the magic link will be returned.

              RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS
                     Disallow resolution  of  symbolic  links  during  path  resolution.   This  option  implies
                     RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

                     If  the  trailing  component  (i.e.,  basename) of pathname is a symbolic link, how.resolve
                     contains RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and how.flags contains both O_PATH and  O_NOFOLLOW,  then  an
                     O_PATH file descriptor referencing the symbolic link will be returned.

                     Note  that  the  effect  of  the  RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS  flag, which affects the treatment of
                     symbolic links in all of the components  of  pathname,  differs  from  the  effect  of  the
                     O_NOFOLLOW  file creation flag (in how.flags), which affects the handling of symbolic links
                     only in the final component of pathname.

                     Applications that employ the RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS  flag  are  encouraged  to  make  its  use
                     configurable  (unless  it  is  used for a specific security purpose), as symbolic links are
                     very widely used by end-users.  Setting this flag indiscriminately—i.e., for  purposes  not
                     specifically related to security—for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors on
                     previously functional systems.  This may occur if, for example, a system pathname  that  is
                     used by an application is modified (e.g., in a new distribution release) so that a pathname
                     component (now) contains a symbolic link.

              RESOLVE_NO_XDEV
                     Disallow traversal of mount points during path  resolution  (including  all  bind  mounts).
                     Consequently,  pathname  must  either  be on the same mount as the directory referred to by
                     dirfd, or on the same mount as the current working  directory  if  dirfd  is  specified  as
                     AT_FDCWD.

                     Applications  that  employ  the  RESOLVE_NO_XDEV  flag  are  encouraged  to  make  its  use
                     configurable (unless it is used for a specific security purpose), as bind mounts are widely
                     used  by end-users.  Setting this flag indiscriminately—i.e., for purposes not specifically
                     related to security—for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors  on  previously
                     functional  systems.   This may occur if, for example, a system pathname that is used by an
                     application is modified (e.g., in a new distribution release) so that a pathname  component
                     (now) contains a bind mount.

              RESOLVE_CACHED
                     Make the open operation fail unless all path components are already present in the kernel's
                     lookup cache.  If any kind of  revalidation  or  I/O  is  needed  to  satisfy  the  lookup,
                     openat2()  fails  with the error EAGAIN.  This is useful in providing a fast-path open that
                     can be performed  without  resorting  to  thread  offload,  or  other  mechanisms  that  an
                     application might use to offload slower operations.

              If any bits other than those listed above are set in how.resolve, an error is returned.

RETURN VALUE

       On  success,  a  new file descriptor is returned.  On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set to indicate
       the error.

ERRORS

       The set of errors returned by openat2() includes all of the errors returned by openat(2), as well as  the
       following additional errors:

       E2BIG  An  extension  that  this  kernel does not support was specified in how.  (See the "Extensibility"
              section of NOTES for more detail on how extensions are handled.)

       EAGAIN how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and the kernel  could  not  ensure
              that a ".." component didn't escape (due to a race condition or potential attack).  The caller may
              choose to retry the openat2() call.

       EAGAIN RESOLVE_CACHED was set, and the open operation cannot be performed using only cached  information.
              The caller should retry without RESOLVE_CACHED set in how.resolve.

       EINVAL An unknown flag or invalid value was specified in how.

       EINVAL mode is nonzero, but how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

       EINVAL size was smaller than any known version of struct open_how.

       ELOOP  how.resolve  contains  RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and one of the path components was a symbolic link (or
              magic link).

       ELOOP  how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS, and one of the path components was a magic link.

       EXDEV  how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and an escape from the root during
              path resolution was detected.

       EXDEV  how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_XDEV, and a path component crosses a mount point.

STANDARDS

       Linux.

HISTORY

       Linux 5.6.

       The semantics of RESOLVE_BENEATH were modeled after FreeBSD's O_BENEATH.

NOTES

   Extensibility
       In  order to allow for future extensibility, openat2() requires the user-space application to specify the
       size of the open_how structure that it is passing.  By providing this information,  it  is  possible  for
       openat2()  to provide both forwards- and backwards-compatibility, with size acting as an implicit version
       number.  (Because new extension fields will always be appended, the structure size will always increase.)
       This   extensibility   design   is   very  similar  to  other  system  calls  such  as  sched_setattr(2),
       perf_event_open(2), and clone3(2).

       If we let usize be the size of the structure as specified by the user-space application, and ksize be the
       size of the structure which the kernel supports, then there are three cases to consider:

       •  If ksize equals usize, then there is no version mismatch and how can be used verbatim.

       •  If ksize is larger than usize, then there are some extension fields that the kernel supports which the
          user-space application is unaware of.  Because a zero value in any added extension field  signifies  a
          no-op,  the  kernel  treats  all of the extension fields not provided by the user-space application as
          having zero values.  This provides backwards-compatibility.

       •  If ksize is smaller than usize, then there are some extension fields which the user-space  application
          is  aware  of  but  which the kernel does not support.  Because any extension field must have its zero
          values signify a no-op, the kernel can safely ignore the unsupported extension fields if they are all-
          zero.  If any unsupported extension fields are nonzero, then -1 is returned and errno is set to E2BIG.
          This provides forwards-compatibility.

       Because the definition of struct open_how may change in the future (with  new  fields  being  added  when
       system  headers  are  updated),  user-space  applications should zero-fill struct open_how to ensure that
       recompiling the program with new headers will not result in spurious errors at run  time.   The  simplest
       way is to use a designated initializer:

           struct open_how how = { .flags = O_RDWR,
                                   .resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT };

       or explicitly using memset(3) or similar:

           struct open_how how;
           memset(&how, 0, sizeof(how));
           how.flags = O_RDWR;
           how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT;

       A  user-space application that wishes to determine which extensions the running kernel supports can do so
       by conducting a binary search on size with a structure which has every byte nonzero (to find the  largest
       value which doesn't produce an error of E2BIG).

SEE ALSO

       openat(2), open_how(2type), path_resolution(7), symlink(7)