Provided by: libapparmor-dev_2.10.95-0ubuntu2.12_amd64 bug


       aa_stack_profile, aa_stack_onexec - combine multiple profiles to confine a task


       #include <sys/apparmor.h>

       int aa_stack_profile(const char *profile);

       int aa_stack_onexec(const char *profile);

       Link with -lapparmor when compiling.


       AppArmor supports stacking two or more profiles when confining a task. The result is an
       intersection of all profiles which are stacked. Stacking profiles together is desirable
       when wanting to ensure that confinement will never become more permissive. When changing
       between two profiles, as performed with aa_change_profile(2), there is always the
       possibility that the new profile is more permissive than the old profile but that
       possibility is eliminated when using aa_stack_profile().

       To stack a profile with the current confinement context, a task can use the
       aa_stack_profile() function. The profile parameter is a NUL-terminated string indicating a
       profile name that should be stacked with the current confinement.

       Calling aa_stack_profile("profile_a") while unconfined is equivalent to calling
       aa_change_profile("profile_a") since the intersection of unconfined and "profile_a" is
       "profile_a". Calling aa_stack_profile("profile_b") while confined by "profile_a" results
       in the task's confinement to be the intersection of "profile_a" and "profile_b". The
       resulting confinement context will be represented as "profile_a//&profile_b" in audit log
       messages, the return value of aa_getcon(2), etc.

       Confined programs wanting to use aa_stack_profile() need to have rules permitting stacking
       the named profile. See apparmor.d(8) for details.

       Open file descriptors may not be remediated after a call to aa_stack_profile() so the
       calling program must close(2) open file descriptors to ensure they are not available after
       calling aa_stack_profile().

       The aa_stack_onexec() function is like the aa_stack_profile() function except it specifies
       that the stacking should take place on the next exec instead of immediately. The delayed
       profile change takes precedence over any exec transition rules within the confining
       profile. Delaying the stacking boundary has a couple of advantages, it removes the need
       for stub transition profiles and the exec boundary is a natural security layer where
       potentially sensitive memory is unmapped.


       On success zero is returned. On error, -1 is returned, and errno(3) is set appropriately.


           AppArmor is not loaded, neither a profile nor a namespace was specified, or the
           communication via the /proc/*/attr/current file did not conform to protocol.

           Insufficient kernel memory was available.

           The specified profile does not exist, or is not visible from the current namespace.


       Using aa_stack_profile() and related libapparmor functions are the only way to ensure
       compatibility between varying kernel versions. However, there may be some situations where
       libapparmor is not available and directly interacting with the AppArmor filesystem is
       required to stack a profile.

       To immediately stack a profile named "profile_a", as performed with
       aa_stack_profile("profile_a"), the equivalent of this shell command can be used:

        $ echo -n "stackprofile profile_a" > /proc/self/attr/current

       To stack a profile named "profile_a" at the next exec, as performed with
       aa_stack_onexec("profile_a"), the equivalent of this shell command can be used:

        $ echo -n "stackexec profile_a" > /proc/self/attr/exec

       These raw AppArmor filesystem operations must only be used when using libapparmor is not a
       viable option.


       The following example shows a simple, if contrived, use of aa_stack_profile().

        #include <stdlib.h>
        #include <string.h>
        #include <sys/apparmor.h>
        #include <sys/types.h>
        #include <sys/stat.h>
        #include <fcntl.h>
        #include <stdio.h>
        #include <unistd.h>

        static void read_passwd()
                int fd;
                char buf[10];

                if ((fd=open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
                       perror("Failure opening /etc/passwd");

                /* Verify that we can read /etc/passwd */
                memset(&buf, 0, 10);
                if (read(fd, &buf, 10) == -1) {
                        perror("Failure reading /etc/passwd");
                buf[9] = '\0';
                printf("/etc/passwd: %s\n", buf);

        int main(int argc, char * argv[])
                printf("Before aa_stack_profile():\n");

                /* stack the "i_cant_be_trusted_anymore" profile, which
                 * should not have read access to /etc/passwd. */
                if (aa_stack_profile("i_cant_be_trusted_anymore") < 0) {
                    perror("Failure changing profile -- aborting");

                printf("After aa_stack_profile():\n");

       This code example requires a profile similar to the following to be loaded with

        # Confine stack_p to be able to read /etc/passwd and aa_stack_profile()
        # to the 'i_cant_be_trusted_anymore' profile.
        /tmp/stack_p {
            /etc/          mr,
            /lib/ld-*.so*             mrix,
            /lib/libc*.so*            mr,

            /etc/passwd               r,

            # Needed for aa_stack_profile()
            /usr/lib/libapparmor*.so* mr,
            /proc/[0-9]*/attr/current w,

       As well as the profile to stack:

        profile i_cant_be_trusted_anymore {
            /etc/      mr,
            /lib/ld-*.so*         mrix,
            /lib/libc*.so*        mr,

       The output when run:

        $ /tmp/stack_p
        Before aa_stack_profile():
        /etc/passwd: root:x:0:
        After aa_stack_profile():
        Failure opening /etc/passwd: Permission denied


       None known. If you find any, please report them at
       <>. Note that using aa_stack_profile(2)
       without execve(2) provides no memory barriers between different areas of a program; if
       address space separation is required, then separate processes should be used.


       apparmor(7), apparmor.d(5), apparmor_parser(8), aa_change_profile(2), aa_getcon(2) and