Provided by: manpages-dev_6.15-1_all bug

NAME

       openat2 - open and possibly create a file (extended)

LIBRARY

       Standard C library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS

       #include <fcntl.h>          /* Definition of O_* and S_* constants */
       #include <linux/openat2.h>  /* Definition of RESOLVE_* constants */
       #include <sys/syscall.h>    /* Definition of SYS_* constants */
       #include <unistd.h>

       long syscall(SYS_openat2, int dirfd, const char *path,
                    struct open_how *how, size_t size);

       Note: glibc provides no wrapper for openat2(), necessitating the use of syscall(2).

DESCRIPTION

       The openat2() system call is an extension of openat(2) and provides a superset of its functionality.

       The openat2() system call opens the file specified by path.  If the specified file does not exist, it may
       optionally (if O_CREAT is specified in how.flags) be created.

       As  with  openat(2), if path is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the directory referred to by
       the file descriptor dirfd (or the current working directory of the  calling  process,  if  dirfd  is  the
       special  value  AT_FDCWD).   If  path  is  absolute,  then  dirfd is ignored (unless how.resolve contains
       RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, in which case path is resolved relative to dirfd).

       Rather than taking a single flags argument, an extensible structure (how) is passed to allow  for  future
       extensions.  The size argument must be specified as sizeof(struct open_how).

   The open_how structure
       The  how  argument  specifies  how  path  should  be opened, and acts as a superset of the flags and mode
       arguments  to  openat(2).   This  argument  is  a  pointer  to  an  open_how  structure,   described   in
       open_how(2type).

       Any  future extensions to openat2() will be implemented as new fields appended to the open_how structure,
       with a zero value in a new field resulting in the kernel behaving as though that extension field was  not
       present.    Therefore,   the   caller   must  zero-fill  this  structure  on  initialization.   (See  the
       "Extensibility" section of the NOTES for more detail on why this is necessary.)

       The fields of the open_how structure are as follows:

       flags  This field specifies the file creation and file status flags to use when opening the file.  All of
              the O_* flags defined for openat(2) are valid openat2() flag values.

              Whereas openat(2) ignores unknown bits in its  flags  argument,  openat2()  returns  an  error  if
              unknown or conflicting flags are specified in how.flags.

       mode   This  field  specifies the mode for the new file, with identical semantics to the mode argument of
              openat(2).

              Whereas openat(2) ignores bits other than those in the range 07777 in its mode argument, openat2()
              returns an error if how.mode contains bits other than 07777.  Similarly, an error is  returned  if
              openat2() is called with a nonzero how.mode and how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

       resolve
              This  is a bit-mask of flags that modify the way in which all components of path will be resolved.
              (See path_resolution(7) for background information.)

              The primary use case for these flags is to allow trusted programs to restrict how untrusted  paths
              (or  paths  inside  untrusted  directories)  are  resolved.   The full list of resolve flags is as
              follows:

              RESOLVE_BENEATH
                     Do not permit the path resolution to succeed if any component of the resolution  is  not  a
                     descendant  of  the directory indicated by dirfd.  This causes absolute symbolic links (and
                     absolute values of path) to be rejected.

                     Currently, this flag also disables magic-link resolution (see below).   However,  this  may
                     change  in  the future.  Therefore, to ensure that magic links are not resolved, the caller
                     should explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

              RESOLVE_IN_ROOT
                     Treat the directory referred to by dirfd  as  the  root  directory  while  resolving  path.
                     Absolute  symbolic  links are interpreted relative to dirfd.  If a prefix component of path
                     equates to dirfd, then an immediately following ..  component  likewise  equates  to  dirfd
                     (just  as  /..  is  traditionally  equivalent  to  /).   If  path  is  absolute, it is also
                     interpreted relative to dirfd.

                     The effect  of  this  flag  is  as  though  the  calling  process  had  used  chroot(2)  to
                     (temporarily)  modify its root directory (to the directory referred to by dirfd).  However,
                     unlike  chroot(2)  (which  changes  the  filesystem  root  permanently  for   a   process),
                     RESOLVE_IN_ROOT  allows  a  program  to  efficiently restrict path resolution on a per-open
                     basis.

                     Currently, this flag also disables magic-link resolution.  However, this may change in  the
                     future.   Therefore,  to  ensure  that  magic  links  are  not  resolved, the caller should
                     explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

              RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS
                     Disallow all magic-link resolution during path resolution.

                     Magic links are symbolic link-like objects that are most notably found in proc(5); examples
                     include /proc/pid/exe and /proc/pid/fd/*.  (See symlink(7) for more details.)

                     Unknowingly opening magic links can be risky for some applications.  Examples of such risks
                     include the following:

                     •  If the process opening a pathname  is  a  controlling  process  that  currently  has  no
                        controlling terminal (see credentials(7)), then opening a magic link inside /proc/pid/fd
                        that  happens  to  refer  to a terminal would cause the process to acquire a controlling
                        terminal.

                     •  In a containerized environment, a magic link inside /proc may refer to an object outside
                        the container, and thus may provide a means to escape from the container.

                     Because of such risks, an application may prefer to disable magic link resolution using the
                     RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS flag.

                     If the trailing component (i.e., basename) of path is a magic  link,  how.resolve  contains
                     RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,  and  how.flags  contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW, then an O_PATH
                     file descriptor referencing the magic link will be returned.

              RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS
                     Disallow resolution  of  symbolic  links  during  path  resolution.   This  option  implies
                     RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

                     If the trailing component (i.e., basename) of path is a symbolic link, how.resolve contains
                     RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and how.flags contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW, then an O_PATH file
                     descriptor referencing the symbolic link will be returned.

                     Note  that  the  effect  of  the  RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS  flag, which affects the treatment of
                     symbolic links in all of the components of path, differs from the effect of the  O_NOFOLLOW
                     file creation flag (in how.flags), which affects the handling of symbolic links only in the
                     final component of path.

                     Applications  that  employ  the  RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS  flag  are  encouraged to make its use
                     configurable (unless it is used for a specific security purpose),  as  symbolic  links  are
                     very  widely  used by end-users.  Setting this flag indiscriminately—i.e., for purposes not
                     specifically related to security—for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors on
                     previously functional systems.  This may occur if, for example, a system pathname  that  is
                     used by an application is modified (e.g., in a new distribution release) so that a pathname
                     component (now) contains a symbolic link.

              RESOLVE_NO_XDEV
                     Disallow  traversal  of  mount  points  during path resolution (including all bind mounts).
                     Consequently, path must either be on the same mount as the directory referred to by  dirfd,
                     or on the same mount as the current working directory if dirfd is specified as AT_FDCWD.

                     Applications  that  employ  the  RESOLVE_NO_XDEV  flag  are  encouraged  to  make  its  use
                     configurable (unless it is used for a specific security purpose), as bind mounts are widely
                     used by end-users.  Setting this flag indiscriminately—i.e., for purposes not  specifically
                     related  to  security—for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors on previously
                     functional systems.  This may occur if, for example, a system pathname that is used  by  an
                     application  is modified (e.g., in a new distribution release) so that a pathname component
                     (now) contains a bind mount.

              RESOLVE_CACHED
                     Make the open operation fail unless all path components are already present in the kernel's
                     lookup cache.  If any kind of  revalidation  or  I/O  is  needed  to  satisfy  the  lookup,
                     openat2()  fails  with the error EAGAIN.  This is useful in providing a fast-path open that
                     can be performed  without  resorting  to  thread  offload,  or  other  mechanisms  that  an
                     application might use to offload slower operations.

              If any bits other than those listed above are set in how.resolve, an error is returned.

RETURN VALUE

       On  success,  a  new file descriptor is returned.  On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set to indicate
       the error.

ERRORS

       The set of errors returned by openat2() includes all of the errors returned by openat(2), as well as  the
       following additional errors:

       E2BIG  An  extension  that  this  kernel does not support was specified in how.  (See the "Extensibility"
              section of NOTES for more detail on how extensions are handled.)

       EAGAIN how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and the kernel  could  not  ensure
              that a ".." component didn't escape (due to a race condition or potential attack).  The caller may
              choose to retry the openat2() call.

       EAGAIN RESOLVE_CACHED  was set, and the open operation cannot be performed using only cached information.
              The caller should retry without RESOLVE_CACHED set in how.resolve.

       EINVAL An unknown flag or invalid value was specified in how.

       EINVAL mode is nonzero, but how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

       EINVAL size was smaller than any known version of struct open_how.

       ELOOP  how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and one of the path components was a symbolic  link  (or
              magic link).

       ELOOP  how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS, and one of the path components was a magic link.

       EXDEV  how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and an escape from the root during
              path resolution was detected.

       EXDEV  how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_XDEV, and a path component crosses a mount point.

STANDARDS

       Linux.

HISTORY

       Linux 5.6.

       The semantics of RESOLVE_BENEATH were modeled after FreeBSD's O_BENEATH.

NOTES

   Extensibility
       In  order to allow for future extensibility, openat2() requires the user-space application to specify the
       size of the open_how structure that it is passing.  By providing this information,  it  is  possible  for
       openat2()  to provide both forwards- and backwards-compatibility, with size acting as an implicit version
       number.  (Because new extension fields will always be appended, the structure size will always increase.)
       This  extensibility  design  is  very  similar  to  other  system   calls   such   as   sched_setattr(2),
       perf_event_open(2), and clone3(2).

       If we let usize be the size of the structure as specified by the user-space application, and ksize be the
       size of the structure which the kernel supports, then there are three cases to consider:

       •  If ksize equals usize, then there is no version mismatch and how can be used verbatim.

       •  If ksize is larger than usize, then there are some extension fields that the kernel supports which the
          user-space  application  is unaware of.  Because a zero value in any added extension field signifies a
          no-op, the kernel treats all of the extension fields not provided by  the  user-space  application  as
          having zero values.  This provides backwards-compatibility.

       •  If  ksize is smaller than usize, then there are some extension fields which the user-space application
          is aware of but which the kernel does not support.  Because any extension field  must  have  its  zero
          values signify a no-op, the kernel can safely ignore the unsupported extension fields if they are all-
          zero.  If any unsupported extension fields are nonzero, then -1 is returned and errno is set to E2BIG.
          This provides forwards-compatibility.

       Because  the  definition  of  struct  open_how may change in the future (with new fields being added when
       system headers are updated), user-space applications should zero-fill  struct  open_how  to  ensure  that
       recompiling  the  program  with new headers will not result in spurious errors at run time.  The simplest
       way is to use a designated initializer:

           struct open_how how = { .flags = O_RDWR,
                                   .resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT };

       or explicitly using memset(3) or similar:

           struct open_how how;
           memset(&how, 0, sizeof(how));
           how.flags = O_RDWR;
           how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT;

       A user-space application that wishes to determine which extensions the running kernel supports can do  so
       by  conducting a binary search on size with a structure which has every byte nonzero (to find the largest
       value which doesn't produce an error of E2BIG).

SEE ALSO

       openat(2), open_how(2type), path_resolution(7), symlink(7)

Linux man-pages 6.15                               2025-05-17                                         openat2(2)